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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Nicole C Packer
vs.
Kingston Properties, L.P.,, DK
Enterprises, Inc., Riverbend
Communications, LLC, Riverbend
Communications Holding, Lie, Riverbend
Events

Supreme Court Case No. 46964-2019

CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL

Appeal from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District,
in and for the County of Bonneville

HONORABLE BRUCE L. PICKETT

Allen H. Browning

John A. Bailey and Donald F. Carey

Attorney for Appellant

Attorney for Respondents

Idaho Falls, ID

Pocatello/Idaho Falls, ID
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BONNEVILLE Cou TY DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CV-2017-7024
§
§
§
§
§

icole C Packer
vs.
Kingston Properties, L.P.,, DK Enterprises, Inc.,
Riverbend Communications, LLC, Riverbend
Communications Holding, Lie, Riverbend Events

Location: Bonneville County District
Court
Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L.
Filed on: 12/04/20 17
Previous Case Number: CV-2017-7024-OC

C..\Sl l :\'FORMATIO.' -

Bonds
Cash Bond
5/20/2019
Counts: 1

Case Type:

$26.65

AA- All Initial District Court
Filings (Not E, F, and HI)

Posted Cash
Case
Status: 12/12/2018 Closed

Cash Bond
5/20/20 19
Counts: 1

$18.95

Cash Bond
4/25/20 19
Counts: I

$200.00
Posted Cash

Cash Bond
4/25/2019
Counts: I

$100.00
Posted Cash

Cash Bond
4/25/2019
4/25/2019
Counts : I

$.00

Cash Bond
4/25/2019
4/25/2019
Counts: I

$.00

Case Flags: Physical File

Posted Cash

Posted Cash
Voided

Posted Cash
Voided

DATE

Current Case Assignment

Case Number
Court
Date Assigned
Judicial Officer

CV-201 7-7024
Bonnevi lle County District Court
12/04/2017
Pickett, Bruce L.

PARTY l.:\'FORMATIO;\

Lead A1torneys
Browning, Allen Harry
Retained
208-542-2700(W)

Plaintiff

Packer, Nicole C

Defendant

DK Enterprises, Inc.

Carey, Donald Francis
Retained
208-525-2604(W)

Kingston Properties, L.P.,

Carey, Donald Francis
Retained
208-525-2604(W)

Riverbend Communications Holding, Lie
Bailey, John A lbert, Jr

Riverbend Communications, LLC
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BONNEVILLE COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE

No. CV-2017-7024

Retained
208-233-200 I (W)

Riverbend Events
En::,... ~ & OROtRS OF TH E Conn

DATE

12/04/20 17

(ij Summons Issued (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L. )
X5 Summons Issued

12/04/20 17

New Case Filed Other Claims (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L.)
New Case Filed-Other Claims

12/04/20 17

Notice of Appearance (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L. )
Plaintiff Packer, Nicole C Notice Of Appearance Allen H. Browning

12/04/20 17

ffl Complaint Filed (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L. )
Complaint for Damages and Demand for Jury Trial Filed

12/04/2017

Initial Appearance (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L.)
Filing: AA- All initial c ivil case filings in District Court ofany type not listed in categories E,
F and/-/( /) Paid by: Browning, Allen H. (allorney for Packer, Nicole C) Receipt number:
00531 75 Dated: 12/4/2017 Amount.· $221.00 (Check) For: Packer, Nicole C (plaintiff)

12/04/20 17

Civi l Case Information Sheet (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L. )

05/18/2018

'm Notice of Appearance (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L.)
Defenda nt: Riverbend Communications, LLC Notice OfAppearance John A Bailey Jr

05/18/20 18

05/29/2018

Initial Appearance (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L. )
Filing: I I - Initial Appearance by p ersons other than the plaintiffor petitioner Paid by:
Riverbend Communications, LLC (defendant) Receipt number: 0020592 Dated: 5/ 18/2018
Amount: $ I 36. 00 (Credit card) For: River bend Communications Holding, lie (defendant)

ffl Notice of Service (Judicial Officer: Picken, Bruce L. )
Notice OfService Allen H. Browning, John A. Bailey , Jr. May 29, 2018

05/29/20 18

05/29/2018

Notice of Appearance (Judicial Officer: Picken, Bruce L. )
Defe ndant: Kingston Properties, L. P. , Notice Of Appearance Donald F Carey

ffl Answer (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L.)
Answer to Complaint

05/29/2018

05/30/2018

Notice of Appearance (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L. )
Defe ndant: DK Enterprises, Inc. Notice Of Appearance Donald F Carey

ffl Affidavit of Service (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L. )
Affidavit ofService - 5115/2018 - Riverbend Communications Holdings, LLC by serving David
Dance

05/30/20 18

'ffl Affidavit of Service (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L. )
Affidavit ofService - 5/ 1512018 - Riverbend Communications, LLC by serving David Dance

05/30/20 18

ffl Affidavit of Service (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L.)
Affidavit ofService - 5/ 1512018 - Riverbend Communications, LLC dba Riverbend Events by
serving David Dance

05/30/2018
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BON '[VI LLE Cou iTY DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CV-2017-7024

ffl Affidavit of Service (J udicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L. )
Affidavil ofService - 51/ 512018- Kingston Properties, L.P. by serving Janae Kingston
05/30/2018

ffl Affidavit of Service (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L. )
Affidavit ofService - 5/ 15/2018 - DK Enterprises, Inc. by serving Janae Kingston

05/30/2018

06/25/20 18

Initial Appearance (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L. )
by persons other than the plaintiffor petitioner Paid by: Carey Romankiw, PLLC Receipt
number. 0021881 Dated: 5130/20/8 Amount: $ /36.00 (Check) Filling II

ffl Stipulation (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L.)
Stipulated Dismissal Of Riverbend Communications Holdings, LLC and Riverbend
Communications dba Riverbend Events

07/ 17/2018

07/17/2018
07/ 19/2018

07/23/2018

Hearing Scheduled (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L.)
Hearing Scheduled (Status Conference 08106120 I8 09.· I 5 AM)

ffl Notice of Hearing (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L. )
Notice (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L. )
Notice of Law Firm Change

ffl Notice of Service (Judic ial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L. )
Notice OfService of Defendant Riverbend Communications, LLC's First Set of Interrogatories
and RequesJs for Production of Documents to the Plaintiff- Defendant Riverbend
Communications LLC

07/23/201 8

ffl Answer (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L. )
Defendant Riverbend Communications, LLC's Answer and Demand for Jury Trial

07/23/20 18

ffl Miscellaneous (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L. )
Written Notice Regarding Non-A vailability For Hearing

08/03/20 18

Continued (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L. )
Hearing result for Status Conference scheduled on 08/0612018 09: 15 AM: Continued

08/03/2018

Hearing Scheduled (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L.)
Hearing Scheduled (Status Conference 08/ 13/2018 08: 15 AM)

08/03/201 8
08/06/2018

08/13/2018

ffl Notice of Hearing (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L. )
Status Conference (9: 15 AM) (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L.)
Hearing result for Status Conference scheduled on 08/06/2018 09: 15 AM: Continued

ffl Minute Entry (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L. )
Minute Entry
Hearing type: Status Conference
Hearing date: 8/ / 3120/8
Time: 8:24 am
Courtroom:
Court reporter: Mary Fox
Minutes Clerk: Amanda Barnes
Tape Number:
Party: DK Enterprises, Inc., Attorney: Donald Carey
Party: Kingston Properties, L.P.,, Attorney: Donald Carey
Party: Nicole Packer, Attorney: Allen Browning
Party: Riverbend Communications Holding, Lie
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BONNEVILLE Cou TY DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CV-2017-7024
Party: Riverbend Communications, LLC, Attorney: John Bailey
Party: Riverbend Events

08/13/2018

DC Hearing Held: Court Reporter: # of Pages: (Judic ia l Officer: Pickett, Bruce L. )
I-fearing result/or Status Conference scheduled on 08/ 13/2018 08: 15 AM: Dislrict Court
I-fearing Held
Court Reporter: Mary Fox
Number a/Transcript Pages/or this hearing estimated: Tippi 208-244-2820 Under 50

08/13/2018

Hearing Scheduled (Jud icial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L.)
I-fearing Scheduled (Pretrial Conference 12/ 13/2018 09:30 AM)

08/ 13/20 18

Hearing Scheduled (Judicial Offi cer: Pickett, Bruce L.)
I-fearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 0//07120/9 10:00 AM)

08/ 13/20 18

ffl

08/13/2018

ffl O rder (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L. )

otice (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L.)
Notice ofAlternate Judges

Jury Trial Scheduling Order

08/ 13/20 18

08/ 14/2018

Status Conference (8: 15 AM) (Judicial Offi cer: Pickett, Bruce L.)
Tippi 208-244-2820 I-fearing result for Status Conference scheduled on 0811312018 08: 15 AM:
District Court Hearing 1-fe/d
Court Reporter: Mary Fox
Number a/Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated:

ffl Notice of Service (Judicial Offi cer: Pickett, Bruce L. )
Plaintiffs Notice OfService - Plaintiffs Witness Disclosure

08/23/2018

ffl Notice of Service (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L. )
Plaintiffs Notice OfService John A. Bailey R. August 22, 20/8

08/23/2018

ffl Notice (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L. )
Notice of Deposition - Nicole Pakcer

09/ 12/2018

ffl

09/17/20 18

ffl Stipulation (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L. )

otice (Judicial Officer: Pickett. Bruce L.)
Amended Notice of Deposition Nicole Packer

Stipulation To Continue Expert Witness D isclosure Deadline

09/21 /20 18

ffl O rder (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L.)
Order to Continue Expert Witness Disclosure Deadline

09/28/20 18

10/09/20 18

Heari ng Scheduled (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L. )
I-fearing Scheduled (Motion I /108/2018 10:00 AM) MSJ

~ Motion for Summary Judgment
Def Kingston's MSJ

10/09/20 18

~ Memorandum In Support of Motion
Def Kingston Memo in Support of MSJ

10/09/20 18

'ffl Affidavit
PAGE40F9
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BONNEVI LLE COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CV-2017-7024
of DFC in Support of MSJ
10/09/2018

ffl Affidavit
ofSommers in Support of MSJ

10/09/20 18

ffl Motion for Summary Judgment
Riverbend's Motion/or Summary Judgment

10/09/2018

ffl Memorandum In Support of Motion
Riverbend's Memorandum in Support of Motion/or Summary Judgment

10/09/2018

ffl Affidavit
Affidavit ofJohn Bailey in Support of Riverbend's Motion/or Summary Judgment

10/09/2018

ffl

I 0/10/ 20 18

ffl Notice of Hearing

otice of Hearing
Notice of Hearing regarding Riverbend's Motion/or Summary Judgment

Def Kingston 's Notice ofHearing/or MSJ
I 0/25/20 18

ffl Memorandum
in Opposition to Summary Judgment

I 0/25/20 18

ffl Brief Filed
Plaintiff's Briefin Opposition to Motions for Summary Judgment By Riverbend
Communications Holding, LLC, and Riverbend Communications LLC.

10/25/2018

ffl Affidavit
of PlaintiffNicole Packer

10/26/20 18

ffl Notice of Service
Plaintiff's Notice ofService - Kingston Properties, LP

10/26/20 18

ffl Notice of Service
Plaintiff's Notice ofService - Riverbend Communications, LLC

I 0/30/20 18

'ffl Notice of Service of Discovery Requests

I 0/30/ 2018

ffl Amended
Plaintiffs Amended Notice ofService

I 0/30/2018

ffl Amended
Plaintiffs Amended Notice ofService

11 /0 1/20 18

11 /01 /20 18

fflMotion
Defendants', Riverbend Communications, LLC And Riverbend Communications Holding, LLC,
Motion To Strike Affidaivt Of PlaintiffNicole Packer

ffl Memorandum In Support of Motion
Defendants', Riverbend Communications, LLC And Riverbend Communications Holding, LLC
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike Affidavit of Plaintiff Nicole Packer
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BONNEV ILLE COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

C ASE SUMMARY
CASE No . CV-201 7-7024
11/01/20 18

ffl Reply
Defendants', Riverbend Communications, LLC And Riverbend Communications Holding, LLC
Reply Brief Re: Motion For Summary Judgment

11/01 /2018

ffl Affidavit
Supplemental Affidavit ofJohn A. Bailey, Jr in Support of Riverbend Communications, LLC's
Motion for Summary Judgment

11 /0 1/20 18

ffl Notice of Hearing
On Defendants' Motion To Strike Affidavit Of Plaintiff Nicole Packer

11 /01 /20 18

ffl Affidavit
Reply Affidavit OfJohn A. Bailey, Jr In Support Of Defendant's Motion/or Summary Judgmen
and Motion to Strike Plaintiff's Affidavit

11/07/2018

'ffl Brief Filed
Plaintiff's second Briefin Opposition to Motions for Summary Judgment By Riverbend
Communications ZHolding, LLC, and Riverbend Communications LLC.

11/07/2018

ffl Brief Filed
Plaintiff's Brief in Opposition to Motion to Strkike Affidavit ofNicole Packer

11/08/2018

QJ Motion Hearing ( I 0:00 AM)

(Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L.)

MSJ
11/08/20 18
11 /08/2018

ffl Court Minutes
Case Taken Under Advisement

11/09/2018

ffl Witness Disclosure
Defe ndant Kingston's Trial Witness Disclosure

11 /20/20 18

ffl Notice
Riverbend's Fact and E.:xpert Witness Disclosure

11/28/20 18

ffl Notice of Service
11128/20/8

11 /30/2018

ffl Decision or Opinion
Memorandum Decision on Defendant Kingston's Motion for Summary Judgment

11/30/2018

ffl Decision or Opinion
Memorandum Decision on Defendanl Riverbend's Motion for Summary Judgment

11 /30/2018

ffl Deci sion or Opinion
Memorandum Decision on Defendants Motion to Strike Affidavit

12/10/2018

12/ 10/2018

fflMotion
Motion for Costs and Fees

ffl Affidavit
Affidavit and Memorandum ofCosts and Fees

PAGE60F9
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B O NEVILLE C OUNTY DISTRICT C OURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE No . CV-2017-7024
12/ 11/20 18

ffl Judgment
to Dismiss with Prejudice

12/ 11/20 18

ffl Order
of Dismissal

12/12/2018

Dismissed With Preju dice (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L.)
Comment()
Party (Kingston Properties, L.P.,; DK Enterprises, Inc. ; Packer, Nicole C; Riverbend
Communications, LLC; Riverbend Communications Holding, Lie; Riverbend Events)
Monetary/Property A ward
In Favor Of: Packer, Nicole C
Against: Kingston Properties, L.P.,; DK Enterprises, Inc.; Riverbend
Communications, LLC; Riverbend Communications Holding, Lie; Riverbend
Events
Entered Date: I 2/ 12/20 I 8
Current Judgment Status:
Status: Active
Status Date: 12/12/20 I 8

I 2/ 12/2018

C ivil Disposition Entered

12/13/2018

CANCELED Pre-trial Conference (9:30 AM) (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L.)
Vacated

12/ 14/2018

ffl Judgment of Dismissal

12/ 14/2018

ffl Notice of Hearing
Notice of Hearing on Defendant's Motion for Costs and Fees

12/14/20 18

ffl Motion
for Costs and Fees

12/ 14/20 18

ffl Memorandum of Costs & Attorney Fees
Affidavit and Memorandum of Costs and Fees

12/ 24/20 18

12/ 24/20 18

'fflobjection
Plaintiffs Objection to Attorney's Fees and Costs

ffl Motion
Plaintiff's Motion to Reconsider

12/24/2018

ffl Memorandum In Support of Motion
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Reconsider

0 1/03/20 19

~ Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs (10:30 AM) (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L.)

0 1/03/20 19

ffl Court Minutes

01 /03/20 19

ffl Objection
to Allorneys Fees and Costs

0 1/04/20 19

ffl Notice of Hearing
PAGE 7 OF9
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BONNEVILLE COUNTY DISTRICT C OURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CV-2017-7024
0 1/04/2019

ffl Amended
Amended Notice of Hearing

0 1/07/20 19

0 1/07/20 19

CANCELED Jury Trial ( 10:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L.)
Vacated

ffl Notice of Hearing
Nol ice ofHearing on Plaintiff's Motion/or Reconsideration

0 1/22/20 19

ffl Decision or Opinion
Memorandum Decision on Defendant Riverbend's Motion/or Attorney's Fees and Costs

0 1/24/20 19

ffl Memorandum
Decision on Defendanl Kingslon 's Mo/ion /or Attorney's Fees and Cos/s

0 1/31 /20 19

ffl Opposition to
Riverbend Communicalion's Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to Reconsider

02/06/2019

ffl Memorandum In Support of Motion
10 Reconsider

02/07/2019

6:) Motion for Reconsideration ( I :30 PM)

02/07/20 19

ffl Court Minutes

02/07/20 19

02/28/20 19

(Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L.)

Memorandum In Support of Motion
Reply Memorandum in Supporl ofMotion to Reconsider

ffl Decision or Opinion
Memorandum Decision on Plainlijfs' Motion/or Reconsideration

04/ 11/20 19

ffl Notice
ofAppeal

04/22/20 19

ffl Notice
Riverbend Communication's Request /or Addi1ional Clerk's Record on Appeal

04/25/20 19

Bond Posted - Cash

04/25/20 19

Bond Posted - Cash

04/25/20 19

Bond Posted - Cash

04/25/20 19

Bond Voided

04/25/2019

Bond Voided

04/25/20 19

Bond Posted - Cash

05/ 17/2019
05/20/20 19

'ffl Appeal Coverffitle Page
Bond Posted - Cash

PAGE80F9
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B ONNEVILLE C OUNTY DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CV-2017-7024
05/20/20 19

Bond Posted - Cash

07/ 16/20 19

/I Transcript Lodged

07/ 16/20 19

~ Transcript Fi led

07/ 16/20 19

ffl Clerk's Certificate of Appeal

DATE

fl'\A ,\ Cl.\l. l !\'FOR'.\1ATIO'\

Attorn ey of Reco rd Browning, Allen Harry
Total Charges
Tota l Payments and Credits
Ba lance Due as of 7/16/2019

3.00
3.00
0.00

Defendant Kingston Properties, L.P.,
Total Charges
Tota l Payments and Credits
Balance Due as of 7/ 16/2019

143.00
143.00
0.00

Defendant Riverbend Communications Holding, Lie
Total Charges
Total Payments and Credits
Balance Due as of 7/ 16/2019

139.00
139.00
0.00

Defendant Ri verbend Communications, LLC
Total Charges
Total Payments and Credits
Ba lance Due as of 7/16/2019
Pla intiff Packer, Nicole C
Total Charges
Total Payments and Credits
Ba lance Due as of 7/16/2019

3.00
3.00
0.00

350.00
350.00
0.00

Defendant Riverbend Communications, LLC
Civil Cash Bond Account Type Balance as of 7/ 16/2019

26.65

Plaintiff Packer, Nicole C
Civil Cash Bond Account Type Balance as of 7/ 16/2019

0.00

Pla intiff Packer, Nicole C
Civil Cash Bond Account Type Balance as of 7/16/2019

0.00

Plaintiff Packer, N icole C
Civil Cash Bond Account Type Balance as of 7/16/20 19

100.00

Plaintiff Packer, Nicole C
Civil Cash Bond Account Type Balance as of 7/16/2019

200.00

Plaintiff Packer, Nicole C
Civil Cash Bond Account Type Balance as of 7/ 16/20 19

18.95

PAGE 90F9
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Case Assigned
Judge Bruce Pickett

'

Allen H. Browning, ISB#3007
Steve Carpenter, ISB#9132
BROWNING LAW
482 Constitution Way, Suite 111
Idaho Falls, ID 83402
Telephone: (208) 542-2700
Facsimile: (208) 542-2711
Email: allen.browning.la w@gmail.com

2017 GEt: -4 PH 3: 39

Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE

NICOLE PACKER,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No.: CV-2017-

Jtft.)/

COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES
AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

KINGSTON PROPERTIES, L.P; DK
ENTERPRISES, INC., RIVERBEND
COMMUNICATIONS, LLC; RIVERBEND
COMMUNICATIONS HOLDING, LLC.
And RIVERBEND COMMUNICATIONS,
LLC dba RIVERBEND EVENTS,
Defendants.

COMES NOW the above-named Plaintiff, NICOLE PACKER, by and through her attorney,

Allen H. Browning of Browning Law, complains and alleges against the Defendants as follows:
1.

At all times relevant hereto, Plaintiff was a resident of the City ofldaho Falls, County

of Bonneville, State of Idaho.
2.

At all times relevant hereto Defendant KINGSTON PROPERTIES, L.P. was a limited

COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

Page 1

Page 11

liability company, licensed to do business in Idaho, operating a business within the state ofldaho.
3.

At all times relevant hereto Defendant DK ENTERPRISES, INC. was a limited

liability company, licensed to do business in Idaho, operating a business within the state ofldaho.
4.

At all times relevant hereto Defendant RIVERBEND COMMUNICATIONS, LLC

(hereinafter "Riverbend Communications") was a limited liability company, licensed to do business
in Idaho, operating a business within the state of Idaho.
5.

At all times relevant hereto Defendant RIVERBEND COMMUNICATIONS

HOLDINGS LLC was a limited liability company, licensed to do business in Idaho, operating a
business within the state of Idaho, including Riverbend Communications, LLC.
6.

At all times relevant hereto Defendant RIVERBEND COMMUNICATIONS, LLC

(hereinafter "Riverbend") was a limited liability company, licensed to do business in Idaho, operating
a business within the state of Idaho.
7.

At all times relevant, Riverbend Events was a division of Riverbend

Communications, LLC.
8.

On or about December 4, 2015, Plaintiff, NICOLE PACKER, was leaving a

Christmas expo sponsored by Riverbend Communications and Riverbend Events at Kingston Plaza
in Idaho Falls, Bonneville County, Idaho. Ms. Packer, began to leave the Christmas expo and was
directed to use a door located in the back of the building by an employee supervising the expo on
behalf ofRiverbend Communications and Riverbend Events. Nicole had not used this exit before,
but was told by this agent ofRiverbend Communications and Riverbend Events that the other doors
were out of commission and could not be used. Nicole Packer used this back door as directed by the
Riverbend Communications employee who was working at the Christmas expo. At this time, there
COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
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Page 12

,_
was a light outside the door, but that light was not working. As the Plaintiff exited the building as
directed, the door closed and locked behind her and she could not re-enter the building. It was dark
out at that time, and she could not see anything except distant lights toward the parking lot area. She
took a couple of steps towards the parking area lights and fell several feet straight down, off an unlit
loading dock, because she could not see the loading dock when she fell.
9.

The actions of having no lighting outside on the loading dock and having an exit door

that automatically locked upon exiting were two dangerous conditions that were the fault of the
owners of the premises, Defendant KINGSTON PROPERTIES, L.P., and DK ENTERPRISES, INC,
and were a proximate cause of the Plaintiffs injuries and damages.
10.

The actions of the employee/agent ofRlVERBEN D COMMUNICATIONS, LLC, and

RlVERBEND EVENTS were the actions of the Defendant RIVERBEND COMMUNICATIONS,
LLC, by virtue of agency law and respondeat superior. The employee's act of directing the Plaintiff
towards an unmarked and dangerous exit was negligent and was a proximate cause of the Plaintiffs
mJunes.
11.

As a direct and proximate result of the aforementioned actions, the Plaintiff, NICOLE

PACKER, was caused to suffer serious, painful, debilitating and permanent injuries, and have caused
her economic and non-economic losses in an amount to be proved at trial. These injuries include,
but are not limited to bulging cervical and lumbar spine discs, knee sprain, cervicalgia, left and right
arm pain, back pain, and soft tissue. Plaintiff has incurred medical bills in the amount no less than
$21,106.79 and may have suffered a loss of income earning capacity as well.
12.

As a direct and proximate result of the aforementioned negligence, Plaintiff has been

required to retain the services of BROWNING LAW and is entitled to reasonable attorney's fees and
COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
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'

costs herein.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, NICOLE PACKER, prays for judgment against the Defendants,

and each of them, as follows:
1.

For past medical expenses in an amount to be proven at trial, but no less than
$21,106.79.

3.

For general damages in excess of $10,000.00.

4.

For other losses, including potential losses of earnings, in an amount to be
determined at trial;

5.

For reasonable attorney's fees and costs as the Court may deem just and proper.

6.

For such other and further relief as the Court deems just, equitable, and proper.

DATED this 1st day of December, 2017.

Allen H. Browning

COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

Page4

Page 14

,
l

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
Plaintiff hereby makes demand the issues in the above-entitled matter be tried before a jury
of 12 persons, pursuant to Rule 38 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.
DATED this 1st day of December, 2017.

BROWNIN G LAW

Allen H. Browning

COMPLAIN T FOR DAMAGES AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
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Donald F. Carey, ISB #4392
Lindsey R. Romankiw, ISB #8438
CAREY ROMANKIW, PLLC
4 77 Shoup Ave., Suite 203
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402
Telephone: (208) 525-2604
Facsimile: (208) 525-8813
Email: dfc@careyromankiw.com
Email: lrr@careyromankiw.com
Attorneys for Kingston Properties, L.P.
& DK Enterprises, Inc.
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE

NICOLE PACKER,
Plaintiffs,

Case No. CV-2017-7024

v.
KINGSTON PROPERTIES, L.P.; DK
ENTERPRISES, INC.; RIVERBEND
LLC;
COMMUNICATIONS,
COMMUNICATIONS
RIVERBEND
HOLDING, LLC; and RIVERBEND
d/b/a
LLC,
COMMUNICATIONS,
RIVERBEND EVENTS,

ANSWER TO COMPLAINT

I.I
Fee Category
$136.00

Defendants.

ANSWER TO COMPLAINT- l
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COMES NOW the Defendants, Kingston Properties, L.P. and D.K. Enterprises Inc.,
by and through counsel, the law firm of Carey Romankiw, PLLC, and answers Plaintiffs
Complaint and alleges as follows:
1.

Defendants hereby admit paragraph 1 of the Complaint.

2.

Defendants are without sufficient knowledge as to paragraphs 5, 6, 7, 8 and

10 of the complaint to either admit or deny and therefore deny the same.
3.

Defendants specifically deny paragraphs 2, 3, 9, 11 and 12 of the

Complaint.
4.

Plaintiff was comparatively negligent, and her negligence exceeds the

negligence, if any of these answering defendants. Her claims are therefore barred by I.C.
§ 6-801.

5.

Plaintiff has failed to mitigate her damages, if any.

6.

Plaintiffs damages, if any, may have been caused by the actions or omissions

of persons or parties other than Defendants, which actions or omissions were the proximate
and primary causes of the damages, if any, suffered by Plaintiff.
7.

Plaintiff may have failed to join, as parties to this action, one or more persons

or entities necessary for a just adjudication. If so, said persons or entities would be
indispensable, and this action should be dismissed due to their absence.
8.

If Plaintiff sustained the damages alleged by her, such damages were

proximately caused by intervening acts and/or omissions constituting superseding causes
of liability precluding Plaintiff from any recovery from Defendants in this action.
WHEREFORE, Defendants prays the Court enter judgment as follows:
1.

Dismissing the Plaintiffs Complaint with Plaintiff taking nothing thereby;

2.

Awarding Defendants costs and attorney's fees pursuant to I.C. § 120(3); and

3.

For such other and further relief as this Court deems just.

ANSWER TO COMPLAINT- 2
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DATED this 29th day of May, 2018.

CAREY ROMANKIW, PLLC

By

~b~~~:.....::::~:::..::::~-

Dona d F. Carey, 0
Attorneys for Kings~to~n-ro---perties, L.P. &
DK Enterprises, Inc.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 29th day of May 2018, I served a true and correct copy
of the above and foregoing document to the following person(s) as follows:

Allen H. Browning

[ ]

BROWNING LAW

[ ]

482 Constitution Way, Suite 111
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402
Telephone: (208) 542-2700
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

[ ]
[X]

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand-Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile (208) 542-2711

John A. Bailey, Jr.
BAILEY,HAHN,&JARMAN,PLLC
101 N. Main Street
PO Box 790
Pocatello, Idaho 83204
Telephone (208) 417-1818
Attorneys for Defendant Riverbend
Communications Holding, LLC

[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[X]

U.S. Mail Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivery
Overnight Mail
Facsimile (208) 418-1861

ANSWER TO COMPLAINT- 3
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Allen H. Browning, ISB#3007
Steve Carpenter, ISB#9132
BROWNING LAW
482 Constitution Way, Suite 111
Idaho Falls, ID 83402
Telephone: (208) 542-2700
Facsimile: (208) 542-2711
Email: alien. browning.law@gmail.com
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
NICOLE PACKER.
Plaintiff,
vs.

KINGSTON PROPERTIES, L.P; DK
ENTERPRISES, INC .• RIVERBEND
COMMUNICATIONS, LLC; RIVERBEND
COMMUNICATIONS HOLDING, LLC.
And RIVERBEND COMMUNICATIONS,
LLC dba RIVERBEND EVENTS,

Case No.: CV-17- Jo ~.t-f
STIPULATED DISMISSAL OF
RIVERBEND COMMUNICATIONS
HOWINGS, LLC AND RIVERBEND
COMMUNICATIONS d.ba RIVERBEND
EVENTS

Defendants.

Nicole Packer, Plaintiff, by and through her counsel of record, and Riverbend
Communications Holdings, LLC and Riverbend Communications dba Riverbend Events, by and
through its attorneys of record, hereby stipulate that Riverbend Communications Holdings, LLC
and Riverbend Communications dba Riverbend Events shall be dismissed, with prejudice, with

Larsen and Riverbend Communications Holdings, LLC and Riverbend Communications dba
Riverbend Events each bearing her or its respective attomey~s fees and costs in respect of
Plaintiff's complaint against Riverbend Communications Holdings, LLC and Riverbend

Communications dba Riverbend Events. 1n consideration for this stipulation, Plaintiff agrees that

Page 19

she waives any right of present or future appeal against Riverbend Communications Holdings,
LLC and Riverbend Communications d.ba Riverbend Events, and her counsel, by stipulating to
this waiver, that he is authorized to waive this right on Plaintiffs behalf.

WHEREFORE, the stipulating parties hereby request that the Court dismiss Riverbend
Communications Holdings, LLC and Riverbend Communications dba Riverbend Events, with
prejudice, with the stipulating parties each bearing her or its respective attorney fees and costs in

respect to PlaintifPs complaint against Riverbend Communications Holdings, LLC and
Riverbend Communications dba Riverbend Events.
SO STIPULATED AND AGREED this _ __

day of June, 2018.

, r

I

SO STIPULATED AND AGREED this

t./

'>

I

day of June, 2018.

~>

David Dance
General Counsel for Defendants, Riverbend
Communications Holdings, LLC and Riverbend
Communications dba Riverbend Events
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John A. Bailey, Jr. (ISB# 2619)
BAILEY, HAHN, & JARMAN, PLLC
101 N. Main Street
P.O. Box 790
Pocatello, Idaho 83204
Telephone: (208) 417-1818
Facsimile: (208) 418-1861

'/ ' • i

i·1

~

'~i
i

jab@bhj-law.com
Attorneys for Defendant Riverbend Communications Holding, LLC

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE

NICOLE PACKER,
Case No.: CV-2017-7024
Plaintiff,
DEFENDANT RIVERBEND
COMMUNICATIONS,LLC'S
ANSWER AND DEMAND FOR
JURY TRIAL

vs,
KINGSTON PROPERTIES, L.P; DK
ENTERPRISES, INC., RIVERBEND
COMMUNICATIONS, LLC; RIVERBEND
COMMUNICATIONS HOLDING, LLC.
And RIVERBEND COMMUNICATIONS
LLC dba RIVERBEND EVENTS, .
Defendants.

COMES NOW, the Defendant RIVERBEND COMMUNICATIONS, LLC., by and
through its attorney John A. Bailey, Jr. of Bailey, Hahn, & Jannan, PLLC, and in answer to the
Complaint for Damages and Demand for Jury Trial ("Complaint") hereby admits, denies, and
avers as follows:
I.
FIRST DEFENSE

The Complaint fails to state a valid claim for which relief may be granted.

DEFENDANT RIVERBEND COMMUNICATIONS, LLC'S ANSWER AND DEMAND FOR JLllY TRIALPagel
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II.
·SECOND DEFENSE

Each and every allegation of lhe Complaint not specifically admitted herein is denied.
1.

With respect to the allegations set forth in Paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 of the

Complaint, those allegations arc denied for lack of sufficient information to verify the truth or
accuracy of the same.
2.

With respect to the allegations set forth in Paragraphs 4, 5, 6 and 7 of the

Complaint, it is admitted that Defendant Riverbend Communications, LLC was at all times
relevant a limited liability company licensed to do business in Idaho, operating a business in
Idaho. It is denied that Defendant Riverbend Communkalions Hoh.lings, LLC operated

Riverbend Communications, LLC. The remainder of the allegations set forth therein are also
denied.
3.

With respect to the allegations set forth in Paragraph 8 of the Complaint, it is

admitted that Nicole Packer, the Plaintiff, fell when she was leaving a Christmas expo on
December 4, 2015. The remainder of the allegations therein are denied for lack of infonnation to
verify the truth or accuracy of the same.
4.

TI1e allegations set forth in Paragraphs 9, 10, 11, and 12 of the Complaint are

denied.

DEFENDANT RIVERBEND COMML'NICATIO~S, LLC'S ANSWER AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIALPage 2
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III.
THIRD DEFENSE

That Nicole Packer was at the time and place set forth in the Complaint guilty of
carelessness, negligence, or recklessness which proximately caused and/or contributed to the
accident and the claimed damages, which was greater than or equal to any alleged negligence or
recklessness of this Defendant, therefore, Plaintiffs claims should be denied or apportioned
according to the Idaho comparative negligence statutes.
IV.
FOURTH DEFENSE

That the Plaintiff has failed to take reasonable steps to mitigate the claimed or alleged
damages and therefore, said damages are not collectable against this Defendant.

v.
FIFfH DEFENSE

That the Plaintift's claimed damages were caused or contributed to by the acts of other
Defendants, or independent contractor(s), over which this Defendant had no control and,
therefore Plaintiff's claims against this Defendant are barred or immunized by Idaho law.
VI.
SIXTH DEFENSE

That the alleged damages complained of in the Complaint were proximately caused by an
intervening supcrccding cause for which this Defendant is not responsible and, therefore,
Plaintiff's claims against this Defendant is barred.

DEFENDANT RIVERBEND COMMUNICATIONS, LLC'S A..~SWER AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL-

Page 3
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VII.
SEVENTH DEFENSE

Plaintiffs claims are barred by Idaho's econornk luss rule.

VIII.
EIGHTH DEFENSE
This Defendant reserves the right to allege additional defenses in this matter in
accordance with Idaho law and with this Court's scheduling order.
XII.
DEMAND FOR A JURY TRIAL

Defendant hereby demands a jury trial of twelve (12) persons on all issues su triable
pursuant to 1.R.C.P. 38.
DATED this

12...-- day of July, 2018.
BAILEY, HAHN & JARMAN PLLC

DEFENDANT RIVERBEND COMMUNICATIONS, LLC'S ANSWER AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIALPage 4
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HERBY CERTIFY that on the

~

day of July, 2018, I caused to be served a true and

correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:

Allen H. Browning
Steve Carpenter
BROWNING LAW
482 Constitution Way, Suite 111
Idaho Falls, ID 83402
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
Don Carey
Carey Romankiw, PLLC
477 Shoup Ave #203
Idaho Falls, ID 83402

l J !Court e-file
[~acsimile to 208-542-2711
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] U.S. Mail
[ ] Email allen.browning.law(a1!,11nail.com
[ ] ].Court e-file
[~Facsimile to 208-542-2711
[ ] Hand Deli very
[ ] U.S. Mail
[ ] Email

DEFENDANT RIVERBEND co:MMUNICATIONS, LLC'S ANSWER AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIALPage 5
47809.0045.11200873. I

Page 25

2019 4Ur;
Jr Dis -,_

/3 A

'M 4: S

e fl Ju[roc r
2
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DIST~:~~R,
- ou¾~Rtc;
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
r 1D
NICOLE PACKER,

Plaintiff,
-vsKINGSTON PROPERTIES, L.P.; DK
ENTERPRISES, INC., and RIVERBEND
COMMUNICATIONS, LLC.

- - - - - - - -Defendants.
-------NOTICE:

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-2017-7024

JURY TRIAL
SCHEDULING ORDER

PLEASE READ CAREFULLY AND NOTE ALL DATES, DEADLINES AND

PROCEDURES TO BE FOLLOWED.
Pursuant to Rule 16 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, the following Scheduling
Order shall govern all proceedings in this case. Therefore, it is hereby ordered as follows:
A. Notice of Hearings.
1. Jury Trial will commence on January 7, 2019, at the hour of 10:00 a.m. Counsel

shall be prepared to meet in chambers at 9:30 a.m. This matter is scheduled for four
(4) days. The remaining days of trial are typically held from 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.
2. A Formal Pre-Trial Conference will be held on December 13, 2018, at the hour of
9:30 a.m. Counsel for the parties are required to attend this conference in person.

B. Pre-Trial Conference Procedure.
1. Trial counsel for the parties are ordered to prepare and file a Pre-Trial Memorandum.
The Pre-Trial Memorandum may be filed separately or jointly, but in any event shall
be submitted to the Court at least fourteen (14) days prior to the time of the
Trial The Pre-Trial Memorandum shall contain, in the order outlined below, the

following:

JURY TRIAL SCHEDULING ORDER
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a. An index of all exhibits. The index shall indicate: I) a brief description of the
exhibit, 2) whether the parties have stipulated to admissibility, and if not, 3)
the legal grounds for objection. If the memorandum is filed jointly, the index
shall also indicate by whom the exhibit is being offered.
b. An indication of whether depositions, admissions, interrogatory responses, or
other discovery responses are to be used in lieu of live testimony, the manner
in which such evidence will be presented, and the legal grounds for any
objection to such excerpts.
c. A summary of the documentary evidence supporting the damages sought by
the parties and a statement as to whether the parties have stipulated to the
admission of the summary under Rule I 006, of the Idaho Rules of Evidence in
lieu of the underlying documents.
d. A list of the names and addresses of all witnesses which such party may call
to testify at trial, including anticipated rebuttal or impeachment witnesses.
Expert witnesses shall be identified as such.
e. A brief non-argumentative summary of the factual nature of the case. The
purpose of the summary is to provide an overview of the case for the jury and
may be included in pre-proof instructions to the jury.
f.

A statement that counsel have, in good faith, discussed settlement
unsuccessfully.

g. A statement that all answers or supplemental answers to interrogatories under
Rule 33 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure reflect facts known to the date
of the Memorandum.
h. A statement of all claims.
1.

Any admissions or stipulations of the parties which can be agreed upon by the
parties.

J.

Any amendments to the pleadings and any issues of law abandoned by any of
the parties.

k. A short statement of the issues of fact and law which remain to be litigated at

the trial and those legal authorities upon which the party relies as to each issue

JURY TRIAL SCHEDULING ORDER
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of law to be litigated. In addition the parties shall include a statement of
whether liability is disputed.

1. A listing of all anticipated motions in limine and any orders which may
expedite the trial.
m. A statement as to whether counsel requires more than thirty (30) minutes per
side for voir dire or opening statement.
2. At the time of the Pre-Trial Conference, all parties shall be prepared to assist in the
formulation of a Pre-Trial Order in the form described in Rule l 6(b) of the Idaho
Rules of Civil Procedure.
C. Discovery Procedures and Deadlines.
1. Discovery Cutoff will be one (1) week prior to the scheduled Pre-Trial
Conference Counsel are advised that this cutoff means that ALL discovery will
be COMPLETE by that deadline. Parties shall allow for the time frames listed in

the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure in filing Discovery pleadings in order to allow all
parties to comply with the discovery guidelines, and the Discovery Cutoff day listed
above.
2. Fact Witnesses: Plaintiff shall disclose the names and addresses of all fact witnesses
which such party may call to testify at trial, except for impeachment witnesses,
ninety (90) days before the Pre-Trial Conference Defendants shall disclose the

names and addresses of all fact witnesses which such party may call to testify at trial,
except for impeachment witnesses, sixty (60) days before Pre-Trial Conference.
3. Expert Witnesses: Plaintiff shall disclose the names and addresses and all other
required information of all expert witnesses in the manner and detail outlined in Rule
26(b)(4) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure no later than ninety (90) days before
the Pre-Trial Conference. The Defendant shall also comply with Rule 26(b)(4) of

the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure and make a similar disclosure of their expert
witnesses no later than sixty (60) days before Pre-Trial Conference. The Plaintiff is
allowed rebuttal expert disclosure with disclosure as required by Rule 26(b)(4) of
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure only to directly rebut defense experts no later than
thirty (30) days before Pre-Trial Conference.

4. Witnesses not disclosed in this manner will be subject to exclusion at trial.
JURY TRIAL SCHEDULING ORDER
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5. Any witnesses discovered after the last required disclosure shall immediately be
disclosed to the Court and opposing counsel by filing and service stating the date
upon which the same was discovered.
6. All depositions that are expected to be submitted as trial testimony shall be completed
thirty (30) days before trial.
D. Motion Cutoff:
1. All Summary Judgment Motions must be filed in compliance with Rule 56 of the
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. Such motions must be filed at least ninety (90)

days before trial. The motion, affidavits and supporting brief shall be served at least
twenty-eight (28) days before the time fixed for the hearing. Opposing affidavits and
answering brief must be served at least fourteen (14) days prior to the date of the
hearing. The moving party may thereafter serve a reply brief within seven (7) days
before the hearing. Argument must be scheduled and heard no less than thirty (30)
days before the pretrial conference.
2. All other motions must be filed by thirty (30) days before trial. This includes all
motions concerning any objections to the testimony of experts at trial. This does not
include other motions in limine the parties may wish to file in compliance with the
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.
E. Exhibits:
1. All exhibits that are to be introduced at trial shall be pre-marked and deposited

with the Clerk of the Court fourteen (14) days before trial, except those for
impeachment.
2. Plaintiff's exhibits shall be marked in numerical sequence. Defendant's exhibits shall
be marked in alphabetical sequence. Labels may be obtained from the Clerk of the
Court, and should have the case number and start date of trial shown on them.
3. Photographs shall be produced on separate pages and shall be individually marked.
4. A duplicate set of all exhibits shall also be provided to the Court fourteen (14)

days before trial, except those for impeachment. The duplicate set shall be placed in
binders, indexed and deposited with the Clerk of the Court for use of the Court.
5. No exhibits shall be admitted into evidence at trial other than those disclosed, listed
and submitted to the Clerk of the Court in accordance with this order, except when
JURY TRIAL SCHEDULING ORDER

Page4of7

Page 29

offered for impeachment purposes or unless they were discovered after the last
required disclosure.
F. Jury Instructions:
1. Jury Instructions shall be filed with the Clerk of the Court five {5) days before

trial. Pursuant to Rule 5l(a)(l) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, requested
instructions must be served upon and received by all parties to the action at least

five (5) days before the commencement of the trial.
2. All requested instructions shall be submitted to the Court in duplicate with the
appropriate citation of law indicated on the copy thereof upon which the party relies
in requesting such instruction. The original shall contain a blank space for numbering
and all duplicate copies shall be numbered by the party submitting the same in
consecutive numbers at the top of the first page of each requested instruction. The
duplicate copy shall also contain blank spaces at the bottom thereof identified as
"Given," "Refused," "Modified," "Covered," and "Other."
3. Five (5) days prior to trial a copy of the instructions shall also be provided to the
Court on a CD in Microsoft Word format or may be emailed to the Court at
tdodge@co.bonneville.id. us .
G. Mediation:
1. The Court, being duly advised, concludes that this case is appropriate for referral to
mediation under I.R.C.P. 16(k). Therefore, this case is hereby referred to mediation
pursuant to I.R.C.P. 16(k). The parties are hereby ordered to confer and select a
mediator. If a mediator is not selected within a reasonable amount of time, the parties
are to notify the Court and the Court will appoint the mediator. The final mediation
session must be completed by 60(sixty) days prior to the pretrial conference unless
this time period is extended by court order.
2. All named parties or their agents with full authority to settle, together with the
attorneys responsible for handling the trial in this cause, are directed to be present
during the entire mediation process pursuant to 1.R.C.P. 16(k)(10), unless otherwise
excused by the mediator upon a showing of good cause or by order of this Court. The
costs of mediation are to be divided and borne equally by the parties. Within seven
(7) days following the last mediation session, the mediator is directed to advise Court
JURY TRIAL SCHEDULING ORDER
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only whether the case has, in whole or in part, been settled. Counsel and parties are
directed to proceed in a good faith effort to attempt to resolve this case.
This order shall control the course of this action unless modified for good cause shown to
prevent manifest injustice. Pursuant to Rule 16 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, if a party
or party's attorney fails to obey a scheduling or pre-trial order, or if no appearance is made on
behalf of a party at a scheduling or pre-trial conference, or if a party or party's attorney is
substantially unprepared to participate in the conference, or if a party or party's attorney fails to
participate in good faith, the judge, upon motion or his own initiative, may make such orders
with regard thereto as are just, and among others any of the orders provided in Rule 37(b)(2)(B),
(C), (D). In lieu of or in addition to any other sanction, the Court may require the party or the
attorney representing said party or both to pay the reasonable expenses incurred because of any
noncompliance with this rule, including attorney's fees, unless the judge finds that the
noncompliance was substantially justified or that other circumstances make an award of
expenses unjust.
All meetings and/or hearings with the Court in the matter shall be scheduled in advance
with the Court's Clerk. The Court appreciates time to adequately consider each issue before it,
prior to a hearing and/or meeting.
~

DATED this -1.l_ day of, August, 2018.

~

Distric

JURY TRIAL SCHEDULING ORDER
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this _lQ_ day of August, 2018 a true and correct copy of the

JURY TRIAL SCHEDULING ORDER was served on the attorney and/or person listed below
as follows:

□ U.S. Mail

Donald Carey
477 Shoup Ave., Suite 203
Idaho Falls, ID 83402
John A. Bailey Jr.
P.O. Box 790
Pocatello, ID 83204

JURY TRIAL SCHEDULING ORDER

i

Courthouse Box

□ Facsimile

U.S. Mail

□ Courthouse Box

□ Facsimile

~ U.S. Mail

□ Courthouse Box

□ Facsimile

Allen Browning
482 Constitution Way, Suite 111
Idaho Falls, ID 83402

i
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Electronically Filed
10/9/2018 3:43 PM
Seventh Judicial District, Bonneville County
Penny Manning, Clerk of the Court
By: Angelica Linares, Deputy Clerk

Donald F. Carey, ISB #4392
Lindsey R. Romankiw, ISB #8438
CAREY ROMANKIW, PLLC
477 Shoup Ave., Suite 203
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402
Telephone: (208) 525-2604
Facsimile: (208) 525-8813
Email: dfc@careyromankiw.com
Email: lrr@careyromankiw.com
Attorneys for Kingston Properties, L.P. &
DK Enterprises, Inc.
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE

NICOLE PACKER,
Plaintiffs,
Case No. CV-2017-7024

v.
KINGSTON PROPERTIES, L.P.; DK
ENTERPRISES,
INC.;
RIVERBEND
COMMUNICATIONS, LLC; RIVERBEND
COMMUNICATIONS HOLDING, LLC; and
RIVERBEND COMMUNICATIONS, LLC,
d/b/a RIVERBEND EVENTS,

DEFENDANT KINGSTON
PROPERTIES, L.P., DK
ENTERPRISE'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGEMENT

Defendants.

COMES NOW Defendant's Kingston Properties, L.P., and DK Enterprises, Inc., by
and through their counsel of record, pursuant to the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule
56(a), and states that there are no issues of material fact, upon which reasonable minds
might disagree, and the movants are entitled to an order of dismissal with prejudice, as a
matter of law. This motion is supported by a memorandum of law, and the affidavits of
Donald F. Carey and Justin Sommers, and the attachments thereto.
DEFENDANT KINGSTON PROPERTIES, L.P., DK ENTERPRISE'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGEMENT- I

Page 33

WHEREFORE: Movant pray for an Order of Dismissal with Prejudice against each
of them, and for other and further relief.

DATED this i-day of~/-:< , 2018.

CAREY ROMANKIW, PLLC

By ::::::.,,,.=--8~::t:::::::::::::::.L...~~~-

Donald F. Carey, Of th inn
Attorneys for Kingst Properf s, L.P &
DK Enterprises, Inc.

DEFENDANT KINGSTON PROPERTIES, L.P., DK ENTERPRISE'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGEMENT - 2
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
c:;

,L;:,e,-~~... ,e_

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the __f__ day or__ 2018, I served a true and correct copy
of the above and foregoing document to the following person(s) as follows:

Allen H. Browning

[ ]

BROWNING LAW

[

482 Constitution Way, Suite 111
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402
Telephone: (208) 542-2700

[ ]
[X]

]

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand-Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile (208) 542-2711

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

John A. Bailey, Jr.
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS
LLP

[ ]
& HAWLEY

412 W. Center Street, Suite 2000
PO Box 100
Pocatello, Idaho 83204
Telephone (208) 233-2001

[
[

]
]

[X]

U.S. Mail Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivery
Overnight Mail
Facsimile (208) 232.0150

Attorneys for Defendant Riverbend
Communications Holding, LLC

DEFENDANT KINGSTON PROPERTIES, L.P., DK ENTERPRISE'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGEMENT - 3
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Electronically Filed
10/9/2018 4:41 PM
Seventh Judicial District, Bonneville County
Penny Manning, Clerk of the Court
By: Maria Padilla, Deputy Clerk

John A. Bailey Jr. (ISB#: 2619)
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP
412 W Center Street, Suite 2000
P.O. Box 100
Pocatello, ID 83 204
Telephone: 208.233.2001
Facsimile: 208.232.0150
Email: JBailey@hawleytroxeil.com
Attorneys for Defendant Riverbend Communications Holding, LLC

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE

NICOLE PACKER,
CaseNo.: CV-2017-7024
Plaintiff,
vs.
KINGSTON PROPERTIES, L.P; DK
ENTERPRISES, INC., RIVERBEND
COMMUNICATIONS, LLC; RIVERBEND
COMMUNICATIONS HOLDING, LLC.
And RIVERBEND COMMUNICATIONS
LLC dba RIVERBEND EVENTS,

DEFENDANTS', RIVERBEND
COMMUNICATIONS, LLC, AND
RIVERBEND COMMUNICATIONS
HOLDING, LLC, MEMORANDUM
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
PURSUANT TO I.R.C.P. 56(c)

Defendants.

COME NOW, Defendants Riverbend Communications, LLC and Riverbend
Communications Holding, LLC (hereafter "Riverbend"), by and through counsel, John A.
Bailey, Jr. of the law firm Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP, and pursuant to I.R.C.P. 56(c),
submit their Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment as follows:

I. INTRODUCTION
This is a personal injury case involving a fall which occurred on December 4, 2015 at the
Christmas Expo Trade Show at Kingston Plaza in Idaho Falls, Idaho. The Plaintiff, Nicole

DEFENDANTS', "RIVERBEND", MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO I.R.C.P. 56(c)-l
47809.0045.11407025.1
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Packer ("Packer"), fell off of a loading dock, sustaining certain allegly injuries as a result of her
exiting the building from the back door, in the dark, when she could not see in front of her.
As is discussed in more detail below, Riverbend should be granted summary judgment
dismissing Packer's claims because: 1) Riverbend Communications Holding, LLC owed no duty
of care to Packer because it is simply a holding company having no relationship with Packer or
Kingston Properties; 2) Riverbend Communications, LLC breached no duty of care owing to
Packer; and, 3) Packer's negligence claim is barred by indemnity. For each of these reasons
discussed in more detail below, summary judgment is proper in favor ofRiverbend, and against
Packer, under I.R.C.P. 56 (c).
II. STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS

I.

Packer was at the Kingston Plaza on the date of the accident because she was

selling items as a vendor under an agreement with the insured, Riverbend Communications, LLC
("Riverbend") to rent booth space at the Christmas Expo Trade Show. (See deposition excerpts
from the oral deposition of Packer taken on the 26th day of September, 2018, to be supplemented
as Exhibit "l" to the Affidavit of John A. Bailey, Jr. ("Bailey Aff.") filed herewith; see also
agreement attached as Exhibit "2" to the Bailey Aff.).
2.

Packer was familiar with the Kingston Plaza facility as she had worked other

events selling items as a vendor and renting booth space from Riverbend. (Id). She had utilized
the front entry to the facility as well as the side doors at her prior vending events. (Id).
3.

Nevertheless, Packer claims that she exited the back door of the facility because

she was told to do so by Riverbend's manager, Jay Dye. (Id).
4.

Although the front door of the facility remained open, Packer went out the back

door of the facility when it was dark outside. (Id). She testified that she could only see lights in
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the distance over the parking lot. (Id). She also claims that there were no working lights outside
the door she exited, despite photographs attached to the Bailey Aff. as Exhibit "3" showing
multiple lights existed in the area where she exited the building.
5.

Packer testified that she was carrying a "few" items as she exited the back door,

when suddenly the back door shut and locked behind her. (Id).
6.

The door that Packer exited has no automatic locking mechanism as she has

claimed. (See Exhibit "3" to the Bailey Aff.).
7.

Packer fell off of a loading dock behind the facility after she took steps forward

away from the back door, in the dark. (Id). Although Packer admitted having her cell phone with
her, she denies knowing that the cell phone could be used to provide her light to see ahead. (Id).
III. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARDS

Summary judgment should be granted forthwith when there is no genuine issue of
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. I.R.C.P. 56(c).
The Court should liberally construe all facts and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the
nonmoving party. 1 Summary judgment should only be denied if reasonable persons could reach
different conclusions or draw different inferences from the evidence presented.2

A mere

scintilla of evidence is insufficient to withstand summary judgment; there must be sufficient
evidence provided which would reasonably allow a jury to return a verdict in the favor of the
party who is resisting the motion.3
Where a motion for summary judgment is made against a party who has the burden
of proof at trial, the non-moving party must set forth sufficient evidence of a genuine issue

1

Iron Eagle Dev., LLC. v. Quality Design Sys., Inc., 138 Idaho 487,491, 65 P.3d 509,513 (2003).
Id.
3
Gneiting v. Idaho Asphalt Supply, Inc., 130 Idaho 393, 396, 941 P.2d 932, 935 (Ct.App. 1997).
2
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of material fact to support each essential element of the non-moving party's case. 4

"It is

axiomatic that upon a motion for summary judgment the non-moving party may not rely upon its
pleadings, but must come forward with evidence by way of affidavit or otherwise which
contradicts the evidence submitted by the moving party, and which establishes the existence of a
material issue of disputed fact." 5 "No affirmative duty to produce evidence rests on the party
moving for summary judgment, and the moving party has no obligation to negate the opponent's
claim". 6
Further, the Court is "not required to comb through the record to find some reason to
deny a motion for summary judgment."7 Instead, the "party opposing summary judgment must
direct [the Court's] attention to specific triable facts." 8 Statements in a brief, unsupported by the
record, cannot create an issue of fact. 9 Affidavits submitted in support of or in opposition to a
motion for summary judgment must be admissible under the Idaho Rules of Evidence. The
admissibility of the evidence contained in affidavits and depositions in support of or in
opposition to a motion for summary judgment is a threshold question to be answered before
applying the liberal construction and reasonable inferences rule to determine whether the
evidence is sufficient to create a genuine issue for trial. 10
IV. ARGUMENT
A.

Riverbend Communications Holding, LLC Owed No Duty To Packer.

4

Sparks v. St. Luke's Regional Medical Center, 115 Idaho 505, 509, 768 P.2d 768, 772 (Idaho 1988)
added).
PHH Mortg. v. Nickerson, 160 Idaho 33,374 P.3d 551 (2016); citing Grabicki v. City of Lewiston, 154
Idaho 686,690,302 P.3d 26, 30 (2013).
6
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 US 317,323 (1986).
7
Carmen v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 237 F.3d 1026, 1029 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Forsberg v.
Pac. Northwest Bell Tel. Co., 840 F.2d 1409, 1418 (9th Cir. 1988)).
8
Southern California Gas Co. v. City ofSanta Ana, 336 F.3d 885, 889 (9th Cir. 2003).
9
Barnes v. Independent Auto. Dealers, 64 F.3d 1389, 1396 n. 3 (9th Cir. 1995).
10
Holdaway v. Broulim 's Supermarket, 158 Idaho 606, 349 P.3d 1197 (2015); citing Gem State Ins. Co. v.
Hutchison, 145 Idaho 10, 13,175 P.3d 172,175 (2007).
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Riverbend Communications Holding, LLC is simply a holding company, located at 400
W. Sunnyside Drive in Idaho Falls, Idaho. (See Exhibit "4" to the Bailey Aff.). There is no
disputing that Riverbend Communications Holding, LLC had no contractual relationship with
Packer or Kingston Properties and was uninvolved with the Christmas Expo where Packer was
injured. Packer has no evidence to show that Riverbend Communications Holding, LLC was an
agent ofRiverbend Communications, LLC as she has alleged in her Complaint. It is a wholly
unrelated entity from Riverbend Communications, LLC. (See Exhibits "4" and "5" to the Bailey,
Aff.). "Where there is no dnty, there can be no negligence". Mugavero v. Auto Sales, Inc.,
130 Idaho 554,944 P.2d 554 (1997) (emphasis added); citing Collins v. Schweitzer, Inc. 774 F.
th

Supp. 1253 (9 Cir. 1991 ). Accordingly, there is no basis for liability against Riverbend
Communication Holding, LLC and Packer's claims against it must be dismissed as a matter of
law pursuant to I.R.C.P. 56 (c).

B.

Riverbend Breached No Duty Of Care Owing To Packer.

Riverbend Communications, LLC is also entitled to summary judgment under I.R.C.P.
56(c) as Packer is unable to meet her burden of proof on her negligence claim. This is because
"it is well-settled that the elements of a common law negligence action are (1) a duty, recognized
by law, requiring a defendant to conform to a certain standard of conduct; (2) a breach of that
duty; (3) a causal connection between the defendant's conduct and the resulting injury; and (4)
actual loss or damage". O'Guin v. Bingham County, 142 Idaho 49, 122 P.3d 308 (2005). No
liability exists under the law of torts unless the person from whom relief is sought owed a duty to
the allegedly injured party. Baccus v. Ameripride Services, Inc., 145 Idaho 346, 179 P .3d 309
(2008); citing Vickers v. Hanover Constr. Co., Inc., 125 Idaho 832, 875 P.2d 929 (1994).
In determining whether a duty will arise in a particular context, the Idaho Supreme court
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has identified several factors to consider. Boots v. Winters, 145 Idaho 389, 179 P.3d 352 (Id.
App. 2008); citing Turpen, 133 Idaho at 247,985 P.2d at 672. 11 However, Idaho courts only
look at those factors if a duty has not been previously recognized.
Idaho courts have long held that the duty of owners and possessors of land is determined
by the status of the person injured on the land (i.e whether the person is an invitee, licensee, or
trespasser). O'Guin v. Bingham County, 142 Idaho 49, 122 P.3d 308 (2005); see also

Holzheimer v. Johnannesen, 125 Idaho 397, 871 P.2d 814 (1994); Brooks v. Wal-Mart Stores,
2018 Ida. LEXIS 91 (2018). An invitee is one who enters upon the premises of another for a
purpose connected with the business conducted on the land, or where it can reasonably be said
that the visit may confer a business, commercial, monetary or other tangible benefit to the
landowner. Id.
In contrast, a licensee is a visitor who enters with the consent of the landowner in pursuit
of the visitor's purpose. Id.. A trespasser is one who goes upon the private property of another
without lawful authority or without permission or invitation, express or implied. Id. The focus
is on the party or entity having control over the property with respect to the duties owed by those
who enter upon it. Forbush v. Sagecrest Multi Family Prop. Owners' Ass'n, 162 Idaho 317,396
P.3d 1199 (2017).
Notably, an owner or occupier ofland is required to share with a licensee knowledge of
dangerous conditions or activities on the land. Id. (emphasis added); citing Evans v. Park,

112 Idaho 400,301, 732 P.2d 369, 370 (Ct.App.1987). The licensee must establish that the
11

The factors include the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff
suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, the moral
blame attached to the defendant's conduct, the policy of preventing future harm, the extent of the burden to the
defendant and consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach,
and the availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved. Id; citing Rife v. Long, 127 Idaho 841,
908 P.2d 143 (1995).
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owner or occupier of the premises had actual or constructive notice of a foreseeable dangerous
condition. Brooks v. Wal-Mart Stores, 2018 Ida. LEXIS 91 (2018). Whereas, an owner or
occupier ofland owes a duty to an invitee to keep the premises in a reasonably safe condition,
or to warn of hidden or concealed dangers. Id. (emphasis added). The duty owed to a

trespasser is only to refrain from willful or wanton acts which might cause injuries. Huyck

v. Hecla Mining Company, 101 Idaho 299,612 P.2d 142 (1980) (emphasis added); see also
O'Guin v. Bingham County, 142 Idaho 49, 122 P.3d 308 (2005).
An invitee or licensee may forfeit such status if he or she goes beyond the scope of
his or her invitation. Boadle v. United States, 472 F.2d 1014 (9th Cir. Mont. 1973) (emphasis

added); see also West v. Tan, 322 F.2d 924 (9 th Cir. Haw. 1963) (noting that the special
obligation toward invitees exists only while the visitor is on the part of the premises which the
occupier has thrown open to him for the purpose which makes him an invitee); see also Rich v.

Tite-Knot Pine Mill, 421 P .2d 370 (Or. 1966) (noting that one may be a licensee or invitee for
one purpose or part of the premises and not for another); see also Lavitch v. Smith, 356 P.2d 531
(Or. 1960); Grahn v. Northwest Sport, Inc., 310 P.2d 306 (Or. 1957); Lindholm v. Northwestern

P.R.Co., (Cal. App. 1926); Aguilar v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 4137
th

(9 Cir. Or. 2000); Hansen v. Cohen, 276 P.2d 391 (Or. 1954) (stating that "when a person has
entered upon the premises of another under invitation, express or implied, he is bound by that
invitation, and becomes a bare licensee ifhe goes, for purposes of his own, to some part of the
premises other than that to which he was invited, uses the premises for purposes or in ways other
than those for which they were intended ... "); Rygg v. County ofMaui, 98 F. Supp.2d 1129 (D.
Haw. 1999); Grossenbach v. Devonshire Realty Co., 261 N.W. 742 (Wis. 1935); McNally v.

Goodenough, 92 N.W.2d 890 (Wis. 1958).
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In Rich v. Tite-Knot Pine Mill, supra, the Oregon Supreme Court made the following key
observation:

The mere fact that a person is invited into a structure and thereby becomes
an invitee does not mean that he is an invitee in every part of the building
and that he is at liberty to enter wherever he wishes. For example, a person
who enters a bank and makes a deposit of money at the window of a teller would
discover that his status as an invitee had changed to that of a trespasser ifhe
attempted to make his way into the teller's cage.

Id. at 193 (emphasis added).
Similarly, in Grossenbach v. Devonshire Realty Co., supra, a plaintiff tenant was deemed
an invitee when she remained in a hall or in any place in the basement maintained for the use of
tenants, but when she went into the boiler room she became a trespasser as that area was
maintained by those whose duty it was to maintain fires or to perform other service for the owner
therein. Id. at 63 8. The court there, in reversing the judgment of the trial court, emphasized that
the plaintiff was not invited or permitted to enter the boiler room by word or implication.
Significantly, the plaintiff tried to argue that she had permission as a tenant to enter the boiler
room simply because she had seen a janitor in the boiler room and was not told to stay out. Id. at
639. In rejecting that argument, the court stated that "One swallow does not make a summer".

Id. (emphasis added).
In this case, even if the Court resolves the facts in Packer's favor and assumes, arguendo,
that she was advised to exit through the back door of the building, Packer lost her status as an
invitee or licensee when she opted to walk through the dark rather than turning back into the
building to exit through the front door. At that point, Packer became a mere trespasser on the
premises. The only arguable duty owing to Packer was for Riverbend to refrain from engaging
in willful or wanton acts which might cause her injury. Packer has no evidence that Riverbend
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engaged in willful or wanton acts which could cause her injury. This is because, even if Packer
was told to exit the back door, Packer's claim that she had to proceed to take steps forward in the
dark is flatly refuted by the evidence showing that the door she exited could not have locked
behind her as she has alleged. (See photographs of the door attached to the Bailey Aff. as
Exhibit "3").
Additionally, even if Packer could be deemed to have retained her status as a licensee,
there is also no evidence that Riverbend was aware of any dangerous condition in the back of the
building. Even if those lights were not working when Packer exited the building, Packer's
knowledge of this condition was the same as the knowledge Riverbend as a mere tenant at the
Expo, with respect to this potential danger. Riverbend could not have known that Packer would
walk forward, in the dark, off of the loading dock as a reasonably prudent person in Packer'
position would have: a) turned back into the building to take a different route; b) turned on her
cell phone flashlight or back light to see ahead; c) called for help; d) waited until someone else
came out of the back door before she tried to proceed ahead; ore) set her things down and waited
until her eyes adjusted to the darkness before stepping forward. Any of these reasonably
necessary and foreseeable actions by Packer could have avoided the accident in this case. Under
these facts, there is no basis for finding a breach of duty by Riverbend. As such, Riverbend is
entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw pursuant to I.R.C.P. 56 (c).

C.

Packer's Claims Against Riverbend Are Also Barred By Indemnity.

Riverbend utilizes what is called a "multi show payment agreement". (See Exhibit "2" to
the Bailey Aff.). As the Court can see by Exhibit "2", Riverbend had clear written terms
and conditions which were intended for vendors to abide by during the Christmas Expo. Packer
does not deny receiving a copy of these terms and conditions and having knowledge of them.
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(Exhibit "l" to the Bailey Aff., to be supplemented). These terms and conditions contained the
following significant provisions:

23. Vendor shall protect, indemnify, defend and hold harmless
Riverbend Communications, the owner/operation of the Facility and any person
associated with the sponsorship or administration of the expo, and their respective
officers, directors, members, employees, agents and representatives, (collectively,
the "Indemnified Parties") for, from and against any third party claims, demands,
proceedings, suits and actions, including any related liabilities, obligations,
losses, damages, deficiencies, penalties, asserted against any of the
Indemnified Parties that relate to, arise out of or result from Vendor's
participation in the expo.
24. THE INDEMNIFIED PARTIES' MAXIMUM LIABILITY FOR
DAMAGES IN CONNECTION WITH THIS CONTRACT, REGARDLESS OF
THE CAUSE OF ACTION, WILL NOT EXCEED THE TOTAL AMOUNT
PAID BY VENDOR TO RIVERBEND COMMUNICATIONS FOR EXHIBIT
SPACE AT THE EXPO. INNO EVENT WILL ANY OF THE
INDEMNIFIED PARTIES BE LIABLE TO A VENDOR OR ANY OTHER
PERSON OR ENTITY FOR ANY INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, INDIRECT,
PUNITIVE, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES,
INCLUDING, WITHOUT LIMITATION, LOSS OF PROFITS, REVENUE,
BUSINESS OR GOODWILL, WHETHER IN AN ACTION CONTRACT,
TORT (INCLUDING, WITHOUT LIMITATION, NEGLIGENCE AND
STRICT LIABILITY) OR OTHERWISE, EVEN IF THE INDEMNIFIED
PARTIES HAVE BEEN ADVISED OR KNEW OF THE POSSIBLITY OF
THE DAMAGES. THE FOREGOING LIMITATION OF LIABILITY
APPLIES EVEN IF ANY REMEDY UNDER THIS CONTRACT FAILS OF
ITS ESSENTIAL PURPOSE.
(Emphasis added).
The foregoing indemnity provisions clearly prevent Packer from prevailing on her
negligence claim against Riverbend. Packer is therefore barred by contractual and/or
equitable indemnity from obtaining relief from Riverbend for her claimed damages. As
such, summary judgment is also proper in favor of Riverbend, and against Packer, under
I.R.C.P. 56 (c) based upon indemnity.
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V. CONCLUSION
Riverbend is entitled to summary judgment because there is no genuine issue of material
fact for trial as to whether any legal duty owing to Packer was breached, thereby causing her
claimed injuries. Further, even if Packer had a viable negligence claim, which she does not, such
claim is clearly barred by contractual and/or equitable indemnity. For each of these reasons,
judgment as a matter of Jaw dismissing Packer's claims against the Riverbend Defendants under
I.R.C.P. 56 (c) is proper.
DATED this 9th day of October, 2018.

HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY, LLP

Isl John A. Bailey, Jr.
JOHN A. BAILEY JR.
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Electronically Filed
10/9/2018 4:41 PM
Seventh Judicial District, Bonneville County
Penny Manning, Clerk of the Court
By: Maria Padilla, Deputy Clerk

John A. Bailey Jr. (ISB#: 2619)
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP
412 W Center Street, Suite 2000
P.O. Box 100
Pocatello, ID 83204
Telephone: 208.233.2001
Facsimile: 208.232.0150
Email: JBailey@hawleytroxell.com
Attorneys for Defendant Riverbend Communications, LLC

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE

NICOLE PACKER,
Case No.: CV-2017-7024
Plaintiff,
vs.
KINGSTON PROPERTIES, L.P; DK
ENTERPRISES, INC., RIVERBEND
COMMUNICATIONS, LLC;
RIVERBEND COMMUNICATIONS
HOLDING, LLC. And RIVERBEND
COMMUNICATIONS LLC dba
RIVERBEND EVENTS,

AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN A. BAILEY, JR.
IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS'
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO I.R.C.P.
56(c)

Defendants.

STATE OF IDAHO )
ss.
County of Bannock )
1.

I, JOHN A. BAILEY, JR., being first duly sworn under oath, deposes and states

that he is counsel of record for the Riverbend Defendants in this matter and he makes this
affidavit based upon person knowledge and belief in support of Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment.
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1. To be supplemented upon receipt from the court reporter as "Exhibit 1", shall be true
and correct copies of deposition excerpts from the oral deposition of Nicole Packer taken on the
26 th day of September, 2018.
2. Attached hereto as "Exhibit 2" is a true and correct copy of the "multi show payment
agreement" between Riverbend and the Plaintiff for the subject event.
3. Attached hereto as "Exhibit 3" are true and correct copies of photographs depicting
the loading dock area and back door exited by the Plaintiff in this case.
4.

Attached hereto as "Exhibit 4" are true and correct copies of the Articles of

Organization for Riverbend Communications Holding, LLC, along with the Annual Report Form
for this entity.
5.

Attached hereto as "Exhibit 5" are true and correct copies of the Articles of

Organization for Riverbend Communications, LLC, along with the Annual Report Form for this
entity.
DATED this ± a a y of October, 2018.
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY, LLP

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this ~ a y of October, 2018.

0 1-,,,,, ,[;}J_j));S,
/~
A

Residing a~ P~catello,_ Id~ - . r")/j :::i ,(/
My Comm1ss10n Explfes11 ~1 (>'f./ (,7 I
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PLEASE COMPLETE THIS AGREEMENT AND:
FAX TO:
{208) 525-2575
OR MAIL TO: Rlverbend Productions

RIVERBEN:b
P R O D U C T Ie

N~l\

400 W. Sunnyside
Idaho Falls, ID 83402
TELEPHONE: (208) 535-8331

EMAIL:

Events@eiradlo.com

MULTI SHOW PAYMENT AGREEMENT
1.

Riverbend Rep's Name

Company Name

Title

Contact

Website

Email Address
Address

State

City

2.

Fax

Mobile

Phone

Zip Code

3. PRODUCT DISPLAYED

EXHIBIT SPACE
YEAR

EVENT

RATE

□ Yes

□ No

East Idaho Home & Garden

□ Yes

0 No

East Idaho's Biggest Garage Sale

□ Yes

□ No

East Idaho Harvest Fest & Outdoor Expo

□ Yes

□ No

What Today's Women Want Expo

□ Yes

□ No

All I Want For Christmas Expo

□ Yes

□ No

Trick or Treat Street (with Co!or-2-Wln coloring page)

□ Yes

□ No

Event Contract must be
attached for all shows

We will exhibit the following

CONTRACT COMPLETED

East Idaho Kid's Fair

products and/or services.
(Only the products that are listed below
may be exhibited and must have Show
Management approval)

TOTALS:
DO NOT LOCATE BY; _ _ _ _ __

DEPOSIT:
BALANCE:

MONTH LY PAYMENT(Divide by number of monthly payments):
4.

PAYMENT

0

CHARGE TO MY

MASTERCARD

VISA

$_ _ __

DISCOVER
EXP DATE

CREDIT CARD ACCOUNT NUMBER

SECURITY CODE

D
SIGNATURE _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

CARD HOLDER'S NAME _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

5.

PAYMENT SCHEDULE
All payments will be equal payments and transacted on the 15th of the months below:
JANUARY
amount

I$
I$

SEPTEMBER
amount

amount

I$

JUNE

MAY
amount

FEBRUARY

I$

amount

OCTOBER
amount

MARCH

APRIL

amount

amount

JULY

1$
I$

0 RECEIPT REQUEST VIA EMAIL

amount

I$

AUGUST

I$

amount

1-$-==c.___

DECEMBER

NOVEMBER
amount

Ir$---"---~

I$

amount

Ir$-....::==~~

Check Here: _ _ I authorize Riverbend Communications to process the credit card payments as noted above.
By signing this Agreement the Exhibiting Company agrees to the Rlverbend Productions Event Agreement Terms and Conditions found on the reverse side

of all contracts. Any change fn the Exhibiting Company's mailing address, show guide information, brand names or product listings must be communicated in
writing. Filming may be in pr6gress at the event. By exhibiting In this event, you agree to allow for your image to appear In our videotaping and photography
for any and all commerdal purposes.

6.
Signature

Date
11/6/14
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PLEASE COMPLETE THIS AGREEMENT AND:
FAX TO:
(208) 525,2575

December 4 & 5, 2015
Kingston Plaza - Idaho Falls
EastldahoChristmas.com

RIVE\\~0

OR MAIL TO: Rlverbend Productions

400 W. Sunnyside
Idaho Falls, ID 83402

¥c~H\\

TELEPHONE: {208) 535-8331

EMAIL:

Events@eiradio,com

EXHIBIT SPACE APPLICATION/CONTRACT
This contract is for commercial vendors only. Craft & food vendors please email: events@eiradio.com for correct contract.
1.

Company Name

Riverbend Account Rep

Contact

Title

Email Address

Website

Address
City

State

Phone

2.

Mobile

Zip Code
Fax

EXHIBIT SPACE

3. PRODUCT DISPLAYED

OFFICE US ONLY
Date Received:

We will exhibit the following
products and/or services.

Booth Sizes: Booth includes 1 - er draped table & 2 cha irs
Single Booth (10'x10')
$350
$
Single Corner Booth (10'x10') limited
$400
$
Double Booth (10'x20')
$600
$
Double Corner Booth (10'x20') limited
$650
$
$750
$
Double End Cap (10'x20') limited
$850
$
Triple Booth (10'x30')
Quad Booth (20'x20')
$1,100 $
$1,300 $
Jumbo Booth (20'x30')
X-Large Booth (20'x40')
$1,S00 $
Non-Profit Booth (10'x10') limited
$250
$

I

(Only the products that are listed below
may be exhibited and must have Show
Management approval)

$10 each
$5 each

Wireless Internet Access
Electricity to Booth
Additional Show Tickets ($4

$10
$25
$1 each

Value)

4.

I

I

I

Booth#:

$
$
$
$
$

Event Listed:
I I
Web Listing:
I I
Tickets Sent:

DO NOT LOCATE BY: _ _ _ _ __

I

I

Payment Method
Check# _ _
Credit Card
Cash

$

TOTAL COST OF SPACE
Marketing Opportunities (ask sales rep for details)
TOTAL INVESTMENT

I

Booth Assigned:

Add On: (Must select to have available at show)

Additional Tables
Additional Chairs

I

Approval Email:

$

$

PAYMENT

0

PLEASE FIND MY CHECK ENCLOSED (PAYABLE TO Riverbend Communications)

OR
0 CHARGE TO MY

VISA

MASTERCARD

DISCOVER

CREDIT CARD ACCOUNT NUMBER

EXP DATE

SECURITY CODE

D
CARD HOLDER'S NAME _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

5.

PAYMENT SCHEDULE

SIGNATURE _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

"'Payment schedule only applies to contract with credit card on file.

34% with signed contract • 33% payment due Oct. 15, 2015 • Balance due Nov. 15, 2015
amount

I$

~~~~~jUNDABLE

I

amount

I$

I

amount

I$

2nd & 3rd payments
MUST be the same amount

Check Here: _ _ I authorize Riverbend Communications to process the second & final payments
(due respectively on Oct. 15, 2015 and Nov. 15, 2015) on credit card above.
By signing this Agreement the Exhibiting Company agrees to the Riverbend Productions Event Agreement Terms and Conditions found on the reverse side of
this Agreement. Any change in the Exhibiting Company's mailing address, show guide information, brand names or product listings must be communicated in
writing. FIim ing may be in progress at the event. By exhibiting In thfs event, you agree to allow for your Image to appear in our videotaping and photography
for any and all commercial purposes.

6.
Signature
Please retain a photocopy of this form for your own records, Terms and Conditions on Reverse Side,

Date
12/11/14
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All I Want For Christmas Expo
December 4 & 5, 2015

I Kingston Plaza, Idaho Falls

Contract Terms & Conditions
1.
2.

Vendor Is responslble for, and must obtain, all permits and licenses required to participate In the expo, lnoludlng a sales tax permit and clearance from the Idaho
Department of Health and Welfare.
Vendor's exhibit materials must meet fire and safety regulations, Authorities may confiscate or remove any non-conforming materials,

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Vendor will not use, store or transport any hazardous materials at expo.
No open flames or cooking grease permitted at expo.
Vendor will not cause or permit beer, wine, liquor or any other alcoholic beverage of any ktnd to be sold, given away or used at the expo.
No smoking Is permitted at the facility hosting the expo (the "Facility"),
Parking at the Facility Is limited to areas designated for Vendor's employees, agents and representatives.

B.

Exhibits must be fully set·up by 9am on Friday, December 4, 2015, or Vendor will be subject to a $50.00 penalty, Vendors will be allowed to set·up from 2pm to 8pm
on Thursday, December 3, 2015.
9. Vendor's exhibit must be open and staffed during all expo hours: Friday December 4, 2015, 10am to 7pm & Saturday December 5, 2015, 10am to7pm.
10. Vendor may not dismantle its exhibit until after the expo closes on Saturday, December 5, 2015 at 7pm. Vendor must dismantle and remove Its exhibit from the Facility
by 9pm on Saturday December 5, 2015, or Vendor wi!I be subject to a $50.00 penalty, Rlverbend Communications may remove and dispose of any exhibit mater!als
remaining after this deadline at Its discretion and without liability to Vendor.
11. Riverbend Communications does not guarantee attendance or booth traffic at the expo.
12.
13,
14.
15,

Vendor may not sublet or reassign booth space without written permission.
Vendor will display only those products specified In the appllcatlon, unless prior wrttten approval Is given by Rlverbend Communications at Its discretion.
All audio or visual media played or displayed In Vendor's exhibit must be authorized in writing by the copyright owner as required by law.
Vendor's exhibit will not visually, physically or aud!bly disturb aisles or adjacent vendors. (No side walls over 4 feet.)

16. Vendor will not attach any materials to columns, walls, floors or any other part of the Facility or to any furniture at the Facility. Banners may be attached with zip-ties or
twine. Vendor will return Its exhibit space to prior set·up condition or better.
17. Rlverbend Communications may reject or restrict any exhibit, In part or In whole, at its discretion.
18, Rlverbend Commun!catlons will assign booth space at Its discretion and may change any booth assignments. Booth assignments will be posted the morning of set·up,
19. This contract is non-cancelable by Vendor. If due to unforeseen circumstances Vendor Is unable to participate in the show, Vendor will notify Rlverbend Communications
In writing on or before November 15, 2015. On receipt of Vendor's notice, Rlverbend Communications may, at Its discretion, attempt to find another vendor to occupy
Vendor's exhibit space. If successful, Rlverbend Communfcatlons may refund all or any portion of any amounts prepaid by Vendor,
20. Vendor Is responsible for any loss, theft or destruction of Its goods or property while at the expo, To the fullest extend allowed by law, Rlverbend Communlcatlons
and the owner/operator of the Facility, and their respective officers, directors, members, employees, agents and representat!ves, are not responsible for the acts or
omissions of any security equipment or security personnel.
21. Vendor hereby grants Rlverbend Communications and Its designates the right to use photographs, audio/video creations or other renderings of Vendor's exhibit space
at the expo for an unl1mlted period of time for Its own purposes without compensation.
22. Vendor may not use the loge for the expo or any other tangible or intangible property of Riverbend Communications or the owner/operator of the Facility without prior
written consent.
23. Vendor shall protect, indemnify, defend and hold harmless Rlverbend Communications, the owner/operator of the Facility and any person associated with the sponsorship
or administration of the expo, and their respective officers, directors, members, employees, agents and representatives, (collectively, the "Indemnified Parties") for,
from and against any third party claims, demands, proceedings, suits and actions, Including any related llab!litles, obl!gatlons, losses, damages, deficiencies, penalties,
taxes, levles, fines, Judgments, settlements, costs, expenses, legal fees and disbursements, and accountants' fees and disbursements, Incurred by, borne by or
asserted against any of the Indemnified Parties that relate to, arise out of or result from Vendor's participation In the expo.
24. THE INDEMNIFIED PARTIES' MAXIMUM LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES IN CONNECTION WITH THIS CONTRACT, REGARDLESS OF THE CAUSE OF ACTION, WILL
NOT EXCEED THE TOTAL AMOUNT PAID BY VENDOR TO RIVERBEND COMMUNICATIONS FOR EXHIBIT SPACE AT THE EXPO. IN NO EVENT WILL ANY OF
THE INDEMNIFIED PARTIES BE LIABLE TO VENDOR OR ANY OTHER PERSON OR ENTITY FOR ANY INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, INDIRECT, PUNITIVE, EXEMPLARY
OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES, INCLUDING, WITHOUT LIMITATION, LOSS OF PROFITS, REVENUE, BUSINESS OR GOODWILL, WHETHER IN AN ACTION IN
CONTRACT, TORT (INCLUDING, WITHOUT LIMITATION, NEGLIGENCE AND STRICT LIABILITY) OR OTHERWISE, EVEN JF THE INDEMNIFIED PARTIES HAVE BEEN
ADVISED OR KNEW OF THE POSSIBILITY OF THE DAMAGES. THE FOREGOING LIMITATION OF LIABILITY APPLIES EVEN IF ANY REMEDY UNDER THIS CONTRACT
FAILS OF ITS ESSENTIAL PURPOSE.
25. If alt or any portion of the expo is not held due to war, fire, strike, government regulation or restriction, natural or public catastrophe or any other event of force majeure,
Riverbend Communications will refund to Vendor any prepaid amou.nts on a pro rate basis. None of the Indemnified Parties wfll be liable if the Facility is damaged from
any cause whatsoever.
26. By entering Into this contract the parties do not Intend to undertake a joint venture. Neither party will be the agent of the other and neither party will have any authority
to create or assume any obligations whatsoever In the name of the other party or on its behalf. This contract establishes a business relationship between Vendor and
Rlverbend Communications. Vendor hereby acknowledges that Rlverbend Communications may communicate with Vendor via fax, email, telephone, U.S. mall or any
other method. Vendor may opt out of receiving these communications at Its discretion.
27, The substantially prevailing party in any suit, action or proceeding brought in connection with this contract will be entitled to payment by the other party of all attorneys'
fees, collection costs, court fees and other expenses Incurred by the substantially prevailing party, regardless of whether Incurred before or after judgment. AU notices
under this contract must be In writing. Notices will be effective lf delivered personally, mailed by certified mail (return receipt requested) or delivered by recognized
commercial courier addressed to the other party at their last known business address. This contract and any Interpretation thereof will be governed by the laws of the
State If Idaho. Facsimile signatures will have the same legal effect as original signatures. This contract constitutes the entire agreement between the parties with respect
to the subject matter hereof and neither party will be bound by any terms, conditions or representations not set forth In this contract. Neither party will be bound by any
oral agreemeJlt or special arrangements contrary to the terms and conditions ofthls contract, and no agent or employee of Aiverbend Communications has the authority
to vary any of the terms and conditions of this contract, except pursuant to a duly authorized and executed written amendment or waiver to this contract. If any portion of
this contract Is declared invalid under applicable !aw, such declaration w!U not affect the remaining terms of the contract, all of which will remain In full force and effect.

RIVERBEN1Y'
!f\\
pR

OO

U CT

•

400 W. Sunnyside, Idaho Falls, ID 83402

• Tel: 208·523-3722

•

Fax: 208-525-2575

•

EastldahoChrlstmas.com

1
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EXHIBIT 3

Page 55

Page 56
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EXHIBIT 4
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07 /29./2016 09:4 6

From;

FILED EFFECTIVE

CERTIFICATE OF ORGANIZATION
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY

?Oli JUL 29 PM 121 36

Title 30, Chapters 21 and 25, Idaho Code
Filing fee: $100 typed, $120 not typed
complete an~ s11bmlt the application In

1.

SECRETARY OF STATE
STATE OF IOAHO

dupncate.

The name of the limited liability company Is:
Rlverbend Communications Holdings, LLC
(Remember

2.

#197 P.002/004

t{)

Include the words ''Umfted UabH(ty Company,•·• "Limited Company," or the

al1brevl,Hl◊nij

LL,C,, LLC, or LC)

The complete street and mailing addresses of the principal office is:
400 W. Sunnyside J)l2...
I

::r:J?6stl0 FAUS lJ? &z4D1-,,

iM8iUr10 Addn)ss. if differnnl)

3.

The name of the registered agent and the street address of the registered agent:
4609 W. 65th South, Idaho Falls, ID 83402

David Dance

4.

The name and address of at least one governor of the limited liability company:
Duston Barton
4609 W. 65th South, Idaho Falls, ID 83402

\ arne1

5.

Mailing address for future correspondence (annual report notices):
4609 W. 65th South, Idaho Falls, ID 83402

Signature of organizer(s).

----::z3./"\...

Secretary of State use only

Signature:~

Printed Name: Duston Barton
Signature: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

IDAHO SECRETARY Of 5TM'E

07/29/2016 05:00
CK:4077566 CT:172099 BH:1539700
1~ 100.00 = 100.00 ORGAN' LLC J2
16 20.00 = 20.00 EXPEDITE C JS

Printed N a m e : - - - - - - - - - - - - Ra .... 11/2015
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Page 1 of 1

Annual Report for W 169591
No. W 169591
Return to:
SECRETARY OF STATE
700 WEST JEFFERSON
PO BOX 83720
BOISE, ID 83720-0080

Due no later than Jul 31, 2017

Annual Report Form
1, Malling Address: Correct in this box if needed.
RIVERBEND COMMUNICATIONS HOLDINGS, LLC
PO BOX 50277
IDAHO FALLS ID 83405
USA

2. Registered Agent and Address
(NO PO BOX)
DAVID DANCE
4609 W 65TH S
IDAHO FALLS ID 83402

3, New Registered Agent Sig.nature:*

NO FILING FEE IF
RECEIVED BY DUE DATE
4. Limited Liability Companies: Enter Names and Addresses of at least one Member or Manager.
State.... ......c.~.uDtrt.
Name
Street or PO Address
Office Held .,.,
······ C,ily
IDAHO FALLS. ID
USA
MANAGER ..... ·····•·· ... RivERBEND MANAGEMENi';iNC: 46o9 W: iisiR S:

5. Organized Under the Laws of:

ID
W 169591
Processed 05/23/2017

Postal Code
83402

6, Annual Report must be signed.*
Signature: David Dance

Name (type or print): David Dance

Date: 05/23/2017
ll~e: Counsel

* Electronically provided signatures are accepted as original signatures.

https:/.fsos.idaho.gov/xt/?xp=%5C20170523%5CXMLPORTS- Wl69591 - 1705231608.xml

7/21/2018
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EXHIBIT 5

Page 61

JAN·IM006 10:06Aij

P.oos/004

1-sos

208-523-9518

FROl,\-HOLDEN KIDWELL HAHN CRAPO

,-122

ARTICLES OF ORGANIZATION

IVE
LIMITED LIA BIL ITY CO MP AN Y FILED EFFECT
(Instructions on back of application)

2Ullfi JMI I 8 A11 IO: 35

1, The name of the limited llabinty company is:
Rivertlend Communications, LLC
2. The street address of the initial registered office is:
2880 N 55 W, Idaho Falls, ID 83405

address is:
and the name of the iniUal registered agent at the above
Frank L, Vandersloot

3, The malling address for future correspondence Is:
PO Box 50305. Idaho Falls, ID 83405
vested in:
4. Management of the limited liability company will be
Manager(s)

0

or Member(s)

0

lpl•"• """"' the •pp,opn>te box)

ger(s), list the name(s) and
5, If management Is to be vested in one or more mana
nt is to be vested In the
address(es) of at least one initial man,;1ger. lf manageme
one initial member,
member(s), list the name(s) and address(es) of at least
.Addre,s

Frank L. YanderSloot

2880 N 55 W 1 Idaho Falls, ID 83405

ng the
6. Signature olf:\leastone perr.,n re:lf ~Si~ for formi

limited liability company;

vt""- 1, L ,~ .i! · ·--- - s.c:-,,,,y ., s,.i.

Signature:
Typed Name: Frank L. Vandersloot
·
Capacity; Member

S!snature _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Typed Na me :__ __ __ __ __
Capacity:

,

uie-cr.ly --···

i

. la
1~

'f}
·!

~~~~~~~~~=

. ,"
rm Sf:CRETl!RY
eeeG B5,ee
01.r.ra-r
CT; 12945 Bit: 932596
OF STATE

i

Cl(:

IOE

I I 118,118 • lilt.II 1J16A11 U.C I B

I 8 21,18 •

21,11 EX.all£ CI 3

W

1.\- (o 3 (.o (p
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Page 1 of 1

Annual Report for W 46366
No. W46366

Due no later than Jan 31, 2018

Annual Report Form

Return to:
SECRETARY OF STATE
700 WEST JEFFERSON
PO BOX 83720
BOISE, ID 83720-0080

1. Mailing Address: Correct in this box if needed.

RIVERBEND COMMUNICATIONS, LLC
DAVID DANCE
PO BOX 50277
IDAHO FALLS ID 8340S

2. Registered Agent and Address
(NO PO BOX)
FRANK L VANDERSLOOT
4609 WEST 65TH SOUTH
IDAHO FALLS ID 83402

3, l':lfily Registered Agent Signature:*

NO FILING FEE IF
RECEIVED BY DUE DATE

4. Limited Liability Companies: Enter Names and Addresses of at least one Member or Manager.
State _country ...
Office Held
Name
, .. ....... , .. ,,,.,,, .
........,. Street or PO Address
....9t\:........
. MANAGER
FRANK L VANDERSLOOT-·
4i;o<i wi:si'i;msoiJrfi
IDAHO FALLS
ID
4609 WEST 65TH SOUTH
IDAHO FALLS
ID
USA
MANAGER
DUSTON BARTON
ID
400 W SUNNYSIDE RD
IDAHO FALLS
USA
MANAGER
BILL Fl)ERST
,

5, Organized l)nder the Laws of:
ID
W46366

Processed 02/21/2018

6, Annual Report must be signed.*
Signature: David Dance
Name (type or print): David Dance

Postal Code
83405
83402
83402

Date: 02/21/2018
Title: Counsel

* Electronically provided signatures are accepted as original signatures.

https://sos.idaho.gov/xt/?xp=%5C20180221 %5CXMLPORTS_W46366_ 1802210915 .xml

7/21/2018
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Electronically Filed
10/9/2018 3:43 PM
Seventh Judicial District, Bonneville County
Penny Manning, Clerk of the Court
By: Angelica Linares, Deputy Clerk

Donald F. Carey, ISB #4392
Lindsey R. Romankiw, ISB #8438
CAREY ROMANKIW, PLLC
4 77 Shoup Ave., Suite 203
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402
Telephone: (208) 525-2604
Facsimile: (208) 525-8813
Email: dfc@careyromankiw.com
Email: lrr@careyromankiw.com
Attorneys for Kingston Properties, L.P. &
DK Enterprises, Inc.
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE

NICOLE PACKER,
Plaintiffs,
Case No. CV-2017-7024
V.

KINGSTON PROPERTIES, L.P.; DK
ENTERPRISES,
INC.;
RIVERBEND
COMMUNICATIONS, LLC; RIVERBEND
COMMUNICATIONS HOLDING, LLC; and
RIVERBEND COMMUNICATIONS, LLC,
d/b/a RIVERBEND EVENTS,

AFFIDAVIT OF DONALD F. CAREY IN
SUPPORT
OF
MOTION
FOR
SUMMARY JUDGEMENT

Defendants.

STATE OF IDAHO
County of Bonneville

)
) ss.
)

DONALD F. CAREY, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states as
follows:

AFFIDAVIT OF DONALD F. CAREY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGEMENT - I

Page 64

1.

That I am the attorney of record for Defendant's Kingston Properties, L.P.,

and DK Enterprises, Inc., in the above-captioned case.
2.

That I am a resident of the United States of America, and that I am over the

age of twenty-one (21) years.
3.

That attached hereto and incorporated by reference as Exhibit "A" is a true

and correct copy of pages from the deposition transcript of Nicole Packer taken
September 26, 2018.
4.

That attached hereto and incorporated by reference as Exhibit "B" is a true

and correct copy of Exhibits 1 and 2 from the deposition transcript of Nicole Packer
taken September 26, 2018.

FURTHER your Affiant saith not.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 9th day of October, 2018.

AFFIDAVIT OF DONALD F. CAREY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGEMENT - 2

Page 65

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 9th day of October, 2018, I served a true and correct copy
of the above and foregoing document to the following person(s) as follows:

Allen H. Browning

[ ]

BROWNING LAW

[ ]

482 Constitution Way, Suite 111
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402
Telephone: (208) 542-2700

[ ]
[X]

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand-Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile (208) 542-2711

Attorneys for Plaintiffe

John A. Bailey, Jr.
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS

[ ]
&

HAWLEY

[

]

LLP

[

]

412 W. Center Street, Suite 2000
PO Box 100
Pocatello, Idaho 83204
Telephone (208) 233-2001

[X]

U.S. Mail Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivery
Overnight Mail
Facsimile (208) 232.0150

Attorneys for Defendant Riverbend
Communications Holding, LLC

AFFIDAVIT OF DONALD F. CAREY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGEMENT- 3
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Exhibit
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'

.

.

1

•
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In The Matter Of:
PACKER vs.
KINGSTON PROPERTIES, L.P., et al.

NICOLE PACKER
September 26, 2018

T& T Reporting, LLC
477 Shoup Avenue, Suite 105
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402

Min-U-Script® with \.Vord Index

Page 68

PACKER vs.
KINGSTON PROPERTIES, L.P., et al.

NICOLE PACKER

September 26, 2018
Page 1

Page 3

1

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF

1

2

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE

2

NICOLE PACKER,

4

3
4

3
)

E X A M I N A T I O N

NICOLE PACKER
BY
BY
BY
BY
BY

)

5
6

Plaintiff,
)

vs.

9

10

)
)

7

8

) Case No.
CV-2017-7024

KINGSTON PROPERTIES, L.P.; DK
ENTERPRISES, INC.; RIVERBEND
COMMUNICATIONS, LLC; RIVERBEND
COMMUNICATIONS HOLDING, LLC; and
RIVERBEND COMMUNICATIONS, LLC,
d/b/a RIVERBEND EVENTS,

11

Defendants.

)

5

6
8

)

)

9

)
>
)

10

)

11

12
13

DEPOSITION OF NICOLE PACKER
Wednesday, September 26, 2018, 2:00 p.m.

14

15

Idaho Falls, Idaho

15

16
17
19
20
21

22
23

E X H I B I T S

No.
1.

2.
3.

16

17
BE IT REMEMBERED that the deposition of
Nicole Packer was taken by the attorney for the
defendants at the office of Carey Romankiw PLLC,
located at 477 Shoup Avenue, Suite 203, Idaho Falls,
Idaho, before Sandra D. Terrill, Court Reporter and
Notary Public, in and for the State of Idaho, in the
above-entitled matter.

18
19

4.
5.
6.

Page
Colored copy of Google map................
Colored copy of Google map................
Plaintiff's Answers to Defendants' .......
First Set of Interrogatories to
Plaintiffs and Plaintiff's Answers to
Defendants' First Set of Requests for
Production of Documents to Plaintiffs
Exhibit Space Application/Contract .....•..
Colored copy of photographs ...............
Copy of social media posts ................

22

23

25

25
Page 2

1

A P P E A R A N C E S

2

5
6

7
8
9

10
11

12
13
14

119
142
171

20

24

4

35
35
100

21

24

3

4

118
169
171
183

)

)

14

18

Page

CAREY.................................
BAILEY ................................
BROWNING ..............................
CAREY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
BAILEY ..............•.••..............

7

12
13

MR.
MR.
MR.
MR.
MR.

For Kingston Properties, L.P. & DK Enterprises, Inc.:
CAREY ROMANKIW PLLC
BY: DONALD F. CAREY
477 Shoup Avenue, Suite 203
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402
(208) 525-2604
For the Plaintiff:
BROWNING LAW
BY: ALLEN H. BROWNING
482 Constitution Way, Suite 111
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402
(208) 542-2700
For Defendant Riverbend Communications Holding, LLC:
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY, LLP
BY: JOHN A. BAILEY, JR.
412 West Center
Post Office Box 817
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-0817
(208) 233-2001

15
16

17
18
19
20
21

22
23
24

25

.\lin-l -Script"

Page4
1
2
3

4
5

6

(The deposition proceeded at 2: 19 p.m.
as follows:)
Nicole Packer,
produced as a witness at the instance of the
defendants, having been first duly sworn, was
examined and testified as follows:

7

EXAMINATION
BY MR. CAREY:
10
Q. Would you please state your full legal
11 name for me?
8

9

12
13

14
15
16
17
10
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

A.
Q.
A.
Q.

Nicole Celeste Packer.
What's the middle name?
Celeste.
Celeste. Thank you.
Nicole, have you ever been deposed
before, to one of these kind of meetings?
A. No. I don't think so.
Q. You would probably remember because even
as fun as they are, they're a bit laborious. Let me
give you some admonitions, rules if you will, that
will help us out today. Just so you know, I'm well
acquainted with your lawyer and I'm well acquainted
with Mr. Bailey and the court reporter. So there's
not going to be any finger pointing over the table or

office@ttreporting.com
T &T Reporting, LLC
208.529.5491
ttreporting.com
208.529.5496 FAX

(1) Pages 1 - 4
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PACKER vs.
KINGSTON PROPERTIES, L.P., et al.

NICOLE PACKER
September 26, 2018
Page 37

1
2
3
4
5
6
7

8
9

10

11
12
13

14
15

16
17
18

19
20

21
22
23
24

25

there but this is Google. Any question that this is
kind of the overhead of the Kingston Building?
A. So if Broadway -Q. Broadway is that street there.
A. Coming here? Okay.
Q. I think this is -- you can just see the
McDonald's parking lot here.
A. Okay.
Q. So that gives us kind of the further
view out. The closer view here is the same building,
but I just wanted to get in closer. Do you see that?
A. Uh-huh.
Q. Exhibit *-2. I want to talk to you -A. Facing the same direction.
Q. -- about Exhibit *-2 or Exhibit *-1,
depending on your answers to my questions. Okay?
A. Okay.
Q. So here's what I want to know: When you
went in to set up for your show, do you recall
whether it was the 4th or the 3rd or the 2nd?
A. I'm typically with my schedule running
busy. So I am not usually set up in advance at any
event.
Q. Okay. What does that mean with respect
to this show?
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A. The same day. I would have.
Q. Tell me, when you set up, what is your
display like? Do you have tables or shelving with
stuff on it? What is your display?
A. I'm trying to remember what I had that
year. I think that -- oh, man. Usually -- I mean, I
don't sell a bunch of candles or things like that.
So there's not going to be that kind of inventory.
But there's multiple loads. I cannot take it all
from my car between decorating, banners, raffle items
to place on a table that might interest a child.
Q. Let me ask you this: What's your target
audience? Who are you trying to reach?
A. Okay. Mostly -- men and women can come
on the retreats, but for anybody who does fitness,
yoga, and even wellness, it's primarily your
middle-aged women. We'll get some from 20s -20-year-old young moms, but then I usually get more
people around their 40s, 50s. And then you'll start
to taper off with kind ofa curve but women is the
big group. Yeah.
Q. So you're trying to attract woman who
are looking for -A. Wellness.
Q. -- a wellness adventure of sorts, and
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A. It's a two-day. So that means I would
have been coming Thursday morning to set up, to check
in and set up.
Q. And what was the Thursday of that year,
do you know?
A. Maybe it's not Thursday. Is it Friday,
Saturday? It's a two-day. It was probably Friday
and Saturday.
Q. Let's all get our phones out and find
out what the Thursday was. Let's look at this -A. So it would not have been Thursday.
That would be incorrect.
Q. December 3rd was a Thursday. You fell
on the 4th, on a Friday -A. Uh-huh.
Q. -- right?
A. Yes.
Q. So did you fall the evening of the first
day of the show?
A. Uh-huh.
Q. Yes? You're going "uh-huh."
A. Yes. I'm sorry. There I go with my
mumbling. Yes.
Q. Okay. So would you have set up on the
4th?
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Page 40

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11

12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

you're advertising your services for retreats
primarily?
A. Retreats, yoga classes, dance fitness
classes, private yoga sessions, wellness coaching.
Q. Do you make brochures, trifolds?
A. Yes.
Q. You have that sort of thing?
A. Yeah. I'll have different kinds.
Business cards, brochures, banners. Stand up images
that you put, like, in the little glass containers,
photographs and -Q. I call them picture frames of sorts,
plastic picture frame that you put on the table to
show -A. Yeah.
Q. -- an activity, that sort of thing?
A. Yeah. Those kinds of things.
Q. So you probably have a table, at least
one table?
A. Yeah. Sometimes I'll bring in another.
I can't remember if they provide -- they may provide
one, but I might need to have another fold table.
Q. When you decided that you wanted to
participate in this show, were you given a contract
to sign? Is there any paperwork at all between you
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and Riverbend as a vendor for their All I Want For
Christmas festival?
A. Yes.
Q. And what is that paper?
A. Like, do I have a copy of it are you
asking?
Q. Yeah. Is it a contract? Is it a rules
and dos and don'ts?
A. There is a packet but I want to say that
it hasn't always come the same way, or I don't even
know if I've received it every time. I have received
a packet at least once that I remember. So I did
sign -- I think the reason why I was at the garage
sale and a few of their events was I did -- I did
sign some kind of a contract with them for multiple
event participation.
Q. Do you have a copy of that contract?
A. Like, right here, no. I would have to
look for it.
Q. When you get -- sometimes you see these
packages come out and it's more and more prevalent
now with e-mail where somebody will attach a PDF to
an e-mail, you print it out, sign it, scan it, shoot
it back to them?
A. It was primarily a payment schedule on
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have been some package of information about this
particular show?
A. I don't know if they gave me for this
show or if it was just -- if this was part of that
series that I signed.
Q. Where would you look, Nicole, to find
out if you still had that?
A. For this I would go back through the
e-mails, but I would probably have to search under -I need to find how they were sending them out and
maybe talk to Riverbend themselves what were these
under and do a search. Because I do save those
records if it was digital. And I would have it.
Q. Who would you have signed and given it
to, whatever that paper was?
A. I don't know if I have a digital
version. To that young man that sold the series of
contract. We might have done it digitally rather
than in person. So if we did it digitally, it would
be in the e-mail.
Q. Have you ever signed -- does this ring a
bell? Sometimes when you're a vendor at these
facilities, part of the documentation that you're
signing is a waiver and release of liability. Have
you heard of that? Do you know what I'm talking
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there, like, the events and how much I would be
1
paying.
2
Q. Sure. My question is: Did you get your
3
package from Riverbend via e-mail?
4
A. I don't know if I did because I was
5
recently doing a search and I wasn't finding as much 6
through the e-mail. I was trying to see if I could
7
find -- you know, what I could pull up from Jay
8
Communications. So I don't know if they always did.
9
I think that for some -- for some people that they
10
did send those but I don't know if it was routine and 11
I haven't only worked with Jay. When I signed the 12
contract, I did not sign it with Jay. I can tell you
13
that.
14
Q. Do you recall who you did sign it with,
15
who your contact was with at the time?
16
A. So they've had people come in and out,
17
and I've worked with different individuals through
18
the company. One was a woman who was helping with 19
half price deals. So she was one of my contacts.
20
And then one was a guy -- I don't even know if he's 21
still there. I think sometimes their salespeople
22
come and go. And so I've dealt with different
23
salespeople which is why -24
Q. But your recollection is there would
25

,1in-l -Script 11

Page44

about?
A. I know what a waiver and release of
liability is. Have I noticed that there's a specific
waiver and release of liability that they gave me?
No, not really. Usually it's one form that I was
signing that had the payment. And then any other
document -- if they gave it -- I don't think I got
one for every single event -- would kind of be the
description: This is where your booth space is,
information about the event logistics. But a
separate waiver as vendors, I've never had that
separated out. It's always: Do you want to be a
vendor? This is your payment. Authorize the card.
Q. You went way beyond the call of my
question.
A. Oh, I'm sorry. Bring me back.
Q. You know what a waiver -A. Yeah, I know what they are.
Q. When people go on your retreats, do you
have them sign a waiver?
A. Sure. Yes.
Q. You know what they are?
A. Yes.
Q. As you sit here today, do you know
whether any of the documentation you signed was a
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waiver and a release holding Kingston, the building
owner, or Riverbend, the promotor, if you will,
harmless from any injuries or damages?
A. I would need to look because, again,
you're given whatever documents or you're with a
salesperson. I don't know that -- do you know what I
mean? I just didn't notice. So I can't say. I
don't want to say something that I -Q. Sure.
A. -- that I don't know.
Q. And "I don't recall" is a perfectly fine
answer.
A. Yeah.
Q. What I am going to ask you to do is to
try and look through your e-mails to see if you can
locate the package of information -A. Can I have a sticky?
Q. You can have a whole notepad.
A. Okay. Thank you.
Q. And a pen.
Look through your e-mails. See if you
can find the package of information that would have
been relevant to the All I Want For Christmas trade
show in 2015, whether it's part of the package of
three or a standalone project. Will you do that for
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there. The parking lot is full. You find what you
can. And I'm thinking: Get into the event to set
up. So I came in through this door, which again, is
not a typical for a vendor. I had come in through
this door in the past.
Q. When you're saying "this door" -A. This is the front?
Q. Yes. There are two doors on the front
of that building.
A. Okay.
Q. Do you know that?
A. It's really big and long. And so
there's all that glass or whatever. The door that I
came through was the one where they check people in
because I needed my packet information and to know
where my booth was.
Q. Let me describe what I think you're
telling me, and you tell me if this makes sense.
Okay?
A. Okay.
Q. The main door when it used to be
whatever the original building was constructed for is
a double -- is a set of double doors with a foyer
entrance where you come through the first door and
then there's kind of a dead space area and you come
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me?
A. Okay. Yeah, I will.
Q. When you find it, don't call me, call
Mr. Browning and give it to him. And he'll give it
to us.
A. Okay. Yes.
Q. I'm glad you're taking notes.
A. Yeah. I won't remember going back three
years.
Q. Let's go back to the exhibit now. On
Exhibit *-1, do you -- it's been a while. Do you
have a present sense recollection -- in other words,
do you know where you parked to load your display
material into the building?
A. So I came in through this way.
Q. I'm going to ask you not to write on it
until I ask you to write on it. Okay? So click that
pen closed.
A. So I don't accidentally -- okay.
Q. Tell me what you think. Explain it to
me while using the exhibit, and then I may have you
mark on it.
A. I cannot say exactly where I parked.
That would be incredible. But I came in -- for me
that would be incredible. I know that there's people
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through the second door and it's all glass.
A. Uh-huh.
Q. Is that what you're talking about?
A. Yeah. Where they set up their check-in.
Where would the other door be that you're saying in
front?
Q. Well, I can't testify. But if you were
to go to the building -- and this is the west, the
east, the south, and the north. So we're talking
about the door -A. Okay.
Q. The front door on the north side of the
building. Okay?
A. Okay.
Q. To the east of there is another flat
series of glass doors, but they don't have a foyer
area.
A. No. I don't think that -- and I can't
say, but I don't even think that they really have
that open because they want to filter people through
the check-in.
Q. So when you went in to set up your
vendor material, you went through the main foyer area
doors?
A. Now I'm thinking. Because I needed to
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get my packet. I would say yes because I did
multiple trips in and out of the building.
Q. And that makes sense. So you would have
parked where in the parking lot, if you know?
A. Wherever there was a spot. It would be
somewhere here.
Q. But it would have been on the north side
of the building? If the main door -A. Yeah.
Q. -- is on the north side, it would have
been on the north side?
A. Yes. At that time.
Q. As close as you could to the door -A. Yeah.
Q. -- so you didn't have to walk as far?
A. Which may not have been close. It's
always busy.
Q. All right. Fair enough. After you set
up your material, do you remember leaving for some
time before going back when the trade show opened?
A. I didn't completely set up from here
because I know that I came in through this side door.
Q. Okay. And "this side door," the door
you're saying you came in on is on the west side of
the building?

booth spots.
Q. What kind of door is the door on the
3
west? Is it a glass? Is it -4
A. It's not glass. Gosh, you have to prop
5
it or it locks. I don't pay much attention to the
6
doors when I'm coming in. But they -- I don't know.
7
It's a common entrance for the vendors as well.
8
Q. So it's propped open; is that what you
9
said?
10
A. Sometimes. Because if people are coming
11
in and out, sometimes it locks. Do I remember if it
12
was locked that day or not? I don't remember.
13
Q. Let me ask you this: When you last -14 the last load you carried in before you staffed your
15 display where you were there for the show, did you
16
use the west door?
17
A. I don't know if it was the last load,
18
but while I was coming in through the west, that's
19
where Jay told me, he's like: Don't use this door.
2 o And there was something weird with the door. I don't
21 remember what -22
Q. Did he say not to use the door for what?
23
A. That I was using to enter and exit. He
24 said: Do not use this door because there's a problem
25 with it.
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A. Yeah. If that's west, yes.
Q. Okay. So why don't you put an arrow -and I don't know where along this end is but I think
it's somewhere right in that area there. Why don't
you put an arrow in through west side. And you're
doing that in blue ink, correct?
A. Okay. West. West.
Q. So when you set up, you came in through
the north doors?
A. Uh-huh.
Q. Main foyer. And when you went to
actually -A. Moving stuff, bags, items for the booth.
Q. You used the west door?
A. Uh-huh.
Q. Yes?
A. Yeah. Because my booth was probably -I don't remember.
Q. That's going to be the next question.
Do you know where your booth was on the inside of
that building?
A. No. Because I've done different vendor
events, many. So whether at Kingston or somewhere
else -- I know I've been in Kingston before though.
I just can't tell you what -- I've had different
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Q. Okay. Where were you parked? You
mention in your recorded statement that we've got
that after you fell -- you were trying to get to your
car?
A. Uh-huh.
Q. Yes?
A. Yeah.
Q. Where were you parked?
A. This side somewhere here.
Q. And the parking lot to the west side -to the west of the building west of the door that you
were carrying stuff in?
A. Yes. Yeah. Because it would be a long
distance to haul it all the way in. So I probably
went through the side.
Q. So when you originally went -- when you
originally got to the building, you parked on the
north side and moved stuff through the main glass
foyer to pick up your package. Did you then relocate
your car to load stuff in through the west?
A. Yeah.
Q. Once you relocated your car and started
loading stuff in on the 4th, did you move it again?
A. At the event? No. I went in to the
event then and stayed.
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Q. Well, you parked your car on the west
side -A. Uh-huh.
Q. -- to load the -- carry the handbags
and-A. And left it there.
Q. And you left your car on the west?
A. Yeah.
Q. Did you stay in the building -- the last
time you went into the building, did you go in
through the west door?
A. I think that it must have been my last
trip. I'm just trying to remember because it's -- I
don't want to misreport anything but while I was
coming in, I had bags. Jay said: We don't want you
using this door anymore. We want you to go through
the back exit because there's a problem with the
door.
Q. The back exit. Okay. And what did you
understand by the back exit?
A. The back is where -- if you're at the
event, this is the front -Q. The north side is the front?
A. Yeah. So you come in. So the back is
over here where the --

use. Was there any vendors set up in there on the
inside of the building?
A. Not far from there.
Q. Do you recall who was set up there?
A. It depends: It varies. That back wall
depending on the event -- and I've been with clients
and I've been as a vendor. So -8
Q. Let me ask you this -A. -- I can't remember.
9
10
Q. -- Nicole. When you were given -11
A. But there is vendors there close to the
12 door.
13
Q. When you were given the data for the
14 show, were you given a location map on the inside of
15 the building with your spot identified?
16
A. They tell us where to go because I have
17 had in the past where I come in -- I always check
18 because sometimes the spot is moved. I've had my
19 spot moved before. So I check at the front with
20 either Jay or -- gosh, what's her name? She's also
21 from the radio station. Has gray hair. Older lady.
22
Q. Have you been at the art show down here
23 on the river? Where is the river?
24
A. Like, walked around at the art show?
25
Q. Yeah.
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Q. On the south side?
A. Which is -- he said the back exit, which
is one that the food vendors -- I know the food comes
in through the back and they usually set up
somewhere. It can vary during the event.
Q. On the inside of the building -- now, we
can go to either one. But on the inside of the
building inside that west door, were there other
vendors set up between your booth and the door?
A. Yeah. I believe so.
Q. Do you recall what was set up between
your booth and the door, what vendors?
A. Oh, my. I don't know ifmy memory is
remembering the Christmas one, but they usually have
food type stuff closer toward this -Q. You said food towards the south wall?
A. Yes. So, like, chocolates.
Q. And what towards the west wall?
A. Oh, this area?
Q. Yes.
A. Right right by?
Q. Between your booth and the west door
that you -A. I don't remember.
Q. -- came in and that Jay told you not to
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A. Not this year but I have before.
Q. And you'll see whoever puts that on, the
Arts Council, they'll draw lines in the grass and
they'll write spot 21?
A. Yeah.
Q. And then there's a map that says spot 21
is this vendor?
A. Uh-huh.
Q. What I'm asking you is: Did you have a
map of the inside of the building that said your
booth will be here in spot 12, for instance, but
there might be a spot 13, 14, 15 around the other
side here? Have you ever seen a map like that?
A. Yeah. I mean, they'll do that kind of
thing. I haven't always received one in the packet
thing beforehand. And I don't know if sometimes they
give it at the Thursday that I don't go to when they
set up. So Friday, the typical procedure, I check
with them, and they have sometimes moved my spot for
different reasons. One time there was somebody in my
spot. Another time they're like: We're going to put
you up here. I don't remember if it was this event.
That's why I'm -Q. But your recollection is there is a
floor plan?
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A. They organize their event. They have a
1
A. He said that that's the door he wanted
plan, yes.
2 me to use. He did say: When you leave. When you
Q. Do you have a copy of that floor plan?
3
leave we want you to go through the back. We don't
A. I wish I did.
4
want people using this door. And basically this -Q. Will you look and see in your data if
5
to leave the front for the public so that vendors are
you have a copy of the floor plan?
6
not bringing stuff in.
A. Okay.
7
Q. Did you understand him to say if you
Q. Okay. Thank you.
8 weren't carrying anything you still can't use the
A. Yes, I will. I didn't look too heavily.
9
front door, or did you understand him to say if
I dabbled a little bit, but I will now really plug
10 you're packing vendor material, we'd prefer that you
away.
11 not use the front door?
Q. Well, what I'm trying to figure out is
12
A. He just said: We want you using the
who the other vendors were between the door and your 13 back. I want you to exit through the back.
booth for informational, just to find out what they 14
Q. Did he tell you what particular door on
knew about the door. Do you know what was
15 the back to use?
specifically wrong with the door?
16
A. I thought it was weird because that's
A. Something with the frame. And, again, I
17 not -- that's not the way that I've ever done it.
was in a hurry so I wasn't paying attention like
18 But he did specify and direct that it was where the
what's going on here? But it seems like they were
19 food vendor exit -- I can't quote his exact words,
worried that something could fall and hurt somebody, 20 but I wanted clarification. It was very clear, not a
that door in particular. It was an unusual
21 doubt in my mind that it was this door. And I knew
circumstance because normally no problem, no problem 22 that the food vendors used that door as well.
through either of these doors.
Q. Do you know how many doors are on the
23
Q. I want to be clear that Jay said he
24 south side of that building?
wanted you to use the back door for, what, loading 25
A. I do not explore this area at all.
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stuff in, loading stuff out?
A. Yeah. He didn't want this door used
because they were worried that it could -Q. When you pointed to the exhibit -A. -- hurt somebody.
Q. -- and said "this door," you're talking
about the west door?
A. The west door.
Q. Okay. Here is what I'm trying to get
at: Jay told you not to use the west door. Did he
tell you not to use any other door in the building?
A. No. No.
Q. So when you -A. But he did say that they -- he didn't
really want me going through the front because I
thought it was weird to use -Q. Taking stuff into the booth?
A. Yes. Yes. He wanted me to -Q. When you left that night at 8:00, the
show had already ended -- or 10:00, whatever,
correct?
A. It was after 8:00 I want to say. Yeah.
Q. What, if anything, prevented you from
walking out the front door north side of the building
and then heading west around to where your car was?
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There's a bathroom, and that's about as far as I go
because when I come to events, I'm usually in a
hurry. I'm not there the day before. I just come to
do my thing and then leave. So the only areas that I
was familiar with was here and here. And I think
that I knew that this door existed because if you
come back, they have, like, the big open area with
some kid stuff going on sometimes in that area.
Q. You're pointing to the area inside the
building to the east end?
A. Yeah. But I'm not talking about an east
door but toward the front that there's another set of
doors but doesn't seem usable to me by the public.
The only doors that I have used in the past and was
aware of was the west and the front.
Q. The north, the main door on the north?
A. Yep. So what's going on along back
here, I can't tell you if there's more doors. I
don't know.
Q. Was the door on the back that you went
out, whether it was the one Jay intended or not, was
it marked as vendor exit or anything like that?
A. No. It seemed to me like this was
something that came up maybe not expected like, hey,
we're having an issue -- this is the gist of his
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words -- with this door here. So we're asking the
vendors to go through the back.
And maybe one of these vendors -- I'll
have to ask Tawnie where her spot was.
Q. Who is Tawnie?
A. Tawnie Sumpsion is her last name. This
just occurred to me within the past month. I
remember the dialogue that I had with her the night
before I fell. And I included her in the witnesses.
But she makes little chocolate and, like, dipped
pretzel type things, peppermints. Anyway, she's
sweets so maybe -- maybe she was toward that end
where they kind of have the food. She might be one
that was near the west door.
And I asked her, I said: Do you
remember where you exited? And she said: Yeah, it
was really weird. They had us go through the back
and the little deer and stuff were back there. She
had a very vivid recollection of exiting through that
door with family. They were carrying her stuff so
there was a whole group of people. I actually have a
few witnesses that said that that was the door that
they were told.
Q. Who are those people? That would be
very important for me to know.
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13

MR. CAREY: These are the interrogatories.
MR. BROWNING: Requests for production?
THE WITNESS: I can't find it in here. Let
me see.
Q. BY MR. CAREY: Let's go through that.
Let's talk about Tawnie. This is why they call it
discovery. That's a new name to me.
A. Okay.
Q. So Tawnie was a vendor, I take it?
A. Uh-huh. Because I talked with her
briefly. I just remembered: Oh, my gosh, I had a
conversation with her. She left before I did.
Q. She left before you did on the same

14

night?
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A. Yeah.
Q. Okay. And share with me the
17 conversation you had with her more recently or that
18 you recall more recently-19
A. This was more -- this was recent, within
2 o the last few weeks.
21
Q. -- about her instructions to leave and
22 what she experienced.
23
A. Okay. She said that she was told to
24 exit through the back door but didn't know why she
25
had been given those instructions.
15

16
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A. I don't have a copy of my thing.
Q. Here. Let me give those to you. Those
are your answers to interrogatories.
A. Oh, you have it?
Q. Yes. Take a look at that and see -A. I'm sure that there's more and I could
get more people. I just for the immediate got some.
Q. Let me show you -A. They're typed into it. Okay. I see.
Q. Let me show you where I think the people
are. It starts here. You've got you and Jay-- and
these are the people that have been identified as
witnesses that have information germane to it. So I
don't see her name there.
A. I don't see her either.
Q. So give me the correct spelling of her
name if you know.
A. Tawnie. I don't know if I can correctly
spell it. But Tawnie, I can take a guess.
T-a-w-n-i-e.
MR. CAREY: What are these? Are these the
same answers?
MR. BAILEY: I thought they were identical
but these are the ones that I think are to my
discovery.
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Q. And who told her to do that, if you
know?
A. I don't know if she said Jay but that
she had been directed. You know, bottom line, we
both had had the same message. I just wanted to see
where were you told to exit from, which would be the
first night. So it wouldn't have been when she was
closing or whatever. But she said her family was
there to help her carry a couple of things, you know.
She said that they went back through that door and
that there was the animals. She remembered vivid,
you know, the reindeer and stuff. They had animals
back there. And then she said they went out the
door. She said that it wasn't very well lit. She
doesn't -- I don't want to speak for her, but she did
say said she remembered it wasn't very well lit,
thought it was kind of weird they had to go through
that door, and she was with other people when she
left.
And also Grandpa's Barbecue, I talked to
them. And she very clearly states that, you know,
the back door is a used door. It's a door that's
generally -- that section is generally not open to
the public. If you come as a participant -- what
would you say? Just to enjoy the event, you,
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generally speaking, don't go back in that area. But
1
do they keep things for the event? Yes. And food
2
vendors use that area. She's a food vendor and she
3
says every time she uses that entrance. And I asked
4
her why. And she said: Well, that's what they tell
5
us to do. They tell us to use that door. So I had
6
her as well.
7
I don't know why it isn't -- there's
8
Loretta and Tawnie. Right there. Loretta from
9
Grandpa's Barbecue.
10
MR. CAREY: Let's go off the record.
11
(A recess was taken from 3 :36 p.m. to
12
3:45 p.m.)
13
Q. BY MR. CAREY: Let's go back on.
14
Nicole, I'm going to give you -- I'll
15
just read over Mr. Bailey's shoulder here. On this 16
document I'm handing you, we've got Jay and we're 17
going to talk a little more about Jay. You're
18
obviously listed. And then we've got Tawnie
19
Sumpsion? How do you say that last name?
20
A. Sumpsion.
21
Q. Okay. Now, you were talking to Tawnie 22
-- you were talking about your conversation with
23
Tawnie when we took the break.
24
A. Uh-huh.
25
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A. Family and people helping her. Whether
they were family and friends, there was multiple
people.
Q. Do you know specifically by name who she
left with?
A. I would have to get the list from her.
I was just trying to see if she remembered anything.
Q. Nobody in her party leaving fell off the
loading dock?
A. Well, they're leaving together and
there's people holding the door open for her and
so -Q. My question is: Nobody fell off the
loading dock, right?
A. No. No. But I think it's helpful -- I
was by myself.
Q. I understand. We'll talk about that in
a minute. And then who is Loretta?
A. Loretta is the Grandpa's Barbecue
vendor.
Q. Now, is that one of the owners of
Grandpa's or an employee; do you know?
A. I think that her and her husband own the
business, but I can't say who owns it but she's -she's a steady goer.
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Q. And as succinctly as you can, tell me
1
what you recall her saying about her being asked to
2
3 leave through the back door and her leaving through
3
4
the back door.
4
5
A. Okay. Just that she said that she
5
6
was -- that she left through the back door because
6
7
she was directed to do so, more or less. That's not
7
8
a quote. She knows that she left through that door
8
9 because she remembers the animals and, like, hay and
9
10 things like that back there. And that she was with
10
11 other people and, you know, members of the family 11
12 that were helping her. And so then when she exited, 12
13 she said that it wasn't very well lit in the back.
13
14 And she was one of the -- I would say that there
14
15 wasn't tons of vendors. Some people sneak out before 15
16 8:00. I stayed the full time and then afterwards,
16
17 you know, kind of wrapping things up.
17
18
Q. It's in December. So it's dark at 5:00,
18
19 right?
19
20
A. Uh-huh. It is. Yeah.
2o
21
Q. So when she left, was she leaving with
21
22
other people? Was it your understanding?
22
A. Yep.
23
23
24
Q. Who were the other people that she was 24
25 leaving with?
25
1

2
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Q. Is she an African American lady?
A. Yeah.
Q. So what do you recall -- well, strike
that.
Have you talked to Loretta about how she
entered the building and left the building that
night?
A. Yeah. She said that she uses the back
door because it seems like one of the concerns was
that maybe I'm just wandering around in a building
and exit through a door that I shouldn't go through.
And I know that that was a used -- that was a used
entrance and exit that I'm sure that people involved
with Kingston know that that door and people involved
with the radio know that that entrance and exit is
used by the food vendors.
Q. Okay. Tell me -A. It's not a weird door like just random.
Q. Tell me on what basis you know that
somebody at Kingston knows that that door is used as
a food -- for access by the food vendors?
A. Well, I mean, they'll talk about it.
Like when Jay said come in through the back, the food
vendors, you'll see people emerging from there. It's
not too mysterious. I mean, if they're coming in
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from that way they're coming through the back.
1
Q. Who at Kingston do you know? Do you
2
3
know who Jay was working for at the time?
3
4
A. I am not sure what Jay's connections
4
5
were. He was just my contact person. Usually it's
5
6
Jay or Jamie on the events. Sometimes I've just
6
7
interacted with Jamie but I've seen Jay from time to
7
a time.
a
9
Q. You said Kingston and Riverbend. I want
9
10 to separate those because they're separate entities. 10
11 You do understand that, right?
11
12
A. Yeah. I might be poorly wording things.
12
13
Q. That's why I'm trying to drill down on
13
14 that a little bit.
14
15
A. But I think both parties would be aware.
15
16 I would assume that Kingston knows how the building 16
17 is being used as well.
17
18
Q. And that's something we don't allow in
18
19 the law is assumptions. Okay?
19
A. No.
20
20
Q. Let me ask you: Do you know of your own 21
21
22 personal knowledge that a Kingston employee was aware 22
23 that food vendors for that All I Want For Christmas 23
24 trade show were coming in and out of the loading dock 24
25
back door?
25
1

2

A. She was there looking for me when she
knew that I was hurt.
Q. Your mom?
A. Yes.
Q. And that's Krisel?
A. Uh-huh.
Q. And did she find you?
A. No. My husband found me first and he
took me to the ER.
Q. So mom never found you there that night?
A. No. She was at the front and talked
to -- she described somebody that -- we won't make an
assumption -- that seems like it's Jay, and said that
she was looking for me. And so she says that he went
along the building, and I don't want to give her
details, but indicating that he was looking for me
heading toward the back of the building.
Q. Okay. You drew a line around the south
side of the building with your finger?
A. Yes. Sorry.
Q. And the east side of the building when
you were explaining that answer, correct?
A. I'm reversing this. I'm so sorry. I'm
turned around. I'm talking as if I'm her from the
front of the building. She's here at the front.
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A. Off the top ofmy head do I know who is
a Kingston employee? No. Because I typically
3
interact with the event coordinators. But it's not a
4
secret. For example, when I talked to Loretta, she's
5
like: We do that all the time. We come in through
6
the back. That's what the food vendors do. She's
7
very matter of fact about it. It's not mysterious.
a And having come as a participant or another vendor,
9 people come in through that back area.
10
Q. You can appreciate that there might be a
11 lease agreement between Kingston and the promotor,
12 and Kingston may not even be on the premises?
13
A. Yeah. I don't know how they have that
14 set up. Yeah. I just say: Do I know offthe top of
15 my head or have I received instructions from somebody
16 that says: I am a Kingston employee? No. I
17
interact on this end.
10
Q. Who is Krisel and Marcus Hamilton? I
19 assume they're husband and wife?
20
A. Yes. They're my parents.
21
Q. And they live out on Gleneagles?
22
A. Uh-huh.
23
Q. Yes?
24
A. Yes.
25
Q. Were they there that night at all?

Q. On the north side?
A. I'm glad that you called that. I did
3
that incorrectly. So she was at the front and she
4
talked to Jay. And she said that he went alongside
5
and back looking -- when she said: I'm looking for
6
Nikki. She's -- I think that she's hurt, indicating
7
that he was heading toward the back, you know, if
8
he's looking for me there then -9
Q. Of your own knowledge you don't know
10 where your mom was looking for you. You just know
11 she was there looking for you?
12
A. She said that Jay did that moving -13 going toward the back of the building to look for me.
14
Q. Do you know whether she went around the
15 west end or east end?
16
A. I don't know her route. She would have
17
to say what she did.
10
Q. That's what I'm asking.
19
A. But I was gone by then.
2o
Q. What else do they -- I'm sure they know
21 that you've been -- that you sustained some injuries?
22
A. Yeah. She was there with me. They went
23 to the hospital when they found out. And they
24 also -- my father went to retrieve my purse. When I
25
fell, I had a few items in my hand. And so when he

1

2
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went back around, he was on the premise and did say
that it was dark.
Q. David is your husband?
A. Uh-huh.
Q. And he's the one that found you,
correct?
A. Uh-huh.
Q. Is that a yes?
A. Yes. Sorry.
Q. And he transported you to EIRMC?
A. Yes, he did.
Q. And at EIRMC -- and I'll come back to
the medical in a minute. But at EIRMC you were
evaluated and then released that night, correct?
A. Uh-huh. I was there for a few hours.
Yeah.
Q. You weren't held overnight at EIRMC?
A. No.
Q. Who is Fran -- how do you say that?
A. Fran Acoba. She works with me at the
clinic at Pearl Health. And she also has been living
in our home. So she's aware of changes in my health
and some of the impact that the injuries have had,
you know, on me.
Q. Let me go back here for a minute. Other
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recently?
A. Recently? It's not like, hey, family
conversation. It might come up sometimes, but
yeah-Q. Who do you talk to more, mom or dad?
A. I talk to my mom mostly. My dad is
great but he's not -Q. He's not mom?
A. He's not a talker.
Q. When do you recall the last time having
a conversation with your mom about the fall or about
your injuries?
A. I asked her a little bit about a month
ago to describe, you know, the individual that she
talked to. I said -- because I assume it's Jay
because there's not that many people there late at
night. But I just asked her, I said: What did they
look like? And what happened? And, you know, where
-- did he tell you where I was? Did he say anything?
And that's when she told me that he was heading
toward the back of the building -- this way. Excuse
me. I don't know why I keep -- from the front that
he was heading towards the back to look for me.
Q. Fran Acoba, have you talked to her about
the fall recently?
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than the evening of the 4th, have you seen or talked
to Jay since then?
A. I think that I conversed with him a year
ago. I was looking for venues for the Fuel and Flo
Fest and he's at the -- I guess he's the one behind
the Pinecrest.
Q. Event center?
A. Yeah.
Q. Yes.
A. So I just talked to him briefly about
the event center.
Q. Did you talk to him about this fall,
this accident?
A. No.
Q. Tawnie, you indicated you talked to her
very recently?
A. Within a month, yeah, I would say.
Q. And then Loretta -A. Approximately -Q. -- when did you talk to Loretta?
A. Approximately a month ago as well.
Q. And then Krisel and Mark, they're your
mom and dad?
A. Uh-huh.
Q. Have you talked to them about this fall

A. Not so much in detail. I mean, maybe
incidentally but, again, we -- not really. It's not
something that we just dwell on.
Q. When was the last time you think you
recall talking to Fran about the fall?
A. I don't even know that I've specifically
sat down. I mean, she observed everything. I just
8 said: You know, may I include you? You're aware.
9 You've lived with us. You know, the flares and stuff
10 that I get from my back. And she said: Yeah. So I
11 didn't sit down and say: What do you know, you know.
12
Q. I'll talk to you about the flares in a
13 minute.
14
A. Okay.
15
Q. Jay. Jay coordinated the event. Is
16 that Jay Dye?
17
A. Yes. Jay Dye.
Q. So we've got Jay up here and Jay down
18
19 here.
20
A. Oh.
Q. Same Jay?
21
22
A. Yeah.
23
Q. We're only dealing with one Jay?
24
A. I don't think there's multiple Jays
25 running around, no. To me I always called him Jay,

.\lin-l-Script 1(

1
2
3
4
5
6
7

office@ttreporting.com
T&T Reporting, LLC
208.529.5491
ttreporting.com
208.529.5496 FAX

(19) Pages 73 - 76

Page 79

PACKER vs.
KINGSTON PROPERTIES, L.P., et al.

NICOLE PACKER
September 26, 2018
Page 77

1
2
3
4

5
6
7

8
9

10

11
12
13

14
15
16

17
10
19
20
21

22
23

24
25

so I apologize. That's why I put him in there as
Jay.
Q. Do you know how many -- I think you've
already answered. Do you know how many overhead or
man doors there are on the back side of the building,
this side here?
A. Goodness, no. I don't go into that
area. I remember feeling really inconvenienced that
he wanted me to go through the back. I was like:
Why? Because I know that I was parked to the west.
Yeah.
Q. So let's talk about you leaving the
building then. I want to focus on you leaving the
building. And I'm going to ask this in kind of real
detailed steps. Okay? So I want to understand what
happened here.
A. Can I ask a question though about the
doors, where the other doors are?
Q. You can, but I can't answer those for
you because I can't testify. I just -- I know that
there are and -A. Because the way that he motioned, you
know, to go straight back also, I don't know if
there's any other doors close by but it was very
clear that it was the --
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you please repeat your question? Sorry I was just
thinking about the booth and then I remembered.
Q. You gather up all your stuff?
A. Yes.
Q. The customers have already left, right?
A. Yeah. Pretty much. Yes. It's thinning
very much.
Q. Is there anyone barricading you or
stopping you from going out the front door?
A. Barricading me? I didn't even try to go
to the front door because I was following directions.
And these kind of events you just go to Jay or Jamie,
whoever is running, and they tell you. And I don't
want to aggravate anybody. I just -- okay. They
want me to go through the back, I'll go through the
back. And I don't know if they would have locked the
front. He didn't say but -Q. That was going to be one of the
questions. You don't know whether the front was
locked -A. I didn't check.
Q. -- or unlocked?
A. No. Because I just followed.
Q. You're following instructions?
A. Yeah.
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Q. Here is what I want to do -- so the show
1
ends at what time?
2
A. I think it was 8:00, but I would have to
3
check. Sometimes they end at 7:00 and -- because
4
I've been there before. It was 7:00 or 8:00.
5
Q. And when you -- so at the end of the
6
show you were gathering -7
A. Yeah.
8
Q. --what to take home with you?
9
A. Just whatever items that you don't want
10
to leave overnight.
11
Q. Because they might, what, get stolen or
12
something?
13
A. Yeah. Or things that I need, you know.
14
Personal items as well. Yeah.
15
Q. And then you headed from -- having
16
talked about it for a minute, do you know where in 17
the store your booth was located?
10
A. I don't remember the exact spot ofmy
19
booth.
20
Q. All right. Tell me what you did. So
21
you gather up whatever you were going to take home 22
with you. What did you do next?
23
A. I know it was facing north because our
24
booth was facing that way. That I do recall. So can 25

\lin-l -Script n.

Page 80

Q. And you head to the back of the
building?
A. Yeah.
Q. I'm going to ask you what happened next
a lot right now. Okay? So what happened next?
A. That's fine.
Q. You walk up to the door. Tell me what
happened.
A. I interacted. I know that I was
probably one of the last ones. I didn't look to see
if there's anybody else in the building because I had
talked to Tawnie briefly. I can't say what time, if
it was before the end or at the end but I had talked
to her and then had gone to get my stuff. So she had
left, which is why I remember: Oh, my gosh, I talked
to Tawnie Sumpsion that night. So I grabbed my
things. I had a Jamba Juice in my hand with some
other stuff. And I went through the back exit,
again, where the vendors come in and out ofby the
bathrooms. It's not far from the bathrooms, which is
the -- you know, where I had been directed.
Q. And then what happened?
A. Then you go -- it goes back further than
it seems, than what's open to the public. And then I
went to the door and opened the door. And I had a
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few items in my hand, so I remember I didn't hold the
door.
Q. Let me ask you this: The door when you
opened it -A. Pushing it.
Q. -- you've seen some doors have knobs
like this one right here?
A. Yeah.
Q. Others have a bar that you push and the
latch opens. Do you recall what the mechanism was on
this door that you opened?
A. No. I don't recall it.
Q. Okay.
A. But I do know that I had things in my
hand. So whether I opened it and switched something
over -- I opened the door. I'm standing -- I'm
standing but using shoulder so I can hold my stuff.
So when I stepped out, the door shut.
Q. Let me ask you this: If you have a -you know what a panic bar is on a door?
A. Uh-huh.
Q. You hit it, it latches, you open it up.
You don't have to turn a knob.
A. Uh-huh.
Q. If it's a panic bar you can hit it with
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that it was locked. And I might even -- I did write
an early letter when I realized I'm more hurt than I
thought and I described more details that -- this is
three years later. I could go back and look at it.
But I couldn't get back in.
Q. Okay. And that's the part that I kind
of want to talk to you about. How you know you
couldn't get back in -A. Well, I would have -Q. -- if you didn't try the door?
A. I would have had to try it. Yeah. But
right now if you say do I have a recollection of
grabbing the door, not so much. But I remember and
I -- I need to look back at my thing. I could not
get back in. So, yes, I would have -- I would have
tried or like you said I wouldn't know.
Q. Do you know -- some doors like in hotel
rooms, if you open a door they're supposed to close.
They're supposed to have an automatic closure.
A. Yeah.
Q. Do you know if this door had an
automatic closure on it or did you nudge it shut or
close it yourself?
A. I don't know the design of it, but it's
a heavy door. And holding the items, what I remember
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your hip or elbow -A. Uh-huh.
Q. -- or something and open it.
Do you have a recollection of hitting
something with your hip or elbow or actually having
to turn a knob?
A. I don't. That was one of the things
8 that I didn't pay attention to.
9
Q. So you got the door open?
10
A. Yeah.
11
Q. Then what happens?
12
A. Then the door shut.
13
Q. And you realize right away it was dark?
14
A. It happened quickly. I mean, you step
15 out, the door shuts.
16
Q. Okay. So it's dark?
17
A. And then it's dark.
18
Q. Did you try and go back in?
19
A. In my head I feel like the door was
20 locked, like it locked.
21
Q. Okay. Let me ask you: Why do you think
22 that? Why do you have that recollection?
23
A. Maybe I did try. It's not clear. Some
24 things on that night are so, so clear, like, without
25 a doubt. And other things it's hard. But I believe
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
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is I stepped out and it shut.
Q. Okay. So you're shut. You have a
recollection of trying to get back in?
A. Of me going and, like, shutting the
door, I don't remember anything like that, trying to
push the door shut. It was heavy.
Q. But you're outside. The door is closed.
You have some kind of a recollection of trying to get
back in but you can't, right?
A. Uh-huh. Because it was darker than I
thought.
Q. Okay. It was dark -A. Unexpected. I would say that I didn't
expect it to be dark. I don't have the greatest
night vision. I mean, you would assume that it would
be lit because this is a door that food vendors use.
That was -- I shouldn't assume things I was told but
that would be my assumption is if I was directed to
go through that door, there shouldn't be a problem.
I said: Okay. I'll exit through that door. And I
don't see the best at night anyway and it was very
dark.
Q. Okay. The reason you tried to go back
in is because it was dark?
A. Yes. For sure it's dark.
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Q. And you have some kind of a recollection
of trying to get back in the building?
A. Yeah. I think so.
Q. You can't. So then what happens?
A. So I look at the -- there's lights over
here in the parking lot.
Q. To the west side of the building?
A. Yes. West. And the shortest route to
my car would be to start walking to the right. So as
you exit the building, tum right to make a B line
and head towards the lights that were there.
Q. On the west parking -A. In the parking lot, which is where my
car was parked when I unloaded and entered in.
Q. And then you -- that's when the fall
occurred?
A. Uh-huh. Yeah. I didn't -- I mean, I
stepped on air. I remember that I was just walking
and then I felt nothing. I didn't even know what had
happened.
Q. Okay. Let me stop you right there and
ask you: You called your husband when you -- after
you fell, right?
A. Yeah.
Q. What kind of phone did you have?
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A. I didn't think that there was something
to be wary of just because he said exit through the
back. If I had thought, okay, you're in a dangerous
place, be careful, you know.
Q. Sure. Let's set the table here. You're
going out a door that you've never used before,
correct?
A. Uh-huh.
Q. In a dark space that you're unfamiliar
with. And you go from a lighted area to a dark
area -A. So it's hard to see.

Q. -- right?
A. Yeah.
Q. And you know just from being however old
you are that it takes a while for your eyes to adjust
from light to dark?
A. Sure.
Q. Okay. Did you give yourself any time at
all to allow your eyes to adjust to the ambient light
that was there?
A. I might have taken a very brief what do
I do, you know, strategy. I'm holding my bags. It's
cold. And there's lights over there so just step
slowly.
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A. A Samsung -- not this one but a
smartphone.
Q. Okay. I have an Apple. I think most
people carry one, right?
A. Uh-huh.
Q. Did your Samsung have the flashlight
feature on it?
A. It probably does. I'm not the best with
these phones because everything you go into a screen
to get to a screen. In fact, I don't even know if it
did. This one does have a flashlight. I actually
recently learned about it and you have to pull it
down and go in and press it on. It's not an obvious
feature on the phone. And I had an older model, so I
actually can't even tell you if that one had the
flashlight.
Q. Most smartphones have had flashlight
features for a long time.
A. From the beginning?
Q. Do you know the model of the phone you
had at the time?
A. Uh-uh.
Q. Did you give any thought at all, Nicole,
to stopping, letting your eyes adjust before you
started walking?
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Q. So the answer is -A. Yeah. I would -Q. -- very brief, if at all?
A. I did take time to think what do I do,
you know. This door is shut and, you know, my car is
over there.
Q. Do you know what these buildings are to
the south of the building that are rectangles and
squares with a brown roofing on it? Do you know what
those are?
A. They might be apartments but I don't
know. Yeah.
Q. Do you know if they were there at the
time of the -- that you fell?
A. What I remember is dim streetlights. So
if it was a complete blackness, no. Because there
was lights dim but more distant, if that makes sense.
So I -- I'm not going to say it was complete pitch
black, no. But it's dark and there's dim lights.
This area is not well lit when I stepped out.
Q. When you were -- you told me a little
while ago that -- I think was it David that went back
to find your purse?
A. My father.
Q. Your father.
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A. That said it's pretty dark out there.
Yeah.
3
Q. He went to find your purse?
4
A. Yeah.
s
Q. Where was your phone when you stepped
6 off the loading dock? Was it in your purse?
7
A. I'm trying to remember. No. I don't
8 think so. I think it must have been -- because it's
9 panic. You know, when I fell and I realized I was
10 having a hard time even breathing, I was just
11 panicked for a while. And then I -- when I finally
12 got a sense of calm because I'm like there's nobody
13 out here, I tried to yell for help. Nobody can hear
14 me if there was. I didn't see anybody or hear
15 anyone. I imagine that they would have come if there
16 was somebody that knew that I had fallen. So it was
17 like, when I finally got calm enough, look, you know,
10 for your phone. And so it was within the proximity
19 when I fell enough that I was able to find it.
20
Q. When you left your booth, was the phone
21 in your purse or was the phone in your hand?
22
A. I can't remember where the phone was.
2 3 Yeah.
24
Q. But you left your purse there. Did
25 David come all the way to where you were laying --

were walking?
A. Yeah. All I know is that it was very
3 dark and I was cold and I had items. And the only
4 obvious option to me seemed to head towards the car.
5
That was my thought.
6
Q. I understand. That's not the question
7 I'm asking you. The question I'm asking you is -- I
8 don't want to -- I don't want to say typically a
9 woman because I'm going to get hit in the head when I
10 do that.
11
A. You can't make assumptions.
12
Q. Typically a woman will keep her phone
13 either in her purse or in her hand. Fair? Is that
14 much fair?
15
A. I don't know because I work with clients
16 so I keep my phone in pockets. You know, especially
17 with kids. I don't necessarily have it in my purse
18 or my hand.
19
Q. I've seen them tuck it in their sports
20
bra before too.
21
A. I did not have it in my bra.
22
Q. Any number of places.
23
A. This jacket has a pretty big pocket
24 because I work with kids.
25
Q. Here is the question: You said you had
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A. I didn't leave it. That would have been
on my shoulder.
Q. Did David come all the way to where you
were laying when he found you?
A. No.
Q. Had you gotten up and walked?
A. No. I had moved.
Q. Okay. But did you still have your phone
with you? You had to have because you called him?
A. Yeah. I did have my phone.
Q. So your purse is left on the scene but
you have your phone?
A. Uh-huh.
Q. So do you recall opening your purse and
getting your phone or did you have your phone in your
hand?
A. I don't have a recollection of that.
But I do have a recollection of you have to find your
phone. Access your phone. And it was not difficult
to access. I want to say that -- well, I don't know.
Q. Nicole, when you fell -- when you walked
out the door, did you have your phone in your hand?
A. I don't remember if it was in my hand.
Q. Do you remember whether you were looking
at the phone instead of paying attention where you
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a Jamba Juice in one hand and you had -A. And a bag.
Q. -- something over your shoulder?
A. The purse.
Q. What was in your other hand, if
anything?
A. I can't remember if I had anything else.
When my father went to collect items, he collected my
purse. It wasn't tons of stuff because I wanted to
leave most of it. It was only a few items.
Q. But you had your phone with you?
A. My phone was with me definitely, yes.
Q. So your purse wasn't with you but your
phone was with you?
A. My purse is on my shoulder because when
I fell it fell.
Q. Right. But you had your phone when you
left, when you walked to your car when you went to
the ER?
A. Because I was calling -- yes. And
directing how to -Q. My question is: Where was the phone
when you stepped off the ramp?
A. I can't remember where it was exactly.
Q. Okay. So you step off the ramp?
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE

NICOLE PACKER,
Plaintiffs,
Case No. CV-2017-7024
V.
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JUDGEMENT

Defendants.

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
This case stems from a fall off a loading dock while exiting a building owned by
Kingston Properties, LP., ("Kingston") and leased to Riverbend Communications
("Riverbend"). Affidavit of Justin Somers, ("Sommers"), exh. A. Nicole Packer,
Claimant was a vendor who had signed a contract with Riverbend to participate as a
vendor in the "All I want for Christmas" craft show in December of 2015. Affidavit of
KINGSTON PROPERTIES, L.P., DK ENTERPRISES, INC.'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGEMENT - 1
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Donald F. Carey, ("Carey"), exh. A, pg. 40. Claimant testified at deposition that she
loaded her display material through the west door of the building and was subsequently
told by Jay, ofRiverbend, to leave via the "back" door. Carey, exh. A, pg. 46. It is
alleged by Claimant that the west door was in some disrepair, although Claimant couldn't
say what the disrepair was. Carey, exh. A, pg. 53. Claimant did testify that there was no
known reason why she couldn't have exited the building through the main front door of
the building, except that she was just following directions. Carey, exh. A, pg. 79. After
leaving the building, Claimant testified that the door through which she existed locked
behind her, preventing her reentry into the building. Carey, exh. A, pg. 82. Claimant also
testified that the outside of the building was dark and poorly lighted. Carey, exh. A, pg.
82. She testified that after talking a few steps, she fell of what is now known to be a
loading dock and suffered injury. Carey, exh. A, pg. 85. Claimant bring this cause of
action for compensation of her injuries.
STANDARD OF REVIEW

"Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions
on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
Disputed facts and reasonable inferences are construed in favor of the non-moving party.
If there is no genuine issue of material fact, only a question of law remains, over which
this Court exercises free review." Idaho First Bank v. Bridges, 2018 Ida. Lexis 181.
The general principles of the law of negligence are well established in Idaho:
In order to establish a cause of action for negligence, a plaintiff
must establish: "(1) a duty, recognized by law, requiring the
defendant to conform to a certain standard of conduct; (2) a
breach of duty; (3) a causal connection between the defendant's
conduct and the resulting injury; and (4) actual loss or
damage."

Gagnon v. W Bldg. Maint., Inc., 155 Idaho 112, 115, 306 P.3d 197, 200 (2013) (quoting
Rountree v. Boise Baseball, LLC, 154 Idaho 167, 171,296 P.3d 373, 377 (2013)).
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"No liability exists under the law of torts unless the person from whom relief is
sought owed a duty to the allegedly injured party." Baccus v. Ameripride Servs., 145 Idaho
346, 349, 179 P.3d 309, 312 (2008) (quoting Vickers v. Hanover Constr. Co., Inc., 125
Idaho 832, 835, 875 P.2d 929, 932 (1994)). "Absent unusual circumstances, a person has
no duty to prevent harm to another, regardless of foreseeability. Idaho law recognizes two
circumstances in which a person has an affirmative duty of care to another: a special
relationship or an assumed duty based on an undertaking." Beers v. Corp. of the President

of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 155 Idaho 680, 686, 316 P.3d 92, 98
(2013).
With respect to premises liability claims, negligence in Idaho consists of four
elements: "(1) a duty, recognized by law, requiring the defendant to conform to a certain
standard of conduct; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) a causal connection between the
defendant's conduct and the resulting injury; and (4) actual loss or damage." Shea v. Kevic

Corp., 156 Idaho 540, 548, 328 P.3d 520, 528 (2014) A landowner owes a duty to an
invitee "to warn of hidden or concealed dangers and to keep the land in a reasonably safe
condition." Id. (quoting Peterson v. Romine, 131 Idaho 537, 540,960 P.2d 1266, 1269
(1998)). An invitee must show "that the owner or occupier knew, or by the exercise of
reasonable care should have known, of the existence of the dangerous condition." All v.

Smith's Mgmt. Corp., 109 Idaho 479,481, 708 P.2d 884,886 (1985) (citations omitted).
The dangerous condition element in a premises liability case can take one of two
forms: (1) isolated or nonrecurring, or (2) continuing or recurring. Shea, 156 Idaho at 548,
328 P.3d at 528. "For a nonrecurring or isolated incident, the invitee must show actual or
constructive notice of the specific condition." Id. Constructive notice is simply knowledge
of a condition that the exercise of reasonable care would have revealed. Smith's Mgmt.

Corp., 109 Idaho at 481, 708 P.2d at 886.
The prototypical "isolated" condition case in Idaho jurisprudence is Tommerup v.

Albertson's, Inc., 101 Idaho 1, 607 P.2d 1055 (1980), superseded by statute on other
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grounds as stated in Harrison v. Taylor, 115 Idaho 588, 591, 768 P.2d 1321, 1324 (1989).

The plaintiff in Tommerup slipped and fell on a discarded cupcake wrapper as she exited
an Albertson's store in Twin Falls. Id. at 2,607 P.2d at 1056. Albertson's sold bakery goods
and did not keep trash containers by its doorways. Id. However, "[t]here was no direct
evidence as to who deposited the cupcake wrapper near the door." Id. Additionally, store
employees were directed to "pick up paper and debris outside the store as they saw it,"
though the store had only one scheduled inspection and cleanup between midnight and six
o'clock a.m. Id. The court determined that the record was "devoid of evidence indicating
the condition which caused appellant's injury to have been other than an isolated
incident." Id. at 4, 607 P.2d at 1058.
An invitee alleging a "continuous or recurring" condition, however, need not

demonstrate actual or constructive knowledge of the specific condition. Smith's Mgmt.
Corp., 109 Idaho at 481, 708 P.2d at 886. Rather, the invitee must show that the

landowner's operating methods "are such that dangerous conditions are continuous or
easily foreseeable." Shea, 156 Idaho at 548, 328 P.3d at 528. However, "[e]ven with a
recurring or continuing condition, the invitee must show that the landowner had actual or
constructive knowledge of the dangerous condition." Id. The Idaho Supreme Court has
explained:
In summary, the invitee must show actual or constructive knowledge
on behalf of the landowner to establish a prima facie negligence claim
regardless of the nature of the condition. The distinction between an
isolated and continuing condition does not eliminate the invitee's burden
to establish the landowner's knowledge. In some cases, it may be easier
for the invitee to show knowledge when the alleged condition is recurring
or continuous, but an allegation of a continuous condition does not
extinguish the invitee's burden simply because the dangerous condition is
regularly occurring. The invitee still must show that the landowner knew
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or should have known his operating methods caused or were likely to
cause a dangerous condition. Shea, 156 Idaho at 548,320 P.3d at 529.

ARGUME NT
1. Riverbend had control over the premises, pursuant to its lease with
Kingston.
The general rule in premises liability cases is the if the doctrine applies the
question becomes which party, the owner or occupier, had control over the premises.

Forbush v. Sagecrest Multi Family Prop. Owners' Ass 'n, 162 Idaho 317, 324, 396 P.3d
1199 (2017). Here, with respect to the vendors attending the craft show, Riverbend had
control over the premises. Riverbend is alleged to have directed Claimant to exit through
the back door. Kingston was in no way "in control" of the events at the building the
evening of the occurrence. It owed no duty to Claimant to protect or to warn her of
anything. In Stiles v. Amundson, 160 Idaho 530, 531, 376 P.3d 734, 735 (2016), the court
explained that "[e ]xisting case law demonstra tes it is the entity having control over the
property that bears the burden of warning social guests and licensees of dangerous
conditions on the property." Id.
2. There was no special relationship between Kingston and Claimant.
In the case at bar Claimant was vendor of Riverbend. She voluntarily completed a
contract to participate in the "All I Want for Christmas " craft show and paid a fee.
Kingston had leased the building to Riverbend. Not only was there no special relationship
between claimant and Kingston, there was no relationship at all. The negligence claim
advanced by Claimant against Kingston should be dismissed.
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3. Claimant was not Kingston's business invitee.

Claimant's participation in the All I want for Christmas craft show was secondary
to a contract between her and Riverbend. She paid a fee to Riverbend to participate. Her
intend was to promote her own business. She was not a business invitee of Kingston. As
such, the premises liability case against Kingston must be dismissed.
4. Kingston bad no actual or constructive knowledge of Claimant's use of the
loading dock door, and as such summary judgment is proper.

Claimant testified that "Jay" ofRiverbend told her to use the back door to leave
the building. Carey, exh. A, pg. 53. There is no evidence in the records to demonstrate
that Kingston had any knowledge ofRiverbend's instruction to vendors to enter or exit
through the loading dock door. In the absence of actual or constructive knowledge there
is no duty owed and no liability that can be asserted against Kingston for the claims
advance by Claimant. Shea v. Kevic Corp., 156 Idaho 540,548 - 49,328 P.3d 520, 528
(2014).
CONCLUSION

Kingston's motion for summary judgment should be granted.
DATED this 9th day of October, 2018.

CAREY ROMANKIW, PLLC

By

....:::t;~~=--£_.....::::::~=-f..-

Donald F. Carey, Of the
Attorneys for Kingston
DK Enterprises, Inc.
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Steve Carpenter, ISB#9132
BROWNING LAW
482 Constitution Way, Suite 111
Idaho Falls, ID 83402
Telephone: (208) 542-2700
Facsimile: (208) 542-2711
Email: alien.browning.law@g mail.com
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE

NICOLE PACKER,
Plaintiff,
vs:

Case No.: CV-2017-7024

MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO
SUMMARY JUDMGENT

KINGSTON PROPERTIES, L.P; DK
ENTERPRISES, INC., RIVERBEND
COMMUNICATI ONS, LLC; RIVERBEND
COMMUNICATI ONS HOLDING, LLC.
And RIVERBEND COMMUNICATI ONS,
LLC dba RIVERBEND EVENTS,
Defendants.

. COMES NOW, Plaintiff, Nicole Packer, by and through her attorneys ofrecord, Allen
Browning, Browning Law, and hereby submits this Memorandum in Opposition to Summary
Judgment.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS

1.

On or about December 4, 2015, Plaintiff took part as a vendor in the "All I Want

For Christmas" expo sponsored by Riverbend Communications and Riverbend Events at Kingston
Plaza in Idaho Falls, Bonneville County, Idaho.
2.

Plaintiff was not given, and did not sign, a contract for the "All I Want For

Christmas" event for 2015. After her deposition, when she was handed an unsigned copy of that
agreement, she checked her emails and found she had in fact never been sent a copy of the contract
for 2015. She paid her fee to participate and that's all that was required of her to take part. Affidavit
of Nicole Packer, ,r 2-4.
3.

On Friday, December 5, 2015, Plaintiff finished bringing her setup materials

through the west door of the building. When she had finished, and after she had setup, Jay Dye,
the Riverbend Communications representative who was supervising the vendors, told her and other
vendors that they did not want the vendors using the west door, and they wanted them to exit
through the back door because there was a problem with the west door. Affidavit of Nicole Packer,

,r 6-8.
4.

On that Friday evening, approximately 8:05 p.m., Plaintiff began to leave the

Christmas expo after dark. Her car was parked near the west exit. She left through the back door.
The only reason she left through the back door is because Jay directed her and the other vendors
to leave by the back door. Jay did not want her to use the north door, as that was for members of
the public, not for vendors. Affidavit of Nicole Packer, ,r 9-10.
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11.

Plaintiff had never used the rear entrance of the building before. Affidavit ofNicole

Packer, ,r 11.
13.

As Plaintiff was leaving the building, she had a drink in one hand and a bag of some

things from her booth, and her purse, in the other hand. Affidavit of Nicole Packer, ,r 13.
14.

When Plaintiff went through the back door, there was no illumination, although, as

shown by Exhibit 1, there was a light fixture present over the door of the rear exit. Affidavit
of Nicole Packer, ,r 14-15.
15.

The door closed behind Plaintiff, and she believed it locked. She was in darkness.

All she could see was distant lights toward the parking lot area to the west.
Affidavit ofNicole Packer, ,r 16-17.
16.

Plaintiff had never been out that door before, and no one had informed her that there

was a dropoff of approximately 5 feet as she exited the door and stepped to her right, toward
the parking lot. Affidavit of Nicole Packer, ,r 18.
17.

Plaintiff took a couple of steps towards the parking area lights and fell several feet

straight down, off an unlit loading dock, because the light above the exit door depicted in
Exhibit 1 was not illuminated. Affidavit of Nicole Packer, ,r 19.
20.

When Plaintiff fell, she was hurt, and she panicked that no one would find me.

After some time I calmed down, took my phone out of my purse and called for help. That's
where my phone was when I fell: in my purse. Affidavit of Nicole Packer, ,r 20.
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STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Court must grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine issue
of dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Rule
56(e), Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court liberally construes the record in favor of the

party opposing the motion and draws all reasonable inferences and conclusions in that party's
favor. Friel v. Boise City Haus. Auth., 126 Idaho 484, 485, 887 P.2d 29, 30 (1994). A "mere
scintilla of evidence or only slight doubt as to the facts is not sufficient to create a genuine issue
for purposes of summary judgment.

The non-moving party must respond to the summary

judgment motion with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Samuel v.
Hepworth, Nungester & Lezamiz, 134 Idaho 84, 87, 996 P.2d 303, 306 (2000). "When a motion

for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not
rest upon the mere allegations or denials of that party's pleadings, but the party's response, by
affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial." Chandler v. Hayden, 147 Idaho 765,771,215 P.3d 485 (2009).
The Court must grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine issue of
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Rule
56(e), Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court liberally construes the record in favor of the

party opposing the motion and draws all reasonable inferences and conclusions in that party's
favor. Friel v. Boise City Haus. Auth., 126 Idaho 484, 485, 887 P.2d 29, 30 (1994). A "mere
scintilla of evidence or only slight doubt as to the facts is not sufficient to create a genuine issue
for purposes of summary judgment.

The non-moving party must respond to the summary
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judgment motion with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Samuel v.
Hepworth, Nungester & Lezamiz, 134 Idaho 84, 87, 996 P.2d 303, 306 (2000).

Any party who brings a summary judgment motion bears the burden of proving there is no
genuine issue for trial. This has not been done.

INTRODUCTION
This is a Personal Injury Case filed in the Seventh Judicial District of Idaho, County of
Bonneville. Plaintiff, Nicole Packer, has alleged that she sustained injuries after falling from a
loading dock at Kingston Plaza at an event conducted by Riverbend Communications.
Defendants Kingston Properties, L.P. and DK Enterprises have moved for Summary Judgment
on Plaintiffs claims. As will be addressed below, Defendants have failed to meet the standard
for Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs claims.

ARGUMENT
I.

Plaintiff was an invitee and Kingston is liable for her injuries.

An invitee is one who enters upon the premises of another for a purpose connected with the
business conducted on the land, or where it can reasonably be said that the visit may confer a
business, commercial, monetary, or other tangible benefit to the landowner. Holzheimer v.
Johannesen, 125 Idaho 397,400, 871 P.2d 814, 817 (1994). A landowner owes an invitee the duty

to keep the premises in a reasonably safe condition or to warn of hidden or concealed dangers. Id.
A licensee is a visitor who goes upon the premises of another with the consent of the landowner
in pursuit of the visitor's purpose. Id.; Evans v. Park, 112 Idaho 400, 401, 732 P.2d 369, 370 (Ct.
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App. 1987). The duty owed to a licensee is narrow. A landowner is only required to share with the
licensee knowledge of dangerous conditions or activities on the land. Evans, 112 Idaho at 401, 732
P.2d at 370.
"[A] tenant or lessee, having control of the premises is deemed, so far as third parties are
concerned, to be the owner, and in case of injury to third parties occasioned by the condition or
use of the premises, the general rule is that the tenant or lessee may be liable for failure to keep
the premises in repair. Robinson v. Mueller, 156 Idaho 237,240 (2014).
"The law is well settled in this state that, to hold an owner or possessor of land liable for
injuries to an invitee caused by a dangerous condition existing on the land, it must be shown that
the owner or occupier knew, or by the exercise of reasonable care should have known, of the
existence of the dangerous condition." Tommerup v. Albertson's, 101 Idaho 1 at 3, 607 P.2d 1055
at 1057 (1980), see also, Mccasland v. Floribec, Inc., 106 Idaho 841, 842, 683 P.2d 877, 878
(1984).
Here, Plaintiff was invited into the building owned by Kingston, to do business. Plaintiff paid
a fee to Riverbend Communications in order to participate in the "All I Want for Christmas" event,
conferring a benefit upon Riverbend and by extension, Riverbend's lessor and the building's
owner, Kingston. This makes Plaintiff an invitee with respect to both Kingston and Riverbend.
The general rule is that owners and lessees may be held liable to third party injuries for a failure
to keep their premises in repair. Because Plaintiff is a licensee, and due to Riverbend' s status as a
lessee to Kingston, they are liable for the injuries incurred by Plaintiff due to the dangerous
condition of the building.
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II.

Kingston had control over the loading dock.

The dangerous condition in this case is that a light was out over a loading dock. Plaintiff was
injured when she fell from the unlighted loading a dock. Her injuries would not have occurred
had the light been functioning. The light would have been functioning if the building owner,
Kingston, had exercised due care by properly maintaining the building and replacing the light bulb.
Defendants were owners of the building at the time that Plaintiff was injured and should have, by
reasonable exercise of due diligience, had knowledge that the light was out on the loading dock.
Defendants have argued that they had no actual or constructive knowledge of Plaintiffs use of
the loading dock door. This is irrelevant. Defendants are not required to have knowledge of
Plaintiffs use of the loading dock door, only constructive knowledge that a dangerous condition
existed on their premises. "To establish a prima facie negligence case, the invitee also must show
that the landowner knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known, of the alleged
dangerous condition." Shea v. Kevic Corp., 156 Idaho 540, 548-9, 328 P.3d 520, 528 (2014).
Plaintiff has stated, under oath, that the light was out at the time of her fall and that even a month
after the fall, the light still was out. Aff. of Nicole Packer ,r 14, 15, 17.

III.

Plaintiff was not under a contractual relationship with Riverbend or Kingston.

Defendants have asserted that a contractual relationship between Plaintiff and Riverbend
existed without proof by affidavit, deposition, or testimony, which cannot be taken into account
on summary judgment. Kingston Properties, L.P., DK Enterprises, Inc. 's Memorandum in Support
of Summary Judgment, pg. 5 ("Kingston Brief'); Chandler v. Hayden, 147 Idaho 765, 771, 215
P.3d 485 (2009); Rule 56(c), Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.
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Defendants are concerned with a contract that Plaintiff was apparently never given, and never
signed. She was confronted with the contract for the first time at her deposition. Neither
Defendant had a copy of the contract signed by the Plaintiff. She said at her deposition she would
check her emails to see if she had received one for the 2015 event. After the deposition, she did
check her records and emails thoroughly, and there was no such contract to be found .
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court deny Defendants'
Motion for Summary Judgment in full.
DATED this 25th day of October, 2018.

1\.llen Browning ?

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 25 th day of October, 2018, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing document was delivered to the following attorney of record by placing same in the
U.S. mail in a postage-paid envelope, hand delivery, or facsimile.

John A. Bailey
P.O. Box 100
Pocatello, Idaho 83204

US MAIL
FAX
HAND DELIVERY
COURTHOUSE BOX

Donald F. Carey
477 Shoup Ave, Suite 203
Idaho Falls, ID 83402

US MAIL
FAX
HAND DELIVERY
COURTHOUSE BOX

Dated this 25 th day of October, 2018.
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d:£_
ALLEN H. BROWNING
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Electronically Filed
10/25/2018 4:33 PM
Seventh Judicial District, Bonneville County
Penny Manning, Clerk of the Court
By: Angelica Linares, Deputy Clerk

Allen H. Browning, ISB#3007
BROWNING LAW
482 Constitution Way, Suite 111
Idaho Falls, ID 83402
Telephone: (208) 542-2700
Facsimile: (208) 542-2711
E-mail: allen.browning.law@gmail.com
Attorney for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
NICOLE PACKER,
Plaintiff,

Case No.: CV-17-7024
PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION
TO MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
BY RIVERBEND COMMUNICATIONS
HOLDING, LLC, and RIVERBEND
COMMUNICATIONS LLC.

vs.

KINGSTON PROPERTIES, L.P.; DK
ENTERPRISES, INC., and RIVERBEND
COMMUNICATIONS, LLC.,; RIVERBEND
COMMUNICATIONS HOLDING, LLC and
RIVERBEND COMMUNICATIONS LLC dba
RIVERBEND EVENTS
Defendants.

COMES NOW the Plaintiff NICOLE PACKER, by and through her attorney of record, Allen
H. Browning, and pursuant to the Court's Order hereby replies to the Defendants' Riverbend
communications Holding, LLC and Riverbend Communications LLC Motions for Summary
Judgment.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

1.

On or about December 4, 2015, PLAINTIFF took part as a vendor in the "All I

Plaintiffs Brief in Opposition to Defendants' Riverbend Communications Holding, LLC and Riverbend Communications LLC
Motions for Summary Judgment
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Want For Christmas" expo sponsored by Riverbend Communications and Riverbend Events at
Kingston Plaza in Idaho Falls, Bonneville County, Idaho.
2.

Plaintiff was not given, and did not sign, a contract for the "All I Want For

Christmas" event for 2015. After her deposition, when she was handed an unsigned copy of that
agreement, she checked her emails and found she had in fact never been sent a copy of the
contract for 2015. Affidavit of Nicole Packer, para. 2-4. She paid her fee to participate and
that's all that was required of her to take part.
3.

On Friday, December 5, 2015, Plaintiff finished bringing her setup materials

through the west door of the building. When she had finished, and after she had setup, Jay Dye,
the Riverbend Communications representative who was supervising the vendors, told her and
other vendors that they did not want the vendors using the west door, and they wanted them to
exit through the back door because there was a problem with the west door. Affidavit of Nicole
Packer, para. 6-8.
4.

On that Friday evening, approximately 8:05 p.m., Plaintiff began to leave the

Christmas expo after dark. Her car was parked near the west exit. She left through the back
door. The only reason she left through the back door is because Jay directed her and the other
vendors to leave by the back door. Jay did not want her to use the north door, as that was for
members of the public, not for vendors. Affidavit ofNicole Packer, para. 9-10.
11.

Plaintiff had never used the rear entrance of the building before. Affidavit of

Nicole Packer, para. 11.
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13.

As Plaintiff was leaving the building, she had a drink in one hand and a bag of

some things from her booth, and her purse, in the other hand.
14.

When Plaintiff went through the back door, there was no illumination, although,

as shown by Exhibit 1, there was a light fixture present over the door of the rear exit.
Affidavit of Nicole Packer, para. 14-15.
15.

The door closed behind Plaintiff, and she believed it locked. She was in darkness.

All she could see was distant lights toward the parking lot area to the west.
Affidavit of Nicole Packer, para. 16-17.
16.

Plaintiff had never been out that door before, and no one had informed her that

there was a dropoff of approximately 5 feet as she exited the door and stepped to her
right, toward the parking lot. Affidavit of Nicole Packer, para. 18.
17.

Plaintiff took a couple of steps towards the parking area lights and fell several feet

straight down, off an unlit loading dock, because the light above the exit door depicted in
Exhibit 1 was not illuminated. Affidavit of Nicole Packer, para. 19.
20.

When Plaintiff fell, she was hurt, and she panicked that no one would find me.

After some time I calmed down, took my phone out of my purse and called for help.
That's where my phone was when I fell: in my purse. Affidavit of Nicole Packer, para.
20.
STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Court must grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine
issue of dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
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Rule 56(e), Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court liberally construes the record in favor of

the party opposing the motion and draws all reasonable inferences and conclusions in that party's
favor. Friel v. Boise City Haus. Auth., 126 Idaho 484, 485, 887 P.2d 29, 30 (1994). A "mere
scintilla of evidence or only slight doubt as to the facts is not sufficient to create a genuine issue
for purposes of summary judgment.

The non-moving party must respond to the summary

judgment motion with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Samuel v.
Hepworth, Nungester & Lezamiz, 134 Idaho 84, 87, 996 P.2d 303, 306 (2000). "When a motion

for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not
rest upon the mere allegations or denials of that party's pleadings, but the party's response, by
affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is
a genuine issue for trial." Chandler v. Hayden, 147 Idaho 765, 771, 215 P.3d 485 (2009).
The Court must grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine issue of
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Rule
56(e), Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court liberally construes the record in favor of the

party opposing the motion and draws all reasonable inferences and conclusions in that party's
favor. Friel v. Boise City Haus. Auth., 126 Idaho 484, 485, 887 P.2d 29, 30 (1994). A "mere
scintilla of evidence or only slight doubt as to the facts is not sufficient to create a genuine issue
for purposes of summary judgment.

The non-moving party must respond to the summary

judgment motion with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Samuel v.
Hepworth, Nungester & Lezamiz, 134 Idaho 84, 87, 996 P.2d 303, 306 (2000).
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Any party who brings a summary judgment motion bears the burden of proving there is
no genuine issue for trial. This has not been done.

LIABILITY OF RIVERBEND COMMUNICATIONS HOLDING, LLC.
When Plaintiff filed this suit, it was unclear which entity bearing a similar name was the
liable party. Plaintiff intended to file against the building owner for having an unsafe condition,
i.e., the unlit loading dock adjacent to the rear exit, and the entity running the event known as the
"All I Want For Christmas" at the Kingston Plaza December 5, 2015.
Counsel for the defense has indicated that Riverbend Communications LLC was the
entity running the event on the date in question, not Riverbend Holding, LLC. For that reason,
Plaintiff will dismiss defendant Riverbend Holding, LLC, from this suit.

THE LIABILITY OF RIVERBEND COMMUNICATIONS, LLC.
Plaintiff paid her vendor's money to Riverbend Communications, LLC, hereinafter
"Riverbend," to take part in the "All I Want For Christmas" event held December 5, 2015. Jay
Dye was the one supervising the event and directing vendors where they were to enter and leave
the building. He specifically directed Plaintiff to leave by an unsafe exit. She followed his
directions. She was injured as a result of having a bad fall off an unlit loading dock as a result.
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ISSUES RAISED BY RIVERBEND

Riverbend has stated it is entitled to walk away from the result of it's employee's
negligent conduct for the following reasons:
1.

Riverbend owed Plaintiff no duty of care, because she was a trespasser for exiting

by the rear door; that rear door exits onto a dangerous loading dock and vendors were not
supposed to go there.
2.

"Even if the Court resolves the facts in Packer's favor and assumes, aguendo, that

she was advised to exit through the back door of the building," she became a trespasser once she
got outside and realized it was too dark to see the hazard right next to the door, as opposed to reentering the building and exiting through one of the two doors she was specifically told not to
use as an exit.
3.

It was unforeseeable by Riverbend that Plaintiff would get hurt by following Jay

Dye's instructions.
4.

Plaintiff is bound by paragraphs 23 and 24 of a contract she never got and never

signed, which state that vendors will hold harmless Riverbend from any third party claims
brought against Riverbend arising as a result of the vendor's participation in the expo.
Let's take these arguments up, one by one.
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PLAINTIFF DID NOT BECOME A TRESPASSER BY GOING TO A
PLACE SHE WAS NOT ALLOWED TO GO

This matter is before the Court on Summary Judgment. Plaintiff has stated, under oath,
that she and other vendors were specifically directed to exit by the rear door by Jay Dye. I am
surprised that Defendant did not include an affidavit by Jay Dye contradicting Plaintiff. Had the
Defendant done so, Plaintiff would have produced affidavits by Tawnie Sumsion and Loretta of
Grandpa's Barbeque in response. However, Plaintiffs assertion here on summary judgment as to
being directed to leave by the rear exit is contradicted only by argument of counsel, which is
irrelevant in determining whether the Plaintiff has produced evidence of her assertion.
There is no merit whatsoever to this assertion of counsel.
The absurdity of this argument by Riverbend is apparent m the line from its brief
following statement: "Even if the Court resolves the facts in Packer's favor and assumes,
aguendo, that she was advised to exit through the back door of the building ... " There is no

assumption to be made by the Court. These facts appear in sworn testimony by the Plaintiff in
her deposition and her affidavit, and the court is required to find in Plaintiffs favor for that
reason. The fact that there is not even a contrary affidavit from Mr. Dye (which would not be
sufficient to prevail on summary judgment anyway) highlights the frivolous nature of this
contention.
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PLAINTIFF DID NOT BECOME A TRESPASSER WHEN SHE FAILED TO REENTER THE BUILDING UPON REALIZING IT WAS DARK OUTSIDE

To this assertion of counsel, Plaintiff responds as follows: there were only 3 means of
exiting the building, so far as Plaintiff knew: the front, the west side, and the back. She went
through the only exit door she was authorized to go out, as stated in her affidavit and in her
deposition. She believed the door locked behind her when it closed on its own, and that re-entry
was not an option.
Riverbend is trying to escape liability by imposing a duty on Plaintiff to correct its
mistakes in a manner that appeared impossible to the Plaintiff at the time, and contrary to the
instructions of Riverbend's supervisor on site.
There is no merit to this argument. Plaintiff has raised facts sufficient to cause this
argument to fail for summary judgment purposes.

IT WAS FORESEEABLE BY RIVERBEND THAT PLAINTIFF WOULD GET
HURT BY FOLLOWING JAY DYE'S INSTRUCTIONS.

In response to this argument, Plaintiff need go no further than the law cited in
Defendant's brief. "an owner or occupier ofland owes a duty to an invitee to keep the premises
in a reasonably safe condition, or to warn of hidden or concealed dangers." Riverbend cited
Brooks v. Wal-Mart Stores, 2018 Ida. LEXIS 91 (2018) in support of that proposition.

Plaintiff has adequately raised a factual question concerning whether the premises were
safe for her. Part of that duty toward invitees would be a duty to provide them safe egress from
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the building. Plaintiff was told not to exit by the front or the west side of the building. She was
directed to exit by the back of the building.
Riverbend cannot escape liability by asserting it did not check to see if the door the
Plaintiff was told to use was or was not safe. All the vendors had to exit somewhere, and
Riverbend had a duty to make sure there was a reasonably safe place to exit. It apparently did
not do this, so it matters not whether Jay Dye bothered to actually check to see if the place he
was directing the vendors to go was or was not safe.
IDJI 3.03 states " The [owner] [occupier] owes a duty to exercise ordinary care to avoid
exposing persons on the premises to an unreasonable risk of harm."

That duty applies to

Riverbend as well as to Kingston.
IDJI 3.03 states "The [owner] [occupant] owes a duty to exercise ordinary care in
inspection of the premises for the purpose of discovering dangerous conditions."
Again, this jury instruction, which reflects Idaho law, tells us that both Kingston and
Riverbend shared an obligation to make a reasonable inspection of the premises to make
sure the premises were safe for persons using the premises. When Riverbend's supervisor
told the vendors, they needed to exit by the back door, it was reasonable to expect him
inspect to see that the area of egress was safe. He didn't do that.

PARAGRAPHS23AND24OFTHECONTRACTAREIRRELEVANTASTHEY
APPLY TO 3RD PARTIES AGGRIEVED BY ACTIONS OF THE VENDORS, AND
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THIS IS IRRELEVANT ANYWAY BECAUSE PLAINTIFF DID NOT SIGN THE
CONTRACT IN QUESTION

Riverbend's final contention concerns a contract that Plaintiff was apparently never
given, and never signed.

She was confronted with the contract for the first time at her

deposition. Neither Defendant had a copy of the contract signed by the Plaintiff. She said at her
deposition she would check her emails to see if she had received one for the 2015 event. After
the deposition, she did check her records and emails thoroughly, and there was no such contract
to be found. Affidavit of Plaintiff Nicole Packer, para. 2-5.
Defendant has no signed document and no witness to testify that Plaintiff signed such a
document. Plaintiff therefore moves to strike this portion of the Defendant Riverbend's brief.
If the Court does not strike this portion of the Defendant's brief, the argument fails

because of Nicole's testimony that she did check her emails and records after her deposition and
found she did not have any signed copy of the contract either, and that she therefore did not in
fact sign that agreement.
Aside from that, the agreement sections quoted refer to an agreement to indemnify
Riverbend if Riverbend gets sued by a third party (not a vendor) for something a vendor did to
that 3rd party at the expo. In fact, if you look at the paragraph 23 section quoted by Riverbend, it
highlights certain sections but skips highlighting for the language that specifically states that
paragraph 23 refers to indemnifying Riverbend for 3rd party claims arising out of vendor's
participation in the expo. The only claims referred to in paragraph 23 are "third party claims."
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Paragraph 24 specifically and expressly, agam, refers to indemnification.

The suit

against Riverbend has nothing to do with indemnification. No one is suing Nicole Packer for
something she did to them at the expo.
CONCLUSION

This summary judgment motion filed by Riverbend Communications, LLC, should be
denied. Plaintiff has shown facts supporting her claim. This Defendant has failed to show facts
supporting its contentions, instead, it has offered arguments of defense counsel in place of facts,
it has ignored the plain language of an unsigned contract it urges the court to consider, and has
urged points utterly unsupported by Idaho law.

DATED this 25th day of October, 2018.
ISi

ALLEN H. BROWNING

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 25 th day of October, 2018, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing document was delivered to the following attorney of record by e-filing.

E-mail: jbailey@hawleytroxell.com

[] E-File

E-mail: dfc@careyromankiw.com

[] E-File

ISi

Legal Assistant
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Allen H. Browning, ISB#3007
BROWNING LAW
482 Constitution Way, Suite 111
Idaho Falls, ID 83402
Telephone: (208) 542-2700
Facsimile: (208) 542-2711
Email: allen.brownin!!.law(a)!!mai l.com
Attorney for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE

NICOLE PACKER,
Plaintiff,

Case No.: CV-17-7024

vs.

AFFIDAVIT OF PLAINTIFF
NICOLE PACKER

KINGSTON PROPERTIES, L.P.; DK
ENTERPRISES, INC., and RIVERBEND
COMMUNICATIONS, LLC.,
Defendants.
STATE OF NEVADA
ss
County of Clark
Nicole Packer, after being duly sworn on her oath, states that she has read the facts in this
affidavit, knows them to be true from first-hand knowledge to the best of her information and belief:

I.

On or about December 4, 2015, I took part as a vendor in the "All I Want For

Christmas" expo sponsored by Riverbend Communications and Riverbend Events at Kingston Plaza
in Idaho Falls, Bonneville County, Idaho.
2.

I was asked in my deposition whether I had signed a contract concerning the events of

that weekend. I was unsure if I had. Neither Kingston nor Riverbend had a copy of an agreement
signed by me.
Affidavit ofNicole Packer
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3.

After leaving the deposition, I carefully checked all of my past emails that would have

covered that time period. I wanted to see if I had a signed copy of an agreement, and to see if I had
received one in an email. I could not locate a copy of any agreement for that event.
4.

To the best of my recollection, after checking my emails, I can say with confidence

that I did not receive a contract for the 2015 "All I Want for Christmas" event, although as I stated, I
have signed other contracts for other Riverbend events in the past.
5.

There was an actual setup time on Thursday, December 3, 2015, for the vendors. I

was not there because of my work schedule, and did not arrive until Friday morning. If they had
people sign contracts during the setup time, that may be why I did not get one.
6.

I brought my materials in on Friday morning, December 5, 2015. I was unloading

items through the west door to the building. When I had finished bringing my things into the
building through the west door, and as I was setting up, Jay said "We don't want you using this door
anymore. We want you to go through the back exit because there's a problem with the door."
7.

I took Jay at his word and did not question him regarding whether there was a

problem with that west door.
8.

When you are a vendor at an event there, Jay supervises the vendors, and all

instructions to the vendors go through Jay of Riverbend Communications. Jay directed all the
vendors to leave through the back door that day. I know that Tawnie Sumpsion and Loretta of
Grandpa's Barbeque were two other vendors I know who were likewise directed to use the rear exit
of the building by Jay.
9.

On that Friday evening, approximately 8:05 p.m., I began to leave the Christmas

expo after dark. My car was parked near the west exit. I left through the back door. The only reason
Affidavit of Nicole Packer
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I left through the back door is because Jay directed me and the other vendors to leave by the back
door. Jay did not want me to use the north door, as that was for members of the public, not for
vendors.
10.

Jay without question said "We are asking all vendors to exit through the back." The

only reason I exited through the back door Jay directed me to.
11.

I had not used this exit before.

12.

I used this back door as directed by Jay Dye.

13.

As I was leaving the building, I had a drink in one hand and a bag of some things

from my booth, and my purse, in the other hand.
14.

When I went through the back door, there was no illumination.

15.

Exhibit 1 is a photograph taken about a month after my fall. It shows the rear door

that Jay Dye told me to use. When I had this photo taken, it was in the afternoon in early
January 2016. The light was not illuminated when this photo was taken. The photo also
shows the door did not have a knob, but a handle to grip, and a keyhole below the grip.
16.

On the day of my accident, when I exited the building as directed, through the door

depicted in Exhibit 1, the door closed and I believed it had locked behind me and I could not
re-enter the building.

17.

On the day of the accident, it was dark when I exited the building as directed, and I

could not see anything except distant lights toward the parking lot area.
18.

I had never been out that door before, and no one informed me that there was an

approximately 5 foot dropoff as I exited the door and stepped to my right, toward the parking
lot.
Affidavit of Nicole Packer
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19.

I
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took a couple of steps towards the parking area lights and fell several feet straight

down, off an unlit loading dock, because the light above the exit door depicted in Exhibit 1
was not illuminated and I had no idea that in walking toward my parked car, I would be
walking right off the edge of a loading dock.

20.

I was asked in my deposition if I was looking at my phone when I exited the

building. I did not remember. However, I do know I had a drink in one hand and my bag
and my purse in the other hand, and ifI had been carrying my phone in my hand or looking at
it, I would have dropped it when I fell off the dock. That did not happen. When I fell, I was

hurt, and I panicked that no one would find me. After some time I calmed down, took my
phone out of my purse and called for help. That's where my phone was when I fell: in my
purse.

Further your affiant sayeth naught.

DATED thls

/J

~

~'6·

day of October, 2018.

On the~y of October. 2018, before me, the undersigned, a Notary Public, in and for

the State of Idaho, personally appeared Nicole Packer, known or identified to me to be the person
whose name is subscribed to the within instrume11t and acknowledged to me that he executed the

same.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my official seal, the day
and year in this certificate first above written.

(Sean
DAVITA BRAGG

NOTARY PUBLIC
>

'

STATE OF NEVAD,\
My Commiaalon &pl1M: 10-24,20
Certlfk:ale No: 18-4249-1
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Electronically Filed
11/1/2018 4:33 PM
Seventh Judicial District, Bonneville County
Penny Manning, Clerk of the Court
By: Jonathan Young, Deputy Clerk

John A. Bailey Jr. (ISB#: 2619)
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP
412 W Center Street, Suite 2000
P.O.Box 100
Pocatello, ID 83 204
Telephone: 208.233.2001
Facsimile: 208.232.0150
Email: JBailey@hawleytroxell.com
Attorneysjbr Defendant Riverbend Communications Holding, LLC

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE

NICOLE PACKER,
CaseNo.: CV-2017-7024
Plaintiff,
vs.
KINGSTON PROPERTIES, L.P; DK
ENTERPRISES, INC., RlVERBEND
COMMUNICATIONS, LLC; RIVERBEND
COMMUNICATIONS HOLDING, LLC.
And RIVERBEND COMMUNICATIONS
LLC dba RlVERBEND EVENTS,

DEFENDANTS', RIVERBEND
COMMUNICATIONS, LLC AND
RIVERBEND COMMUNICATIONS
HOLDING, LLC, MOTION TO
STRIKE AFFIDAVIT OF
PLAINTIFF NICOLE PACKER

Defendants.

COME NOW, Defendants, Riverbend Communications, LLC and Riverbend
Communications Holdings, LLC, (hereafter "Riverbend"), by and through counsel, John A.
Bailey, Jr. of the law firm Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP, and pursuant to I.R.C.P. 12(f)
and 56(c) as well as I.R.E. 403, 801, and 802, submit their Motion to Strike the Affidavit of
Plaintiff Nicole Packer. This Motion is supported by the Memorandum in Support of Motion to
Strike Affidavit of Plaintiff Nicole Packer and the Reply Affidavit of John A. Bailey, Jr. filed
contemporaneously herewith.
Oral argument is requested.
RIVERBEND DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT OF PLAINTIFF NICOLE PACKER-1
47809.0045.11407025,l
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DATED this 1st day ofNovember, 2018.
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY, LLP

Isl John A. Bailey. Jr.
JOHN A. BAILEY JR.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 1st day of November, 2018, I filed the foregoing
electronically through the iCourt e-file system, which caused the following parties or counsel to
be served by electronic means, as more fully reflected on the Notice of Electronic Filing:
Allen H. Browning
Steve Carpenter
BROWNING LAW
482 Constitution Way, Suite 111
Idaho Falls, ID 83402
Attorneys.for Plaintiffs

[ x]
[ x]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]

!Court e-file
Facsimile to 208-542-2711
Hand Delivery
U.S. Mail
Email allen.browning.law@gmail.com

Donald F. Carey
Lindsey R. Romankiw
CAREY ROMANKIW, PLLC
477 Shoup Ave, Suite 203
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402
Attorneys for Kingston Properties, L.P. & DK
Enterprises, Inc.

[x]
[ x]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]

ICourte-file
Facsimile to 208-525-8813
Hand Delivery
U.S. Mail
Email: dfc(a),careyromankiw.com and
lrr@careyromankiw.com

Isl John A. Bailey, Jr.
JOHN A. BAILEY JR.

RTVERBEND DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT OF PLAINTIFF NICOLE PACKER-2
47809.0045.11407025.l
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Electronically Filed
11/1/2018 4:33 PM
Seventh Judicial District, Bonneville County
Penny Manning, Clerk of the Court
By: Jonathan Young, Deputy Clerk

John A. Bailey Jr. (ISB#: 2619)
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP
412 W Center Street, Suite 2000
P.O. Box 100
Pocatello, ID 83204
Telephone: 208.233.2001
Facsimile: 208.232.0150
Email: JBailey@lhawleytroxell.com
Attorneys/or Defendant Riverbend Communications Holding, LLC

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
NICOLE PACKER,
CaseNo.: CV-2017-7024
Plaintiff,
vs.
KINGSTON PROPERTIES, L.P; DK
ENTERPRISES, INC., RIVERBEND
COMMUNICATIONS, LLC; RIVERBEND
COMMUNICATIONS HOLDING, LLC.
And RIVERBEND COMMUNICATIONS
LLC dba RIVERBEND EVENTS,

DEFENDANTS', RIVERBEND
COMMUNICATIONS, LLC AND
RIVERBEND COMMUNICATIONS
HOLDING, LLC, REPLY BRIEF
RE: MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

Defendants.
COME NOW, Defendants, Riverbend Communications, LLC and Riverbend
Communications Holdings, LLC, (hereafter "Riverbend"), by and through counsel, John A.
Bailey, Jr. of the law firm Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP, and pursuant to I.R.C.P. 56(c),
submit this Reply Brief Re: Motion for Summary Judgment as follows:

I. INTRODUCTION
Riverbend is not liable for injuries Nicole Packer (hereafter "Packer") allegedly sustained
as a result of her falling off a loading dock at the Kingston Plaza in Idaho Falls, Idaho. First,
Packer has conceded that Riverbend Communications Holding, LLC owed her no duty of care
RIVERBEND DEFENDANTS' REPLY BRIEF RE: MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT PURSUANT
TO I.R. C.P. 56(c)-1
47809.0045.11464260. l
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and, thus, it must be dismissed on summary judgment as a party defendant. Second, Packer has
not come forward, as required by I.R.C.P. 56, with admissible evidence showing that Riverbend
Communications, LLC breached a duty of care owing to her, whether she is deemed to have been
a licensee or a trespasser at the time of the fall. Third, not only should Packer's sham affidavit
testimony be rejected on the events surrounding the subject accident, but it should also be
rejected by the Court in passing upon Riverbend's defense of indemnity. For each of these
reasons discussed in more detail below, summary judgment should be granted, dismissing
Packer's claims against Riverbend as a matter of!aw,

II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARDS IGNORNED BY PACKER
"No affirmative duty to produce evidence rests on the party moving for summary
judgment, and the moving party has no obligation to negate the opponent's claim". 1
Further, the Court is "not required to comb through the record to find some reason to deny a
motion for summary judgment."2 Instead, the "party opposing summary judgment must direct
[the Court's] attention to specific triable facts." 3 Statements in a brief, unsupported by the record,
cannot create an issue of fact, 4 Affidavits submitted in support of or in opposition to a motion for
summary judgment must be admissible under the Idaho Rules of Evidence. The admissibility of
the evidence contained in affidavits and depositions in support of or in opposition to a motion for
summary judgment is a threshold question to be answered before applying the liberal

1
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 US 317,323 (1986) (Emphasis added).
2
Carmen v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 237 F.3d 1026, 1029 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Forsberg v.
.Pac. Northwest Bell Tel. Co., 840 F.2d 1409, 1418 (9th Cir. 1988)).
3
Southern California Gas Co. v, City of Santa Ana, 336 F.3d 885,889 (9th Cir, 2003).
4
Barnes v. Independent Auto. Dealers, 64 F.3d 1389, 1396 n. 3 (9th Cir, 1995).
RIVERBEND DEFENDANTS' REPLY BRIEF RE: MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT PURSUANT
TO I,R,C.P, 56(c)-2
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construction and reasonable inferences rule to detennine whether the evidence is sufficient to
create a genuine issue for trial. 5

III. ARGUMENT
A.

Premises Liability Principles Demonstrate That There Was No Breach Of
Duty By Riverbend.

In Plaintiffs Response Brief, Packer sidesteps pertinent legal authority relied upon by
Riverbend, simply arguing that she was an invitee under the law of torts. It is clear that Packer's
efforts to cast herself as an invitee, with aim at imposing a heightened duty of care on Riverbend,
are unconvincing.

1. At Best, Packer Was A Licensee, Not An Invitee.
Packer admittedly participated in the Christmas Expo event for her own commercial gain
as a vendor. (See Response Brief, Pg. 2). This admission by Packer shows that she was a
licensee, at best, not an invitee. Again, "a licensee is a visitor who enters with the consent of the
landowner in pursuit of the visitor's purpose". O'Guin v. Bingham County, 142 Idaho 49, 122
P.3d 308 (2005); see also Holzheimer v. Johnannesen, 125 Idaho 397,871 P.2d 814 (1994);
Brooks v. Wal-Mart Stores, 2018 Ida. LEXIS 91 (2018). An owner or occupier ofland is only

required to share with a licensee knowledge of dangerous conditions or activities on the land.
Id (emphasis added); citing Evans v. Park, 112 Idaho 400,301, 732 P.2d 369,370

(Ct.App.1987). 6 The licensee must establish that the owner or occupier of the premises had
actual or constructive notice of a foreseeable dangerous condition. Brooks v. Wal-Mart

5

Holdaway v, Broulim 's Supermarket, 158 Idaho 606, 349 P.3d 1197 (2015); citing Gem State Ins. Co. v.
Hutchison, 145 Idaho 10, 13, 175 P.3d 172, 175 (2007).
6

In contrast, a landowner or occupier owes an invitee the duty to "keep the premises in a reasonably safe
condition, or to warn of hidden or concealed dangers". Brooks v. Wal-Mart Stores, 2018 Ida. LEXIS 91
(2018). Packer's argument that such duty was owing by Riverbend is invalid.

RIVERBEND DEFENDANTS' REPLY BRIEF RE: MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT PURSUANT
TO I.R.C.P, 56(c)-3
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Stores, 2018 Ida. LEXIS 91 (2018) (emphasis added), These dangerous conditions must be
"existing hazards on the land that were known or to the owner and unknown to and not
reasonably discoverable by the licensee." Chapman v. Chapman, 147 Idaho 756,215 P.3d 476
(2009),
Since there is no dispute that Packer was a licensee at the time she decided to exit the
Christmas Expo, then Packer is required to come forward with admissible evidence showing that
Riverbend failed to warn her of dangerous conditions on the land for which it had actual or
constructive notice and which were unknown and not reasonably discoverable by Packer as a
licensee. 7 There is no such evidence in the record. The Plaintiff did not even attempt to respond
to the evidence of the correct standard of care as required by the case law.
Packer inappropriately attempts to shift her evidentiary burden to Riverbend, arguing
through inadmissible hearsay comments by counsel, that Jay Dye must have negligently directed
Packer to exit through the back door of the facility, because he did not submit an affidavit in
support ofRiverbend's Motion for Summary Judgment. Rule 56 does not require such a
production of evidence by Riverbend. (See I.R.C.P. 56(£)(3) (allowing the Court to grant
summary judgment if the motion and supporting materials, including the facts considered
undisputed, show that the movant is entitled to a judgment). Instead, it was Packer's evidentiary
burden to show, through admissible evidence refuting summary judgment, that Jay Dye had
actual or constructive notice that: a) the back door exit area was "dimly lit" as claimed by
Packer; b) the back door would automatically lock behind someone exiting as claimed by Packer;
and c) that there was a loading dock within two feet of the back door exit as claimed by Packer.
7

Packer's Response Brief at Pg. 9 has ascribed inspection duties to Riverbend which is an incorrect
standard and is misleading as inspection is a duty only owed by a landowner or occupier to an invitee, not a licensee.
Not only are those inspection duties incorrectly noted, but legal counsel's argument that Jay Dye failed to
reasonably inspect the premises in accordance with those duties should be disregarded by the Court. !DJ! 3 .15 sets
forth the correct legal standard outlined by Riverbend herein.

RIVERBEND DEFENDANTS' REPLY BRIEF RE: MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT PURSUANT
TO I.R.C.P. 56(c)•4
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(See I.R.C.P. 56(d)(2)). 8 Instead, there is a complete lack of facts with which to create a disputed

issue.
While it is unclear from Packer's Response Brief whether she is claiming that one of the
foregoing conditions was a "dangerous" one for which there was a duty to warn, or whether all
three conditions combined to become "dangerous" ones for which there was a duty to warn, it is
immaterial. 9 The key is that Packer has not shown that Jay Dye had notice. actual or
constructive, of any one of these conditions with the back door exit.
Moreover, Packer failed to refute the evidence in the record showing that these allegedly
dangerous conditions did not even exist at the time of her fall. The photographs in the record
show that there were multiple lights around the back door exit which Packer has not shown were
inoperable at the time of her fall. 10 She merely alleges that the light directly over the loading
dock was unlit. Next, she fails to respond to the fact that the back door had no automatic locking
mechanism as is claimed by Packer. 11 Therefore, she could have gone back inside instead of
walking out into an area where she claims she could not see. Lastly, the loading dock was
several feet from the back door exit, rather than "two steps" away as is claimed by Packer. 12
Because Packer has not shown actual or constructive notice by Riverbend of a dangerous
condition for which she was not warned 13 , or which she could not have reasonably been
discovered on her own, then she is unable to prevail on her negligence claim even if she is
8

Packer's contention that she would have produced affidavits by Tawnie Sumsion and Loretta of
Grandpa's Barbeque ifan affidavit of Jay Dye had been submitted is disingenuous. If Packer had such
evidence, it was her burden under Rule 56 to come forward with it as the non-moving party. Her failure to
do so precludes her reliance upon such evidence,
9
Notably, Packer cited lack of lighting on the loading dock and an automatic locking exit
door as the two "dangerous" conditions in her Complaint at Pg. 3.
IO See Exhibit "3" to the Bailey Aff. on file herein.
11
See Affidavit of Justin Sommers on file herein.
12
See Exhibit "3" to the Bailey Aff.; Affidavit on file herein at Pg. 4.
13
As is argued by Riverbend on its Motion to Strike, Packer's affidavit testimony eluding to instructions
which Jay Dye may have given to other vendors at the Christmas Expo is based upon inadmissible hearsay
and speculation and, as such, this testimony must not be considered on summary judgment.
RIVERBEND DEFENDANTS' REPLY BRIEF RE: MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT PURSUANT
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deemed a licensee instead of a trespasser. In fact, the undisputed evidence is clear that Packer
did discover, or could have reasonably discovered, the allegedly dangerous, prior to any injury.
At that point it was Packer's duty to protect herself; and not the duty of any third party to warn
the Plaintiff of information she already possessed.

2. Packer Became A Mere Trespasser When She Went Out Into The
Darkness.
In her Response Brief, Packer also completely ignored legal authority relied upon by
Riverbend showing that she should be deemed to be a trespasser, having forfeited her status as
licensee. 14 The duty of a trespasser is a narrow and limited one. The duty is only to refrain from
willful or want acts with might cause injuries. 15 Those authorities citied by Riverbend point to
the conclusion that, even if Jay Dye told Packer to exit through the back door, which has not
been properly placed in the record by Packer, when Packer chose to continue walking into the
dark, when she could admittedly had poor night vision and could not see in front of her, she
became a mere trespasser on the premises. (See Exhibit "1" to the Bailey Reply Aff. at Pg. 84,
Ln. 10-25; Pg. 138, Ln. 2-15). There is no genuine issue of fact for trial on Packer's negligence
claim because Riverbend engaged in no willful or wanton acts which could cause Packer injury.
To find otherwise would open the door to premises liability in any number of unjust
situations involving a change from licensee status to trespasser status. For example, a landowner
or occupier could ask a licensee to exit a door without knowing that a fire, flooding, tomadic
winds, or other dangers existed outside, and yet the landowner would be liable if the licensee

14

Boodle v. United States, 472 F.2d 1014 (9ili Cir. Mont. 1973); West v. Tan, 322 F.2d
24 (9ili Cir. Haw. 1963); Rich v. Tite-Knot Pine Mill, 421 P.2d 370 (Or. 1966); Lavitch v. Smith, 356 P.2d
531 (Or. 1960); Grahn v, Northwest Sport, Inc., 310 P.2d 306 (Or, 1957); Lindholm v. Northwestern
P.R.Co., (Cal. App. 1926); Aguilar v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 4137 (9 th Cir.
Or, 2000); Hansen v. Cohen, 276 P.2d 391 (Or. 1954); Ryggv. County of Maui, 98 F. Supp,2d 1129 (D.
Haw, 1999); Grossenbach v. Devonshire Realty Co., 261 N.W, 742 (Wis. 1935); McNa//y v. Goodenough,
92 N.W.2d 890 (Wis, 1958).
15
Huyck v Hecla Mining Company, 101 Idaho 299, 612 P.2d 142 (1980).
RIVERBEND DEFENDANTS' REPLY BRIEF RE: MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT PURSUANT
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stepped out into these apparent dangers for simply being told to exit that door. The same would
be true if a brawl were ensuing outside of the exit door, or a gunfight. If the licensee walked out
into this apparent danger simply because the licensee was told to exit through that door, and a
landowner or occupier could be held liable, it would upend the core principles of tort liability in
this area of the law.
This is particularly true where the undisputed facts in the record show that the back exit
door had no automatic locking mechanism that prevented Parker from returning to the building,
and that Packer could have instead exited through the front door. 16 There is no evidence in the
record that Jay Dye instructed Packer that she could not exit through the front door, Packer
simply assumed that she could not go that route. 17 On these undisputed facts showing that
Packer became a trespasser, Riverbend is entitled to judgment as a matter of law dismissing her
negligence claim.

B.

Packer's Claim Is Also Barred By Indemnity.

Again, Riverbend utilizes what is called a "multi show payment agreement".

(See

Exhibit "2" to the Bailey Aff. on file herein). Packer admitted in her deposition, repeatedly, that
she was familiar with this agreement and that she believed she had signed it. 18 Her efforts to
disavow her prior deposition testimony and to directly contradict it by sham affidavit testimony
stating that she never received the agreement or signed it should be disallowed.

Under the

"sham affidavit rule", a party cannot create an issue of fact by contradicting prior deposition
testimony.

19

Although the Idaho Supreme Court has not expressly adopted the sham affidavit

rule, admissibility of affidavit testimony is still a threshold question to be answered before
16
See Packer depo excerpts, Exhibit "l" to the Bailey Reply Aff. at Pg 58, Ln, 9-12,
17
Id; see also Pg. 131, Ln. 11-20.
18
See Exhibit "1" to the Bailey Reply Aff. at Pg. 41, Ln,7-19; Pg. 43, Ln, 3-5; Pg. 118, Ln. 9-16; Pg. 119,
Ln. 24-25; Pg. 120, Ln. 1-12; Pg. 121, Ln, 1-3.
19
See Yeagerv. Bowlin, 693 F.3d 1076 (9 th Cir. 2012).
RIVERBEND DEFENDANTS' REPLY BRIEF RE: MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT PURSUANT
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applying the liberal construction and reasonable inferences rule to determine whether the
evidence is sufficient to create a genuine issue for trial.

20

Again, as the Court can see by Exhibit "2", Riverbend had clear written terms
and conditions which were agreed terms for vendors during the Christmas Expo. Packer does
not deny receiving a copy of these terms and conditions and having knowledge of them. (Exhibit
"l" to the Bailey Aff., to be supplemented). These terms and conditions contained the following
significant provisions:
23. Vendor shall protect, indemnify, defend and hold harmless
Riverbend Communications, the owner/operation of the Facility and any person
associated with the sponsorship or administration of the expo, and their respective
officers, directors, members, employees, agents and representatives, (collectively,
the "Indemnified Parties") for, from and against any third party claims, demands,
proceedings, suits and actions, including any related liabilities, obligations,
losses, damages, deficiencies, penalties, asserted against any of the
Indemnified Parties that relate to, arise out of or result from Vendor's
participation in the expo.
24. THE INDEMNIFIED PARTIES' MAXIMUM LIABILITY FOR
DAMAGES IN CONNECTION WITH THIS CONTRACT, REGARDLESS OF
THE CAUSE OF ACTION, WILL NOT EXCEED THE TOTAL AMOUNT
PAID BY VENDOR TO RIVERBEND COMMUNICATIONS FOR EXHIBIT
SPACE AT THE EXPO. IN NO EVENT WILL ANY OF THE
INDEMNIFIED PARTIES BE LIABLE TO A VENDOR OR ANY OTHER
PERSON OR ENTITY FOR ANY INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, INDIRECT,
PUNITIVE, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES,
INCLUDING, WITHOUT LIMITATION, LOSS OF PROFITS, REVENUE,
BUSINESS OR GOODWILL, WHETHER IN AN ACTION CONTRACT,
TORT (INCLUDING, WITHOUT LIMITATION, NEGLIGENCE AND
STRICT LIABILITY) OR OTHERWISE, EVEN IF THE INDEMNIFIED
PARTIES HAVE BEEN ADVISED OR KNEW OF THE POSSIBLITY OF
THE DAMAGES. THE FOREGOING LIMITATION OF LIABILITY
APPLIES EVEN IF ANY REMEDY UNDER THIS CONTRACT FAILS OF
ITS ESSENTIAL PURPOSE.
(Emphasis added).

20 See Shea v. Kr,vic Corp., 156 Idaho 540, 328 P.3d 520 (2014); Holdaway v. Broulim 's Supermarket, 158
Idaho 606,349 P.3d 1197 (2015); citing Gem State Ins. Co. v. Hutchison, 145 Idaho 10, 13, 175 P.3d 172,
175 (2007),
RIVERBEND DEFENDANTS' REPLY BRIEF RE: MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT PURSUANT
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Even if the Court finds that the third party language contained in Paragraph 23 of
the agreement does not apply to third party claims made by a participating vendor, the
indemnity and limits of liability provisions stated in Paragraph 24 unambiguously
preclude Packer's claims in this case. This language is clearly intended to prevent
Riverbend from being exposed to liability of any sort as the result of a vendor's
participation in the Christmas Expo. This language is also !early intended to limit the
total possible liability that Riverbend could face by a vendor's claim to the contract
amount paid for booth space at the Christmas Expo. As it is undisputed that the booth
space rent was less than the jurisdiction limit of $10,000 necessary to proceed at the
District Court level in Idaho, Packer's claim must be dismissed as being in violation of
the indemnity provision of the agreement.

IV. CONCLUSION
Riverbend is entitled to summary judgment because Packer has failed to raise a genuine
issue of material fact for trial on whether Riverbend breached a legal duty owing to her as a
vendor at the Christmas Expo. Further, even if Packer could show a breach of duty, her claim is
barred by indemnity. For each of these reasons, judgment as a matter of law dismissing Packer's
claims against the Riverbend Defendants under I.R.C.P. 56 (c) is proper.

. .....+

xlovl'IM.~N

DATED this>_<day o f ~ , 2018.
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY, LLP

Isl John A. Bailey, Jr.
JOHN A. BAILEY JR.
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the )~day of November, 2018, I filed the foregoing
electronically through the iCourt e-file system, which caused the following parties or counsel to
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Electronically Filed
11/1/2018 4:33 PM
Seventh Judicial District, Bonneville County
Penny Manning, Clerk of the Court
By: Jonathan Young, Deputy Clerk

John A. Bailey, Jr. (ISB# 2619)
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP
412 West Center Street, Suite 2000
P.O. Box 100
Pocatello, Idaho 83204
Telephone: (208) 233-2001
Facsimile: (208) 232-0150
Email: ibailey@hawleytroxell.com
Attorneys for Defendant Riverbend Communications, LLC

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE

NICOLE PACKER,
Case No.: CV-2017-7024
Plaintiff,
vs.
KINGSTON PROPERTIES, L.P; DK
ENTERPRISES, INC., RIVERBEND
COMMUNICATIONS, LLC; RIVERBEND
COMMUNICATIONS HOLDING, LLC; and
RIVERBEND COMMUNICATIONS LLC
dba RIVERBEND EVENTS,

SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF
JOHN A. BAILEY, JR. IN
SUPPORT OF RIVERBEND
COMMUNICATIONS, LLC'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

Defendants.

STATE OF IDAHO )
: ss
County of Bannock )
I, JOHN A. BAILEY, JR., being first duly sworn, on oath deposes and states as follows:

1.

I am an attorney licensed to practice law in the State ofidaho, am counsel of

record for defendant Riverbend Communications, LLC herein and make this affidavit based on
my own personal knowledge.
2.

As referenced in Riverbend Communications, LLC's Memorandum in Support of

Motion for Summary Judgment, attached hereto as "Exhibit A" are true and correct copies of
SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN A. BAILEY, JR. IN SUPPORT OF RIVERBEND
COMMUNICATIONS, LLC'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT- Page 1
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excerpts from transcript of the deposition of Nicole Packer taken on September 26, 2018 that
were cited to in the above referenced memorandum but were not yet available at the time of the
filing of the motion.
FURTHER SAITIL.\FFIANT NAUGHT.
,f~

DATED this_),_ day ofNovember, 2018.
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP

;tJ-"
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO be re me this~ day ofNovember, 2018.

f2fhtctt ~aJJlS
(SEAL)

NOTARY P?,3LIS F9,R ID~H,Q
Residing at:
1
My Commission Expires:
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..
fl1°tJ c;}oJl/

SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN A. BAILEY, JR. IN SUPPORT OF RIVERBEND
COMMUNICATIONS, LLC'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT- Page 2
47809.0045.11464302, l

Page 132

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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I HERBY CERTIFY that on the~ day of November, 2018, I caused to be served a
true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the
following:
Allen H. Browning
Steve Carpenter
BROWNING LAW
482 Constitution Way, Suite 111
Idaho Falls, ID 83402
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

[
[
[
[
[

Donald F. Carey
Lindsey R. Romankiw
CAREY ROMANKIW, PLLC
477 Shoup Ave, Suite 203
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402
Attorneys for Kingston Properties, L.P. & DK
Enterprises, Inc.

[ 6ourt e-file
[ ] Facsimile to 208-525-8813
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] U.S. Mail
[ ] Email: dfc(ii),careyrornankiw.com and
hT@careyromankiw.com

]
]
]
]

!Court e-file
Facsimile to 208-542-2711
Hand Delivery
U.S. Mail
Email allen.browning.law(al.gmail.com

SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN A. BAILEY, JR. IN SUPPORT OF RIVERBEND
COMMUNICATIONS, LLC'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT- Page 3
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Page 133

EXHIBIT A
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Page 1
1 IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
2 THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
3
4 NICOLE PACKER,
)
5
6

7
8
9

Plaintiff,

vs.

) Case No.
) CV-2017-7024

)

)
.)
KINGSTON PROPERTIES, LP.: DK
)
ENTERPRISES, INC,; RIVERBEND
)
COMMUNICAT!ONS, LLC; RlVERBEND
COMMUNICATIONS HOLDING, LLC; and

RIVERBEND COMMUNICATIONS, LLC,
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d/b/a RIVERBEND EVENTS,
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DEPOSJT!ON OF NICOLE PACKER
Wednesday, September 26, 2018, 2:00 p,m.
Idaho Falls, Idaho
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BE IT REMEMBERED that the deposition of
Nicole Packer was taken by the attorney for the
defendants at the office of Carey Romanklw PLLC,
located at 477 Shoup Avenue, Suite 203, Idaho Falls,
Idaho, before Sandra D. Terrill, Court Reporter and
Notary Public, !n and for the State of Idaho, In the
above-entltled matter.
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Q, For Journey and Pearl?
A. Yes.

Q, You two work together as a team
sometimes?
A Not usually, but on occasion we are in
the same home. Yeah.
Q. And his education background, is it
social sciences as well?
A, Not at all. He used to be a police
officer. He was on the other end and then he went
into rehab. His degree is in business, I think. So
he kind of -Q, Did he grow up in this area?
A. Blackfoot. His family is from
Blackfoot. He's lived within the region if you ask
about towns or whatever, but, yes, mostly Blackfoot.
Q, All right. Enough of that.
Let's talk about the trade show -A Okay.
Q, -- that you were attending or
participating in, I guess is a better way?
A Yeah. I was a vendor.
Q, You were a vendor, right?
A Uh-huh.
Q, And it was at the Kingston Plaza, right?
Page 29
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A Yes.
Q. Had you ever been to the Kingston Plaza
other years to put on a similar trade show or to
participate in a similar trade show?
A I've been there before, yes.
Q. So you've been there. Have you been a
vendor there before?
A Yes.
Q. Okay. That was the question.
A I don't remember if they ever had
another location but I have been to that building
before. I want to say yes.
Q. What is the name of the trade show that
you were a vendor at?
A Oh, man. Because I've done a few things
with them, you know, like the garage sale and stuff.
It's not the garage sale, but I think it was the All
I Want For Christmas because I've also been at the -here it is. I think I was at, like, What Women Want.
And maybe not that year, but I've been at one before.
Q. Okay. The -A At least one.
Q. The year of the occurrence for us is
2015. Have you done - did you do a trade show at
the Kingston building in 2014?
Page 30
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wrong thing. Yeah. I'm not sure.
Q, What would you look at? And here is
what I'm really wanting to know.
A. I would go through my e-mails.
Q. This is really where I'm going. So let
me just get right to it.
A. Yeah.
Q. Have you been a vendor in the Kingston
building in years prior to December of A. I think I have.
Q. -- 2015?
A I want to say -MR. BROWNING: Let him finish his question
because he was about to give you a year and you said
yes.
THE WITNESS: I'm sorry.
Q. BY MR. CAREY: Prior to 2015. She
waited enough. So you think you have?
A. Yeah.
Q. What would you be able to look at to
know rather than just thinking I've got that memory?
A E-mails. I can try to pull it up if you
want.
Q. E-mails?
A. Yeah. Because that has some of the
Page 33
Pages 1, 29, 30, 33

Page 135

Page 35

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
1o
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

all their setup, how it's organized. But yes.
Q. Was there anything different -- prior to
December 4th of 2015, was there anything different
with the trade show you were attending in 2015 from
your prior experiences?
A. Yes.
Q. Tell me what was different.
A. I have entered in through -- so I must
have been there before. I've entered in through the
front as a vendor or the side door. So the front
door, meaning the door that the public goes through,
and had no trouble coming in that way. And then and that also could be, you know, with clients of
course you're going to come in through the front.
And then there's this side door that I want to say is
on the west. So I've never used the back. Never
personally. I've never gone back that way except for
this event.
I would have done my homework on history
of the events.
MR. CAREY: The other admonition: If she's
sticking things on paper, we can't talk if we're on
the record. She can't type while she's marking
exhibits.
(Exhibits •-1 and •-2 marked.)
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Q. Well, you parked your car on the west
side -A. Uh-huh.
Q. - to load the -- carry the handbags
and -A. And left it there.
Q. And you left your car on the west?
A. Yeah.
Q. Did you stay in the building -- the last
time you went into the building, did you go in
through the west door?
A. I think that it must have been my last
trip. I'm just trying to remember because it's -- I
don't want to misreport anything but while I was
coming in, I had bags. Jay said: We don't want you
using this door anymore. We want you to go through
the back exit because there's a problem with the
door.
Q. The back exit. Okay. And what did you
understand by the back exit?
A. The back is where -- if you're at the
event, this is the front -Q. The north side is the front?
A. Yeah. So you come in. So the back is
over here where the -Page 53
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On the south side?
A. Which is -- he said the back exit, which
is one that the food vendors -- I know the food comes
in through the back and they usually set up
somewhere. It can vary during the event.
Q. On the inside of the building -- now, we
can go to either one. But on the inside of the
building inside that west door, were there other
vendors set up between your booth and the door?
A. Yeah. I believe so.
Q. Do you recall what was set up between
your booth and the door, what vendors?
A. Oh, my. I don't know if my memory is
remembering the Christmas one, but they usually have
food type stuff closer toward this -Q. You said food towards the south wall?
A. Yes. So, like, chocolates.
Q. And what towards the west wall?
A. Oh, this area?
Q. Yes.
A. Right right by?
Q. Between your booth and the west door
that you -A. I don't remember.
Q. -- came in and that Jay told you not to
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you please repeat your question? Sorry I was just
thinking about the booth and then I remembered.
Q. You gather up all your stuff?
A. Yes.
Q. The customers have already left, right?
A. Yeah. Pretty much. Yes. It's thinning
very much.
Q. Is there anyone barricading you or
stopping you from going out the front door?
A. Barricading me? I didn't even try to go
to the front door because I was following directions.
And these kind of events you just go to Jay or Jamie,
whoever is running, and they tell you. And I don't
want to aggravate anybody. I just -- okay. They
want me to go through the back, I'll go through the
back. And I don't know if they would have locked the
front. He didn't say but -Q. That was going to be one of the
questions. You don't know whether the front was
locked -A. I didn't check.
Q. -- or unlocked?
A. No. Because I just followed.
Q. You're following instructions?
A. Yeah.
Page 79
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Q.
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Q. And you head to the back of the
building?
A. Yeah.
Q. I'm going to ask you what happened next
a lot right now. Okay? So what happened next?
A. That's fine.
Q. You walk up to the door. Tell me what
happened.
A. I interacted, I know that I was
probably one of the last ones. I didn't look to see
if there's anybody else in the building because I had
talked to Tawnie briefly. I can't say what time, if
it was before the end or at the end but I had talked
to her and then had gone to get my stuff. So she had
left, which is why I remember: Oh, my gosh, I talked
to Tawnie Sumpsion that night. So I grabbed my
things. I had a Jamba Juice in my hand with some
other stuff. And I went through the back exit,
again, where the vendors come in and out of by the
bathrooms. It's not far from the bathrooms, which is
the •· you know, where I had been directed.
Q. And then what happened?
A. Then you go-· it goes back further than
it seems, than what's open to the public. And then I
went to the door and opened the door. And I had a
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1 few items in my hand, so I remember I didn't hold the
2 door.
3
Q, Let me ask you this: The door when you
4 opened it 5
A. Pushing it.
6
Q. -- you've seen some doors have knobs
7 like this one right here?
8
A. Yeah.
9
Q. Others have a bar that you push and the
10 latch opens. Do you recall what the mechanism was on
11 this door that you opened?
12
A. No. I don't recall it.
13
Q. Okay.
14
A. But I do know that I had things in my
15 hand. So whether I opened it and switched something
16 over•· I opened the door. I'm standing -- I'm
17 standing but using shoulder so I can hold my stuff.
18 So when I stepped out, the door shut.
19
Q. Let me ask you this: If you have a ••
20 you know what a panic bar is on a door?
21
A. Uh-huh.
22
Q. You hit it, it latches, you open it up.
23 You don't have to turn a knob.
24
A. Uh-huh.
25
Q. If it's a panic bar you can hit it with
Page 81
[9/26/2018] Packer, Nicole

your hip or elbow ••
A. Uh-huh.
Q. •· or something and open it.
Do you have a recollection of hitting
something with your hip or elbow or actually having
to turn a knob?
A. I don't. That was one of the things
that I didn't pay attention to.
Q. So you got the door open?
A. Yeah.
Q. Then what happens?
A. Then the door shut.
Q. And you realize right away it was dark?
A. It happened quickly. I mean, you step
out, the door shuts.
Q. Okay. So it's dark?
A. And then it's dark.
Q. Did you try and go back in?
A. In my head I feel like the door was
locked, like it locked.
Q. Okay. Let me ask you: Why do you think
that? Why do you have that recollection?
A. Maybe I did try. It's not clear. Some
things on that night are so, so clear, like, without
a doubt. And other things it's hard. But I believe
Page 82
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that it was locked. And I might even •· I did write
an early letter when I realized I'm more hurt than I
thought and I described more details that -- this is
three years later. I could go back and look at it.
But I couldn't get back in.
Q. Okay. And that's the part that I kind
of want to talk to you about. How you know you
couldn't get back in ••
A. Well, I would have ••
Q. •· if you didn't try the door?
A. I would have had to try it. Yeah. But
right now if you say do I have a recollection of
grabbing the door, not so much. But I remember and
I •• I need to look back at my thing. I could not
get back in. So, yes, I would have •• I would have
tried or like you said I wouldn't know.
Q. Do you know•· some doors like in hotel
rooms, if you open a door they're supposed to close.
They're supposed to have an automatic closure.
A. Yeah.
Q. Do you know if this door had an
automatic closure on it or did you nudge it shut or
close it yourself?
A. I don't know the design of it, but it's
a heavy door. And holding the items, what I remember
Page 83
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STATE OF IDAHO

4

COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE

)
)
)

ss.

5
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12
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I, Sandra D. Terrill, CSR, RPR, and Notary
Public in and for the State of Idaho, do hereby
certify:
That prior to being examined Nicole Packer, the
witness named in the foregoing deposition, was by me
duly sworn to testify to the truth, the whole truth,
and nothing but the truth;
That said deposition was taken down by me in
shorthand at the time and place therein named and
thereafter reduced to typewriting under my direction,
and that the foregoing transcript contains a full,
true, and verbatim record of said deposition.
I further certify that I have no interest in the
event of the action.
WITNESS my hand and seal this 5th day of October
2018.

15
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18
19 ·

20

Sandra D. Terrill
Idaho CSR No. 702,
Notary Public in and for
the State of Idaho

21
22
23
24

My Co111I11ission Expires:

11-10-22
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office@ttreporting.com
T& T Reporting, LLC
208.529.5491
ttreporting.com
208.529.5496 FAX
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Electronically Filed
11/7/2018 4:29 PM
Seventh Judicial District, Bonneville County
Penny Manning, Clerk of the Court
By: Maria Padilla, Deputy Clerk

Allen H. Browning, ISB#3007
BROWNING LAW
482 Constitution Way, Suite 111
Idaho Falls, ID 83402
Telephone: (208) 542-2700
Facsimile: (208) 542-2711
E-mail: allen.browning.law@gmail.com
Attorney for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
NICOLE PACKER,
Plaintiff,

Case No.: CV-17-7024

vs.

PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION
TO MOTION TO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT OF
NICOLE PACKER

KINGSTON PROPERTIES, L.P.; DK
ENTERPRISES, INC., and RIVERBEND
COMMUNICATIONS, LLC.,; RIVERBEND
COMMUNICATIONS HOLDING, LLC and
RIVERBEND COMMUNICATIONS LLC dba
RIVERBEND EVENTS
Defendants.

COMES NOW the Plaintiff NICOLE PACKER, by and through her attorney of record, Allen
H. Browning, and pursuant to the Court's Order hereby replies to the Defendants' Riverbend
communications Holding, LLC and Riverbend Communications LLC Motion to Strike Affidavit of
Nicole Packer.

ARGUMENT
Defendant has argued that under Yeager v. Bowlin, a 2012 case decided by the 9 th Circuit,
that Plaintiffs affidavit should be stricken from the record. Idaho has not adopted the "sham

Plaintiff's Brief in Opposition to Defendants' Riverbend Communications Holding, LLC and Riverbend Communications LLC
Motions for Summary Judgment

1
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affidavit rule" as referred to by Defendants, but instead employs an analysis of whether or not an
affidavit is admissible before applying the liberal construction and reasonable inferences rule.
"Summary judgment proceedings are decided on the basis of admissible evidence." Campbell v.
Kvamme, 155 Idaho 692, 696, (2013). "The admissibility of evidence contained in affidavits and

depositions in support of or in opposition to a motion for summary judgment is a threshold
matter before applying the liberal construction and reasonable inferences rule to determine
whether the evidence creates a genuine issue of material fact for trial." Fragnella v. Petrovich,
153 Idaho 266,271, (2012). Defendants' argument fails not only because Idaho has not adopted
the legal doctrine that they arguing under, but also because, even if Idaho had adopted the "sham
affidavit" doctrine, the facts cited by Defendants do not qualify under that doctrine.
Defendants have not cited to any statutory authority or binding authority on this Court
under which the Court could find that the Affidavit of Nicole Packer could be found
inadmissible. Defendants have been unable to cite to contradictions between the deposition of
Nicole Packer or even inconsistencies, which would lead the Court to believe that her affidavit
was a "sham" filed to somehow create issues of fact. Defendant stated in her deposition that she
would check her records and see if she signed the contract she was asked about. She checked her
records, found that she had not signed the contract, and made that statement in her affidavit.
This is not an inconsistency as Defendants have urged the Court to believe.
Because Defendants' Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Nicole Packer is unsupported by
facts or law, their motion must be denied.

Plaintiffs Brief in Opposition to Defendants' Riverbend Communications Holding, LLC and Riverbend Communications LLC
Motions for Summary Judgment

2
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DATED this 7th day of November, 2018.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the 7th day of November, 2018, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing document was delivered to the following attorney ofrecord bye-filing.

E-mail: jbailey@hawleytroxell.com

FA)E-File· .

E-mail: dfc@careyromankiw.com

f/PE-File

C?Y~aM~
Legal Assistant

Plaintiff's Brief in Opposition to Defendants' Riverbend Communications Holding, LLC and Riverbend Communications LLC
·
Motions for Summary Judgment

3
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Electronically Filed
11/7/2018 4:01 PM
Seventh Judicial District, Bonneville County
Penny Manning, Clerk of the Court
By: Maria Padilla, Deputy Clerk

Allen H. Browning, ISB#3007
Steve Carpenter, ISB#9 l 32
BROWNING LAW
482 Constitution Way, Suite 111
Idaho Falls, ID 83402
Telephone: (208) 542-2700
Facsimile: (208) 542-2711
E-mail: alien. browning. law@grnai I. corn
Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
NICOLE PACKER,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No.: CV-17-7024
PLAINTIFF'S SECOND
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION
TO MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
BY RIVERBEND COMMUNICATIONS
HOLDING, LLC, and RIVERBEND
COMMUNICATIONS LLC.

KINGSTON PROPERTIES, L.P.; DK
ENTERPRISES, INC., and RIVERBEND
COMMUNICATIONS, LLC.,; RIVERBEND
COMMUNICATIONS HOLDING, LLC and
RIVERBEND COMMUNICATIONS LLC dba
RIVERBEND EVENTS
Defendants.

COMES NOW the Plaintiff NICOLE PACKER, by and through her attorney of record, Allen
H. Browning, and pursuant to the Court's Order hereby replies to the Defendants Riverbend

communications Holding, LLC and Riverbend Communications LLC Responses to Motion for
Summary Judgment.

Plaintiff's Second Brief in Opposition to Defendants' Riverbend Communications Holding, LLC and Riverbend Communications
LLC Motions for Summary Judgment

1
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ARGUMENT
1. Defendant has failed to make any argument as to Plaintiff's status.

Defendant, in section "1" of their response brief has assumed Plaintiffs status as a
licensee, but has failed to provide any argument, citations to case law, or citations to the record
with which that assumption can be made in good faith. Defendant instead states that "there is no
dispute that Packer was a licensee." Riverbend Defendants' Brief Re: Motion for Summary
Judgment Pursuant to I.R.C.P 56(c)-4, pg. 4, L. 5 ("Def. Resp. Brief.") This is false. Plaintiff
was an invitee appearing as one of many business invited to take part in the "All I want for
Christmas" event. Under the definition in Idaho Jury Instruction 3.13, "An invitee is a person
who enters upon the premises of another for a purpose connected with business there conducted,
or whose visit may reasonably be said to confer or anticipate a business, com-,mercial, monetary
or other tangible benefit to the [owner] [occupant]," Plaintiff is an invitee. IDJI 3.13.

2. Defendant Cannot Show That No Question of Material Fact Exists
Defendant further argues that Plaintiff has not "shown that Jay Dye had notice." Def. Resp.
Brief., Pg. 5, L. 6. Plaintiff was ordered to leave by the rear exit. She would have been leaving
after dark. It was incumbent upon Jay Dye to know that the exit he picked for the participants in
his event was a safe exit. Idaho Jury Instruction 3.05 states: "The [owner] [occupant] owes a duty
to fix or warn of any dangerous or defective condition known to the [owner] [occupant], or which,
in the exercise of ordinary care, should have been discovered." IDJI 3.05. Idaho Jury Instruction
3.03 states: "The [owner] [occupier] owes a duty to exercise ordinary care to avoid exposing

Plaintiffs Second Brief in Opposition to Defendants' Riverbend Communications Holding, LLC and Riverbend Communications
LLC Motions for Summary Judgment

2
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persons on the premises to an unreasonable risk of harm." IDJI 3.03. It was Jay Dye's duty of care
to avoid exposing Plaintiff to walking out on a dark loading dock.
Plaintiff has asserted that the unlit loading dock and the door to the loading dock
locking behind her when she exited the facility lead to her injuries. Defendant has not provided
any citation to facts in the record or case law which establishes undisputed facts or by a matter of
law that no material fact of Plaintiff's claims is undisputed.

3. Plaintiff cannot be bound by an agreement she was not party to.
Plaintiff has not signed or been a party to the agreement referenced by Defendants in their
Response Brief on pages 7-9. Def. Resp. Brief. Pg. 7-9. Because Defendant has not submitted any
I

signed copy of the referenced agreement and the terms do not apply to Plaintiff, Defendant is
unable to present any relevant argument pertaining to this non-existent contract. Defendant has
no signed document and no witness to testify that Plaintiff signed such a document. Plaintiff
therefore moves to strike this portion of the Defendant Riverbend's brief.
If the Court does not strike this portion of the Defendant's brief, the argument fails because

of Nicole's testimony that she did check her emails and records after her deposition and found she
did not have any signed copy of the contract either, and that she therefore did not in fact sign that
agreement.
CONCLUSION

This summary judgment motion filed by Riverbend Communications, LLC, should be
denied. Plaintiff has shown facts supporting her claim. This Defendants have failed to show
facts supporting their contentions. Instead, Defense Counsel has offered unsupported argument,

Plaintiffs Second Brief in Opposition to Defendants' Riverbend Communications Holding, LLC and Riverbend Communications
LLC Motions for Summary Judgment
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and contrary to law, has urged this Court to resolve matters of contested fact in favor of the
Defense. For these reasons, their motion must be denied.

DATED this 7th day of November, 2018.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 7th day of November, 2018, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing document was delivered to the following attorney of record by e-filing.

E-mail: jbailey@hawleytroxell.com

[><p E-File

E-mail : dfc@careyromankiw.com

ii E-File

M~
Legal Assistant

Plaintiffs Second Brief in Opposition to Defendants' Riverbend Communications Holding, LLC and Riverbend Communications
LLC Motions for Summary Judgment
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Filed:11/30/2018 12:02:39
Seventh Judicial District, Bonneville County
Penny Manning, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk -Corona, Tawnya

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE

NICOLE PACKER,
Plaintiffs,

Case No. CV-2017-7024

V.

MEMORANDUM DECISION ON
DEFENDANT KINGSTON'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

KINGSTON PROPERTIES, L.P.; DK
ENTERPRISES, INC., RIVERBEND
COMMUNICATIONS HOLDING, LLC.,
and RIVERBEND COMMUNICATIONS,
LLC dba RIVERBEND EVENTS,
Defendants.

This Memorandum Decision is in response to Defendant Kingston Properties Motion for
Summary Judgment. The Motion for Summary Judgment is Granted.

I.
FINDINGS OF FACT

On December 4th, 2015, Plaintiff Nicole Packer participated as a vendor in the "All I
Want For Christmas" expo sponsored by Defendant Riverbend Communications at the Kingston
Plaza in Idaho Falls, Idaho. Ms. Packer had participated in the expo in the years prior, and was
familiar with the plaza and the event. On the morning of December 4th, after Ms. Packer
unloaded her equipment for the expo, she was instructed by Jay Dye, an employee of Riverbend

MEMORANDUM DECISION ON DEFENDANT KINGSTON'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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helping organize the vendors, to use the back door of the plaza. There is some dispute among the
parties as to why Mr. Dye instructed Ms. Packer to use the back door, but there is no dispute that
Mr. Dye did, in fact, instruct Ms. Packer to exit through the back. Ms. Packer left at

approximately eight that night, which was after dark. Upon exiting the back door, Ms. Packer
realized the lights were either out or had not yet been turned on, and it was dark save for the
distant parking lot lights that provided no immediate light to Ms. Packer's surroundings.
Unbeknownst to Ms. Packer, she was standing on a loading dock with a five foot drop. She
proceeded towards the parking lot where she knew her car to be, and suddenly found the ground
vanish beneath her feet. Ms. Packer fell five feet and injured herself. After falling, Ms. Packer
located her cell phone and managed to call for help.

II.
APPLICABLE LAW

1. Summary Judgment

The court must grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine
issue of material fact, and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 1 The court
liberally construes the record in favor of the nonmoving party, and draws all reasonable
inferences and conclusions in that party's favor.2 Summary Judgment should only be denied if
reasonable persons could reach different conclusions, or draw different inferences from the
evidence provided. 3 A "mere scintilla" of evidence is insufficient to withstand summary
judgment; there must be sufficient evidence which would allow a jury to return a verdict in favor

1

Idaho R. Civ. P. 56(e).
Friel v. Boise City Housing Auth., 126 Idaho 484,485, 887 P.2d 29, 30 (1994).
3
Iron Eagle Dev., LLC v. Quality Design Sys., Inc., 138 Idaho 487,491, 65 P.3d 509, 513 (2003).
2
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of the non-moving party. 4 The non-moving party must respond to the motion for summary
judgment with specific evidence showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. 5 The court is not
required to "comb through the record to find some reason to deny a motion for summary
judgment." 6

2. Premises Liability
It is well-settled that to succeed in a common-law tort action for negligence, the plaintiff
must demonstrate the following four elements: (1) a duty, recognized by law, requiring the
defendant to conform to a certain standard of conduct; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) a causal
connection between the defendant's conduct and the resulting injury; and (4) actual loss or
damage. 7 Idaho has long held that owners and possessors of land owe a duty to people on that
land, the extent of which is determined by the status of the person injured on the property. 8 There
are three categories of status for persons injured on land: Invitees, Licensees, and Trespassers.
An invitee is one who enters upon the premises of another for a purpose connected with
the business conducted on the land, or where it can reasonably be said that the visit may confer a
business, commercial, monetary or other tangible benefit to the landowner. 9 A licensee is a
visitor who enters with the consent of a landowner in pursuit of the visitor's purpose. 10 Lastly, a
trespasser is one who goes upon the private property of another without lawful authority or
without permission or invitation, express or implied. 11 The duty to an invitee by an owner or
possessor of land is to keep the premises in a reasonably safe condition, or to warn of hidden or

4

Gneiting v. Idaho Asphalt Supply, Inc., 130 Idaho 393, 396, 941 P.2d 932, 935 (Ct. App. 1970).
Samuel v. Hepworth, Nungester & Lezamiz, 134 Idaho 84, 87, 996 P.2d 303, 306 (2000).
th
6
Carmen v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 237 F.3d 1026, 1029 (9 Cir. 2001).
7
O'Guin v. Bingham County, 142 Idaho 49, 122 P.3d 308 (2005).
8
Id.
9
Holzheimer v. Johannesen, 125 Idaho 397, 871 P.2d 814 (1994).
io Id.
II Id.

5
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concealed dangers. 12 The landowner or possessor of the land must have known, or through the
exercise of reasonable care should have known, of the existence of the dangerous condition. 13
Whereas, the duty to a licensee is only to share knowledge of any dangerous conditions or
activities on the land that the owner/possessor is aware of or should have been aware of. 14 The
duty to a trespasser is simply to refrain from willful or wanton acts which might cause injuries. 15
Furthermore, a landowner will not be held liable for injuries to visitors where they are not
in possession of the land, but where a tenant occupies the land and has control over the
premises. 16 A tenant is an occupier of land, and therefore has a duty to keep the premises it is
leasing reasonably safe for visitors. 17 The tenant has a duty to make reasonably safe the portions
of the premises over which it has control. 18

III.
ANALYSIS

1. Defendant Kingston did not have control over the loading dock.

Although Kingston owns the expo building where the Christmas event was being held, it was
the Defendant Riverbend that was in possession and control of the property at the time of the
incident. As Idaho courts have made abundantly clear, tenants in control of the premises are
liable for injuries caused by negligent maintenance of the premises.

19

12

Brooks v. Wal-Mart Stores, 2018 Ida. LEXIS 91 (2018).
All v. Smith's Mgm 't Corp., 109 Idaho 479,481, 708 P.2d 884, 886 (1985).
14
Evans v. Park, 112 Idaho 400,401, 732 P.2d 369, 370 (Ct.App. 1987).
15
Huyck v. Hecla Mining Company, 101 Idaho 299,612 P.2d 142 (1980).
16
McDevitt v. Sportsman's Warehouse, Inc., 151 Idaho 280,255 P.3d 1166 (2011).
17
Johnson v. K-Mart Corp., 126 Idaho 316,317,882 P.2d 971,972 (Ct. App. 1994).
18
McDevitt, 255 P.3d at 1171.
19
See McDevitt, 255 P.3d 1166; Johnson, 882 P.2d 971; Heath v. Honker's Mini-Mart, Inc., 134 Idaho 711, 8 P.3d
1254 (Ct. App. 2000).
13
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While tenants are not liable for common areas, or those areas not under its control absent a
contractual obligation20 , Ms. Packer fails to make any argument or provide any evidence that it
was Kingston and not Riverbend that had control over the loading dock at the time of the
incident. Under the lease agreement between Kingston and Riverbend, there is no language to
indicate that Riverbend was not permitted to use the loading dock, or that they were relieved of
liability as to any designated portions of the premises. The lease was for the expo building in
general, and therefore, it can only be concluded that the loading dock, being a part of the expo
building, was then under the control of Riverbend at the time of the incident.
Ms. Packer has not provided any evidence to the contrary, nor made any argument that would
allow this Court to make a reasonable inference that Kingston was in control of the loading dock.
Therefore, Kingston had no duty to Ms. Packer as either an invitee or a licensee.

2. Ms. Packer was a licensee, and therefore must show that Kingston knew or
should have known about the dangerous condition.
Even if Kingston was found to have control over the loading dock, Ms. Packer was still a
licensee, and cannot establish that Kingston knew or should have known about the lights in the
loading dock. Ms. Packer was a participant in the Christmas event, and had entered into an
agreement with Riverbend to set up a booth in which Ms. Packer could sell her products and
services. There was no agreement, either express or implied, entered into between Ms. Packer
and Kingston. She was not on the premises as a patron of Kingston, nor was she there for the
purpose of conferring a benefit on Kingston. Ms. Packer was there as a vendor to promote her
own business, and is therefore a licensee.
Even if Ms. Packer's participation in the event conferred some minor or incidental benefit
upon Kingston, it would not change the relationship between Kingston and Ms. Packer as

20

See McDevitt, 255 P.3d 1166.

MEMORANDUM DECISION ON DEFENDANT KINGSTON'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Page~

Page 150

landowner and licensee. 21 This clarification by the Idaho courts suggests that even if there is a
benefit conferred upon the landowner, the benefit alone is not enough to elevate a visitor's status
to an invitee. Furthermore, it suggests that courts are to focus on the intent and objective of the
guest in visiting the landowner's premises. Where Ms. Packer's sole objective in participating in
the event was to promote her own business interests, she cannot be an invitee despite having
conferred a minor and incidental benefit upon Kingston.
The duty of a landowner to a licensee is to share knowledge of any dangerous conditions
or activities on the land that the landowner is aware of or should have been aware of. However,
Ms. Packer failed to provide any evidence that Kingston was aware of or should have been aware
of the lights in the loading dock. Ms. Packer makes the assertion that because Kingston owned
the building, they should de facto have actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition.
However, without evidence to support the conclusion that Kingston knew or should have known,
Ms. Packer's assertion is just that- an assertion. Ms. Packer claims that if Kingston maintained
the property the lights would have been functioning. However, without any evidence to establish
how the lights were off, if they were broken at all, and about how long they had been off, this
Court cannot make any reasonable inferences as to whether or not there was actual or
constructive notice.
Even if Ms. Packer were an invitee as she claims, the standard is the same. She must still
show that Kingston was aware of or should have been aware of the lighting in the loading dock.
Because she has not provided any evidence to support her assertion that Kingston knew or
should have known about the lighting, she cannot establish that Kingston had a duty.
IV.
CONCLUSION

21

See Ball v. City of Blackfoot, 152 Idaho 673,273 P.3d 1266 (2012).
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.-

Based on the foregoing, the Court orders as follows:
1- The Defendant Kingston Properties Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated this ] ~ day of November, 2018

Bruce L. Pickett
District Judge

MEMORANDUM DECISION ON DEFENDANT KINGSTON'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY WDGMENT

Page'
Page 152

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on t h i s ~ day of November 2018 the MEMORANDUM DECISION ON
DEFENDANT KINGSTON'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT was entered and a true
and correct copy was served upon the parties listed below by mailing, with the correct postage
thereon, or by causing the same to be delivered to their courthouse boxes.

Counsel for Plaintiffs:
Allen H. Browning, ISB #3007
Steve Carpenter, ISB #9132
Allen.browning.law@gmail.com

Counsel for Defendants:
Donald F. Carey, ISB #4392
Lindsey R. Romankiw, ISB #8438
dfc@careyromankiw.com
lrr@careyromankiw.com
John A. Bailey Jr., ISB #2619
JBailey@hawleytroxell.com

Penny Manning
Clerk of the District Court
Bonneville County, Idaho

by

f

Deputy Cler

MEMORANDUM DECISION ON DEFENDANT KINGSTON'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Pagel

Page 153

Filed:11/30/2018 12:01:55
Seventh Judicial District, Bonneville County
Penny Manning, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk -Corona, Tawnya

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE

NICOLE PACKER,
Plaintiff,

Case No. CV-2017-7024

V.

MEMORANDUM DECISION ON
DEFENDANT RIVERBEND'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

KINGSTON PROPERTIES, LP; DK
ENTERPRISES, INC., and RIVERBEND
LLC dba RIVERBEND EVENTS,
Defendants.

This Memorandum Decision is in response to Defendant Riverbend's Motion for
Summary Judgment. Motion for Summary Judgment is Granted.

I.
FINDINGS OF FACT

On December 4th , 2015, Plaintiff Nicole Packer participated as a vendor in the "All I
Want For Christmas" expo sponsored by Defendant Riverbend Communications at the Kingston
Plaza in Idaho Falls, Idaho. Ms. Packer had participated in the expo in the years prior. On the
morning of December 4th, after Ms. Packer unloaded her things, she was instructed by Jay Dye,
an employee of Riverbend helping organize the vendors, to use the back door of the plaza. There
is some dispute among the parties as to why Mr. Dye instructed Ms. Packer to use the back door,
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but there is no dispute for the purposes of summary judgment that Mr. Dye did, in fact, instruct
Ms. Packer to exit through the back. Ms. Packer left at approximately eight that night, which was
after dark. Upon exiting the back door, Ms. Packer realized the lights were either out or had not
yet been turned on, and it was dark save for the distant parking lot lights that provided no
immediate light to Ms. Packer's surroundings. Unbeknownst to Ms. Packer, she was standing on
a loading dock with a five foot drop. She proceeded towards the parking lot where she knew her
car to be, and suddenly found the ground vanish beneath her feet. Ms. Packer fell five feet and
injured herself. After falling, Ms. Packer located her cell phone and managed to call for help.

II.
APPLICABLE LAW

1. Summary Judgment
The court must grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine
issue of material fact, and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 1 The court
liberally construes the record in favor of the nonmoving party, and draws all reasonable
inferences and conclusions in that party's favor.2 Summary Judgment should only be denied if
reasonable persons could reach different conclusions, or draw different inferences from the
evidence provided. 3 A "mere scintilla" of evidence is insufficient to withstand summary
judgment; there must be sufficient evidence which would allow a jury to return a verdict in favor
of the non-moving party. 4 The non-moving party must respond to the motion for summary
judgment with specific evidence showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. 5 The court is not

1

Idaho R. Civ. P. 56(e).
Friel v. Boise City Housing Auth., 126 Idaho 484,485, 887 P.2d 29, 30 (1994).
3
Iron Eagle Dev., LLC v. Quality Design Sys., Inc., 138 Idaho 487,491, 65 P.3d 509, 513 (2003).
4
Gneitingv. Idaho Asphalt Supply, Inc., 130 Idaho 393,396,941 P.2d 932,935 (Ct. App. 1970).
5
Samuel v. Hepworth, Nungester & Lezamiz, 134 Idaho 84, 87, 996 P.2d 303, 306 (2000).
2
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required to "comb through the record to find some reason to deny a motion for summary
judgment." 6

2. Premises Liability
It is well-settled that to succeed in a common-law tort action for negligence, the plaintiff
must demonstrate the following four elements: (1) a duty, recognized by law, requiring the
defendant to conform to a certain standard of conduct; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) a causal
connection between the defendant's conduct and the resulting injury; and (4) actual loss or
damage. 7 Idaho has long held that owners and possessors of land owe a duty to people on that
land, the extent of which is determined by the status of the person injured on the property. 8 There
are three categories of status for persons injured on land: Invitees, Licensees, and Trespassers.
An invitee is one who enters upon the premises of another for a purpose connected with
the business conducted on the land, or where it can reasonably be said that the visit may confer a
business, commercial, monetary or other tangible benefit to the landowner. 9 A licensee is a
visitor who enters with the consent of a landowner in pursuit of the visitor's purpose. 10 Lastly, a
trespasser is one who goes upon the private property of another without lawful authority or
without permission or invitation, express or implied. 11 The duty to an invitee by an owner or
possessor of land is to keep the premises in a reasonably safe condition, or to warn of hidden or
concealed dangers. 12 The landowner or possessor of the land must have known, or through the
exercise of reasonable care should have known, of the existence of the dangerous condition. 13
Whereas, the duty to a licensee is only to share knowledge of any dangerous conditions or
6
7

8
9

Carmen v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 237 F.3d 1026, 1029 (9th Cir. 2001).
O'Guin v. Bingham County, 142 Idaho 49, 122 P.3d 308 (2005).

Id.
Holzheimer v. Johannesen, 125 Idaho 397, 871 P.2d 814 (1994).

10

Id.
Id.
12
Brooks v. Wal-Mart Stores, 2018 Ida. LEXIS 91 (2018).
13
All v. Smith's Mgm 't Corp., 109 Idaho 479,481, 708 P.2d 884, 886 (1985).

II
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activities on the land that the owner/possessor is aware of or should have been aware of. 14 The
duty to a trespasser is simply to refrain from willful or wanton acts which might cause injuries. 15

III.
ANALYSIS
1. Plaintiff was a Licensee, and could not show that Defendant should have been aware
of the dangerous condition.

The distinction between licensee and invitee is a narrow one, and one that has not been
discussed at any meaningful length in Idaho courts. But the case law suggests a difference
between vendors and patrons of businesses for the purposes of designation in premises liability. 16
Ms. Packer entered the premises not as a patron or a member of the public, but rather as a
vendor, there to set up a booth to sell her own wares. As the Idaho Supreme Court iterated in
Holzheimer, a licensee is a visitor who enters the premises with the permission of the

owner/occupier of the land for the visitor's purpose. Despite having paid a fee to be able to set
up her booth at the expo, Ms. Packer's purpose at the expo was primarily for her own purpose in
advertising and selling her own business.
The mere fact that Ms. Packer conferred some tangential benefit upon the Defendant does not
change the relationship between Ms. Packer and Riverbend as licensee and landowner. 17 Ms.
Packer's situation is analogous to a solicitor or vendor delivering goods to a grocery store to be
sold. She is not considered a patron, despite the fact that she paid for the booth. Similarly, a
vendor delivering goods to be sold at a grocery store confers a benefit on the grocery store
tangentially through receiving a portion of the profits. While Idaho Courts have not expressly
determined whether vendors are licensees or invitees, the case law suggests a difference between
14

Evans v. Park, 112 Idaho 400,401, 732 P.2d 369,370 (Ct.App. 1987).
Huyck v. Hecla Mining Company, 101 Idaho 299, 612 P.2d 142 (1980).
16
See generally Ball v. City ofBlackfoot, 273 P.3d 1266 (2012); Brooks v. Wal-Mart Stores, 2018 Ida. LEXIS 91
(2018); Shea v. Kevic Corp., 328 P.3d 520 {Idaho 2014).
17
See Ball v. City ofBlackfoot, 152 Idaho 673,677,273 P.3d 1266, 1270 (2012)(quoting Wilson v. Bogert, 81 Idaho
535, 347 P.2d 341 (1959).
15
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patrons of a store, and all others. For instance, the Court in Wilson v. Bogert, 81 Idaho 535, 347
P.2d 341 (1959), stated that ''the fact that a guest may be rendering a minor, incidental service to
the host does not change the relationship between them as a landowner and a licensee." 18 This
suggests a difference between those on the premises to patronage the business, and those there to
pursue their own business interests. Vendors regularly confer minor or tangential benefits upon
landowners, but in exchange are given the opportunity to sell or advertise their own services and
products to other consumers. Per Wilson, these minor or incidental benefits do not elevate the
status of the visitor from licensee to invitee, and suggests that courts focus on the intent and
objective of the visitor in entering the premises. Ms. Packer's purpose on December 5th was to
seek out her own business opportunity, and was not there as a patron of the expo.
For these reasons, Ms. Packer was a licensee as a participant in the expo, and was not a
patron or a member of the public there to peruse the various booths. Because Ms. Packer was a
licensee, it was her burden to demonstrate that Riverbend was aware of, or should have been
aware of, the dangerous condition, and therefore failed to warn her. Ms. Packer failed to address
the duty of a landowner/occupier to a licensee, and therefore failed to present any evidence that
Riverbend was aware or should have been aware of the lights.
2. Even if Plaintiff was an Invitee, she failed to show that Defendant had actual or
constructive notice of the dangerous condition.
As mentioned above, the distinction between licensee and invitee is narrow. Likewise,
the difference in duty owed to visitors is similarly narrow. In either situation, the Defendant must
have known or should have known of the existence of the dangerous condition on the property.
The difference is where a landowner/occupier has a duty to warn of the dangerous condition to a
licensee, but for an invitee must take reasonable steps to correct the dangerous condition. But in

18

Wilson, 81 Idaho at 545, 347 P.2d at 347.

MEMORANDUM DECISION ON DEFENDANT RIVERBEND'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUOOMENT

Page 5 of8

Page 158

either situation, on a motion for summary judgment, the Plaintiff must still show that the
Defendant had actual or constructive knowledge of the dangerous condition.
As discussed above, Ms. Packer failed to present any evidence that Riverbend knew or
should have known about the lights over the loading dock. While her affidavit asserts
unequivocally that the lights were off or broken, this does little to show that Riverbend knew or
should have known that the lights were off or broken. Even though both parties dispute other
facts such as what was in Ms. Packer's hands at the time that she fell, whether or not the door she
exited out oflocked automatically behind her and barred her reentry, or the location of her phone
when she fell, these facts are only tangential to the ultimate issue of liability, and can only serve
to potentially mitigate liability for the Defendant.
Despite the claims that the lights were off or broken, Ms. Packer must still meet the
necessary elements to show a duty was owed by Riverbend to her as a visitor. Failing to establish
a duty is a failure to state a prima facie case for negligence. The burden for Ms. Packer to
establish her prima facie case for negligence, regardless of whether she was a licensee or invitee,
was to provide evidence enough to show that Riverbend knew or should have known about the
lights being off or broken.
Ms. Packer asserts in her Brief in Opposition to Riverbend's Motion for Summary
Judgment that because Mr. Dye had instructed her to use the backdoor, then he should have
known about the lighting and had a duty to warn Ms. Packer of the danger. However, an
instruction by Mr. Dye does not de facto create actual or constructive knowledge of a danger.
Ms. Packer does not establish how long the light was off or broken for, did not establish that Mr.
Dye, when giving his instruction, knew or should have known about the lights, nor did she
establish why the lights were off or broken. Furthermore, Ms. Packer even asserts in her own

MEMORANDUM DECISION ON DEFENDANT RIVERBEND'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Page 6 of8

Page 159

affidavit that Mr. Dye instructed her to use the back door in the morning of December 4th, but it
wasn't until eight at night that Ms. Packer was injured. Because Ms. Packer did not establish or
even present any evidence on the cause of the lighting being off or broken, she therefore could
not establish that Mr. Dye knew or should have known about the lighting condition. There are
simply not enough facts for this Court to make any reasonable inference as to the actual or
constructive notice necessary to establish that Riverbend had a duty to Ms. Packer.
Furthermore, Ms. Packer claims that it was Riverbend's burden to assert facts to
demonstrate that there was no genuine issue of a material fact. However, it is Ms. Packer's
burden to provide evidence to dispute Riverbend' s motion for summary judgment, and Ms.
Packer has fallen short of providing evidence that the lighting condition was one in which
Riverbend knew or should have known.
Ms. Packer failed to meet her burden by neglecting to provide any evidence that
Riverbend knew or should have known about the lighting in the loading dock.
IV.
CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court orders as follows:
1- The Defendant Riverbend Communications Motion for Summary Judgment is

GRANTED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated this

3~ay of November 2018.

~
District Judge
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Filed:11/30/2018 11:59:59
Seventh Judicial District, Bonneville County
Penny Manning, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk -Corona, Tawnya

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE

NICOLE PACKER,
Plaintiff,

Case No. CV-2017-7024

v.
MEMORANDUM DECISION ON
DEFENDANTS MOTION TO STRIKE
AFFIDAVIT

KINGSTON PROPERTIES, L.P.; DK
ENTERPRISES, INC., RIVERBEND
COMMUNICATIONS HOLDING, LLC.,
and RIVERBEND COMMUNICATIONS,
LLC dba RIVERBEND EVENTS,,
Defendants.

This Memorandum Decision is in response to Defendants Motion to Strike Plaintiffs
Affidavit. The Motion to Strike is hereby denied.

I.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Plaintiff Nicole Packer participated in the "All I Want For Christmas" expo as a vendor. The expo
was put on by Defendant Riverbend Communications, who leased the property from Defendant Kingston
Properties. After setting up her booth, Ms. Packer was instructed to exit through the back door of the
building. It was dark when she left, and the lights out the back were either not working or had not yet
been turned on. Unbeknownst to Ms. Packer, she was standing on a loading dock and couldn't see that a
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few feet in front of her there was a five foot drop. Ms. Packer proceeded to walk out to the parking lot,
and suddenly found the ground vanish beneath her feet and she fell five feet.
Ms. Packer initiated a personal injury tort claim under the premises liability theory against
Riverbend and Kingston. In response, both Defendants brought motions for summary judgment, arguing
that Ms. Packer could not demonstrate any duty to Ms. Packer as she was not an invitee but a licensee on
the property as a vendor. In response, Ms. Packer submitted a motion in opposition, along with an
affidavit to support her allegations against Kingston and Riverbend. Already on record was the deposition
of Ms. Packer. Riverbend filed a motion to strike Ms. Packer's affidavit, claiming that it was
contradictory to her deposition testimony, constituting a "sham" affidavit, as well, as alleging that part of
it contained hearsay which precluded it from being considered by this Court for the purposes of deciding
on the Motions for Summary Judgment.

II.
APPLICABLE LAW

The admissibility of evidence contained in affidavits in support of or in opposition to
motions for summary judgment is a threshold question before deciding whether there are genuine
issues of material fact. 1 Idaho has not recognized nor adopted the "sham" affidavit rule.

2

Affidavits submitted that clarify existing evidence in the record is acceptable, and should not be
stricken. 3 "Evidence presented in support of or in opposition to a motion for summary judgment
must be admissible.',4 Admissibility of evidence is determined by the Idaho Rules of Evidence.

III.
ANALYSIS

1

Shea v. Kevic Corp., 156 Idaho 540,328 P.3d 520,524 (2014) (quoting Gerdon v. Rydalch, 153 Idaho 237,280
P.3d 740, 744 (2012).
2
/dat531.
3
See Shea v. Kevic Corp., 156 Idaho 540, 328 P.3d 520, 531 (2014).
4
Nieldv. Pocatello Health Services, Inc., 156 Idaho 802,332 P.3d 714, 726 (2014).
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Defendant Riverbend directs this Court's attention to what it perceives as several
admissibility issues with Ms. Packer's affidavit. Each concern will be addressed in tum.
First, Riverbend identifies an inconsistency between Ms. Packer's deposition testimony
and her affidavit where she claims that the back door she exited out of had locked behind her. In
her deposition, Ms. Packer stated that the door had locked behind her as she exited, but in her
affidavit, she only claims that she believed that the door had locked behind her. While this seems
like an obvious inconsistency, which in front of a jury may bring doubt into the credibility of Ms.
Packer's testimony, is hardly a concern for the purposes of the Motion for Summary Judgment.
The issue of whether or not the door was locked is not a genuine issue of material of fact
related to whether or not Riverbend or Kingston owed Ms. Packer a duty to warn her of any
dangers they were aware of or should have been aware of, nor does it relate to whether or not
they breached such a duty. Therefore, it is a moot point for the purposes of deciding the Motions
for Summary Judgment.
Secondly, Riverbend claims that Ms. Packer's testimony regarding the location of her
cellular phone when she fell is similarly inconsistent. However, again, this is a moot point for the
purposes of deciding whether or not to grant a motion for summary judgment. Riverbend
attempts to use the fact that her -phone had a flashlight on it, and therefore she could have used
the light feature to see the loading dock. But that is not an ultimate question of liability in a
premises liability case, but rather may be a mitigating factor for a jury to consider at trial.
Third, Riverbend raises the issue of Ms. Packer's testimony regarding a supposed
agreement, and whether or not Ms. Packer remembered signing it. In Ms. Packer's deposition,
she claims that she was familiar with the "multi show payment agreement" because she had been
a vendor at the "All I Want For Christmas" event in years prior. Her deposition testimony states
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clearly that she was unsure of whether or not she had signed a contract that year, and that she
would search her emails for an agreement. In her affidavit, however, Ms. Packer asserts that after
the deposition she did in fact search for any agreement, and could not find it, and therefore
unequivocally denied ever signing an agreement.
Riverbend would like this Court to believe this is a direct contradiction to her deposition
testimony. However, the Court does not see it that way. In fact, this Court interprets Ms.
Packer's affidavit more as clarifying existing evidence that already existed in the record. Ms.
Packer did not know if she had signed an agreement before, but then after diligent searching,
could not locate any agreement that she had signed, and so concluded that she had not signed
one. That is not a contradiction, but a clarification. And as stated by the Idaho Supreme Court,
clarifying existing evidence is permissible. 5
Fourth, Riverbend argues that Ms. Packer further contradicted deposition testimony when
she first claimed that an employee told her to exit through the back door because it was implied
that she could not use the other doors. In her affidavit, Ms. Packer claims the same thing, that an
employee told her to use the back door, but then adds that employee told her not to use the north
door because it was for members of the public and not vendors. Again, however, Riverbend fails
to explain how this minor distinction between testimonies ultimately makes any difference on the
outcome of a motion for summary judgment. The fact remains that Ms. Packer unequivocally
alleged that an employee told her to use the back door. The reasons for using the back door,
however, are inconsequential and not a matter necessary to determine for the purposes of the
Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment.
Lastly, Riverbend contends that Ms. Packer's statements that Jay Dye, an employee of
Riverbend, had told her to use the back door is inadmissible hearsay. According to the Idaho
5

See Shea v. Kevic Corp., 328 P.3d 520, 531 (Idaho 2014).
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Rules of Evidence 80l(d)(2), a statement by a party-opponent is not considered hearsay, and is
therefore admissible. Mr. Dye, as an agent/employee of Riverbend, is considered a partyopponent, and therefore any statement made by Mr. Dye is admissible and will not be stricken
from the affidavit.

IV.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Court orders as follows:
1- The Defendant Riverbend's Motion to Strike the Plaintiff's Affidavit is hereby
DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated this

5'1

~

day of November 2018.

~

·

District Judge
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I hereby certify that on this
day of November 2018 the MEMORANDUM DECISION ON
DEFENDANTS MOTION TO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT was entered and a true and correct copy
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causing the same to be delivered to their courthouse boxes.
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Allen.browning.law@gmail.com
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Filed:12/11/201816:19:31
Seventh Judicial District, Bonneville County
Penny Manning, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk -Corona, Tawnya

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE

NICOLE PACKER,
Plaintiff,

Case No. CV-2017-7024

V.

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

KINGSTON PROPERTIES, L.P.; DK
ENTERPRISES,
INC.;
RIVERBEND
COMMUNICATIONS, LLC; RIVERBEND
COMMUNICATIONS HOLDING, LLC; and
RIVERBEND COMMUNICATIONS, LLC,
d/b/a RIVERBEND EVENTS,
Defendants.

A Stipulation for Dismissal of Defendant with prejudice having duly and regularly come
before this Court, and good cause appearing therefor,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED, and this does order,
adjudge, and decree that the above-entitled cause be and the same hereby is dismissed with
prejudice as against Kingston Properties, L.P ., and DK Enterprises, Inc.

DA.TED this __day of _ _ _ _ _ , 2018.
Signed: 12/11/201812:54 PM

By:
Honorable Bruce L. Pickett
District Judge
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE

NICOLE PACKER,

Case No.: CV-2017-7024
Plaintiff,
JUDGMENT TO DISMISS WITH
PREJUDICE

vs.
KINGSTON PROPERTIES, L.P; DK
ENTERPRISES, INC., RIVERBEND
COMMUNICATIONS, LLC; RIVERBEND
COMMUNICATIONS HOLDING, LLC; and
RIVERBEND COMMUNICATIONS LLC
dba RIVERBEND EVENTS,

Defendants.

JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS:
1. Defendant Riverbend Communications Holding, LLC, and Riverbend

Communications LLC hereby awarded a Judgment of Dismissal with Prejudice
against the Plaintiffs.
2. All Plaintiff's claims in the above captioned matter are dismissed with prejudice in
their entirety as to Riverbend Communications Holding, LLC, and Riverbend

Communications LLC .
Signed: 12/11/2018 12:51 PM

Dated: - - - - - - - - -- -

HONORABLE BRUCE L. PICKETT
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE

NICOLE PACKER,
Plaintiff,

Case No. CV-2017-7024

V.

KINGSTON PROPERTIES, L.P.; DK
ENTERPRISES,
INC.;
RIVERBEND
COMMUNICATIONS, LLC; RIVERBEND
COMMUNICATIONS HOLDING, LLC; and
RIVERBEND COMMUNICATIONS, LLC,
d/b/a RIVERBEND EVENTS,

JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL

Defendants.

JUDGEMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS: all pending matters against Kingston
Properties, L.P. and DK Enterprises, Inc., in the above-entitled case are hereby dismissed with
prejudice.

DATED this __day of _ _ _ _ _ , 2018.
Signed: 12/11/201812:55 PM

,,,,......,,,,

By:===========~~,)
Honorable Bruce L. Pickett
,,,,,.,,.,.,,,,
District Judge

WDGMENT OF DISMISSAL - 1

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Signed: 12/14/2018 03:24 PM

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the_ day of _ _ _ _ _ _, 2018, I served a true and
correct copy of the above and foregoing document to the following person(s) as follows:

Allen H. Browning

[X]

BROWNING LAW

[

482 Constitution Way, Suite 111
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402
Telephone: (208) 542-2700
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

[ ]
[ ]

John A. Bailey, Jr.

[X]

]

iCourt/eFile
Hand-Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile (208) 542-2711

LLP

[

412 W. Center Street, Suite 2000

[ ]

iCourt/eFile
Hand Delivery
Overnight Mail
Facsimile (208) 232-0150

[X]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]

iCourt/eFile
Hand-Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile (208) 525-8813

HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS

& HAWLEY

[

]
]

PO Box 100

Pocatello, Idaho 83204
Telephone (208) 233-2001
Attorneys for Defendant Riverbend
Communications Holding, LLC
Donald F. Carey
CAREY ROMANKIW, PLLC

477 Shoup Ave., Suite 203
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402
Telephone: (208) 525-2604

Clerk of the Court
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Electronically Filed
12/24/2018 12:21 PM
Seventh Judicial District, Bonneville County
Penny Manning, Clerk of the Court
By: Maria Padilla, Deputy Clerk

Allen H. Browning, ISB#3007
Steve Carpenter, ISB#9132
BROWNING LAW
482 Constitution Way, Suite 111
Idaho Falls, ID 83402
Telephone: (208) 542-2700
Facsimile: (208) 542-2711
Email: allen.browning.law@gmail.com
Attorney for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE

NICOLE PACKER,
Case No.: CV-17-7024
Plaintiff,
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO RECONSIDER
vs.

KINGSTON PROPERTIES, L.P; DK
ENTERPRISES, INC., RIVERBEND
COMMUNICATIONS, LLC; RIVERBEND
COMMUNICATIONS HOLDING, LLC.
And RIVERBEND COMMUNICATIONS,
LLC dba RIVERBEND EVENTS,

COMES NOW Plaintiff, NICOLE PACKER, by and through her counsel of record, Allen H
Browning and hereby moves this court, pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 11.2(b), to
reconsider the following decisions:
1.

Judgment of Dismissal ofRiverbend Communications Holding, LLC., and Riverbend
Communications LLC., entered on December 11, 2018; and

2.

Order of Dismissal of Riverbend Communications Holding, LLC., and Riverbend
Communications LLC., entered on December 11, 2018.
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This motion is based upon the Plaintiffs Brief in Support of Motion to Reconsider filed
herewith, as well as the Court record and file to date. Oral argument is requested.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays the Court to reconsider the above stated decisions.
DATED this 24th day of December, 2018.

BROWNING LAW

/s/ Allen H. Browning
Allen H. Browning

NOTICE OF SERVICE

I certify that on this day I served a true and correct copy of the foregoing document in
accordance with Rule 5(b) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure on the following by the method of
service indicated:

John A. Bailey, Jr.
BAILEY, HAHN, & JARMAN, PLLC
P.O. Box 790
Pocatello, Idaho 83204
ll!Q@bhj-law.com

_

US MAIL
FAX (208) 418-1861
HAND DELIVERY
COURTHOUSE BOX
EMAIL/EFILE

DATED this 24th day of December, 2018.

/s/ Leah Hollo
Legal Assistant
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Electronically Filed
12/24/2018 12:21 PM
Seventh Judicial District, Bonneville County
Penny Manning, Clerk of the Court
By: Maria Padilla, Deputy Clerk

Allen H. Browning, ISB#3007
Steve Carpenter, ISB#9132
BROWNING LAW
482 Constitution Way, Suite 111
Idaho Falls, ID 83402
Telephone: (208) 542-2700
Facsimile: (208) 542-2711
E-mail: allen. browning.law@gmail.com
Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE

NICOLE PACKER,
Plaintiff,

Case No.: CV-17-7024
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION
TO RECONSIDER

vs.

KINGSTON PROPERTIES, L.P.; DK
ENTERPRISES, INC., and RIVERBEND
COMMUNICATIONS, LLC.,; RIVERBEND
COMMUNICATIONS HOLDING, LLC and
RIVERBEND COMMUNICATIONS LLC dba
RIVERBEND EVENTS
Defendants.

COMES NOW the Plaintiff NICOLE PACKER, by and through her attorney of record, Allen
H. Browning, and pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 11.2(b), files this Memorandum in
Support Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration.
INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff filed a Personal Injury Case filed in the Seventh Judicial District of Idaho, County of
Bonneville. Plaintiff, Nicole Packer, alleged that she sustained injuries after falling from a loading

Plaintiffs Brief in Support of Motion to Reconsider in re: Riverbend Communications LLC

1

dock at Kingston Plaza at an event conducted by Riverbend Communications and brought suit
against Kingston Properties, L.P., DK Enterprises, Inc., Riverbend Communications, LLC.,
Riverbend Communications Holding LLC., and Riverbend Communications LLC., dba Riverbend
Events. Defendants moved for Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs claims and Summary Judgment for
Defendants was entered on December 11, 2018. Plaintiff has filed a Motion to Reconsider the
Court's ruling for Summary Judgment in regard to Defendants Riverbend Communications, LLC.,
Riverbend Communications Holding LLC., and Riverbend Communications LLC., dba Riverbend
Events.
Plaintiff desires to make clear that there are two separate bases for holding Defendant
Riverbend defendants liable: premises liability and negligence not based on premises liability.
ARGUMENT
Premises Liability: Plaintiff was an Invitee of Riverbend.

The Court, in its Memorandum Decision on Defendant Riverbend's Motion for Summary
Judgment ("Decision"), cites to Brooks v. Wal-Mart Stores, 423 P.3d 443, 2018 Ida. Lexis 138,
for the proposition that vendors are treated differently for the purposes of premises liability;
however, in Brooks, the question was whether Rug Doctor, a vendor in a Wal-Mart store, was
liable for a slip and fall accident inside the Wal-Mart Store. That is not the question in this case,
where a vendor was injured by the owner and controller of the property's failure to exercise due
care by failing to illuminate a loading dock and affirmatively directing Plaintiff to use that dock.

Plaintiffs Brief in Support of Motion to Reconsider in re: Riverbend Communications LLC

2

The Court in Brooks did find that merely owning the property was not enough to incur
liability, but that an actual or constructive knowledge of the perilous instrumentality can be cause
to hold them liable.
The Court quoted Tommerup v. Albertson's stating because "the true ground of liability is
the superior knowledge of the owner or possessor, we fail to see any justification for holding him
liable for injury caused by defects about which he had no knowledge, when the lack of
knowledge was not due to a failure by the owner or possessor to use ordinary care." Tommerup
v. Albertson's, 101 Idaho 1, 4, 607 P.2d 1055, 1058 (1980).

Here, the possessor of the property, Riverbend, had a duty to exercise due care in
determining that the premises were reasonably safe before inviting vendors in for the "All I Want
for Christmas" event. Defendant Riverbend failed to inspect, replace, or tum on the light to the
loading dock, creating a dangerous condition on the premises.
2. Negligence Liability Apart From Premises Liability: Defendant Created Liability
by Ordering Plaintiff to Use the Loading Dock Exit.

"(1) One a part of whose business or profession it is to give information upon
which the bodily security of others depends and who in his business or
professional capacity gives false information to another is subject to liability
for bodily harm caused by the action taken in reliance upon such
information by the recipient or by a third person to whom the actor should
expect the information to be communicated if the actor, although believing
the information to be accurate, has failed to exercise reasonable care
(a) to ascertain its accuracy, or
(b) in his choice of the language in which it is given.
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(2) The actor is subject to liability under the statement in Subsection (1) not
only to the recipient or to a third person who expectably acts in reliance upon
it but also to such third persons as the actor should expect to be put in peril
by the action taken."
Restatement of the Law, Torts§ 311. The Restatement also provided further discussion of this
point in its Comments.

•

"COMMENTS & ILLUSTRATIONS

Comment:
a. Business or professional advice. If it is a part of the actor's business or
profession to give information or advice as to the matter upon which the personal
safety of the recipient or a third person depends, he is subject to liability under the
rule stated in this Section if the information or advice is given in his business or
professional capacity, irrespective of whether it is given as part of a business
transaction or for a consideration paid to him for his professional services. Thus, a
physician who negligently gives erroneous information to a patient in respect to
the latter's physical condition, as where he informs him that it is safe to walk upon
a leg which has not sufficiently recovered from a fracture, is liable under the rule
stated in this Section irrespective of whether the patient is himself paying for the
physician's services or the services are being paid for by a third person or are
being rendered gratuitously to a charity patient.
Comment on Subsection ( 1, a):
b. Care in ascertaining facts and forming judgment thereon. If it is a part of the
actor's business or profession to give information or advice as to matters upon
which the personal safety of the recipient or a third person depends, he is under a
duty before giving such information in his business or professional capacity to
exercise reasonable care that the information shall be sufficiently accurate to
adequately safeguard the safety of such persons. He must exercise reasonable care
to ascertain the facts upon which his information is to be based and must also
exercise such competence in forming his judgment as to the effect of the facts so
ascertained as it is reasonable to expect of one in his business or profession."
Restatement of the Law, Torts§ 311 COMMENTS & ILLUSTRATIONS.
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Liability on the part of Riverbend was not created simply by a landowner or possessor's
relationship, but by the affirmative action of Jay Dye.
In Packer's case, Jay Dye was responsible for instructing people how to safely enter and
exit the building. It was his business, when instructing people where to enter or exit, to instruct
them to do so in a safe manner.
There is no question that Jay Dye instructed Plaintiff that she was not allowed to exit the
building in the way she had entered, and that he had specifically instructed her to exit through a
door which had no lighting outside. It was implied in his statement that the manner of egress
was safe. In fact, it was not safe.
In the Court's Decision, the Court states that "There is some dispute among the parties as
to why Mr. Dye instructed Ms. Packer to use the back door, but there is no dispute for the
purposes of summary judgment that Mr. Dye did, in fact, instruct Ms. Packer to exit through the
back." Decision Pg. 1-2, L. 9-10, 1-2. Mr. Dye affirmatively directed Plaintiff to use the loading
dock doors and had a duty to make sure that he was directing her to a safe path of travel.
Plaintiff did not choose to go out those doors, but was specifically forbidden from using other
doors and instructed by Mr. Dye to use the loading dock to exit. The loading dock was unlit,
causing Plaintiff to fall off of the loading dock and causing her injuries. Because the Defendant
Riverbend
Under the Restatement of Torts, Section 311, by virtue of Jay Dye's position with
Riverbend, and the information he gave the Plaintiff, he, and his employer Riverbend, are liable
for the harm done. He had a duty to make sure that the information which he gave, in his
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capacity of running the event, was safe. He did not do so, and harm resulted. For that reason, he
and Riverbend are liable for the harm which actually did occur.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff requests that this Court reconsider its Decision and Judgment
Dismissing Defendant Riverbend.
DATED this 24th day of December, 2018.

BROWNING LAW

/s/ Allen H. Browning
Allen H. Browning

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the24th day of December, 2018, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing document was delivered to the following attorney of record by e-filing.

E-mail: jbailey@hawleytroxell.com

[ X] E-File

E-mail: dfc@careyromankiw.com

[ X] E-File

/s/ Leah Hollo
Legal Assistant
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE

NICOLE PACKER,
Plaintiff,

Case No. CV-2017-7024

V.

MEMORANDUM DECISION ON
DEFENDANT KINGSTON'S
MOTION FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES
AND COSTS

KINGSTON PROPERTIES, L.P.; DK
ENTERPRISES, INC.; RIVERBEND
COMMUNICATIONS LLC;
RIVERBEND COMMUNICATIONS
HOLDING, LLC; and RIVERBEND
COMMUNICATIONS, LLC, dba
RIVERBEND EVENTS,
Defendants.

This Memorandum Decision is in response.to DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR COSTS
AND FEES.

I.
FINDINGS OF FACT
In December of 2016, Nicole Packer suffered a fall off of a loading dock at an event center
owned by Kingston Properties, after having participated as a vendor in an event hosted by Riverbend. Ms.
Packer filed this action against both Kingston and Riverbend in an attempt to recover for the injuries she
sustained from the fall, claiming that the parties were negligent. In December, 2018, this Court granted
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the Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment, and summarily dismissed Ms. Packer's case against the
Defendants. Shortly thereafter the Defendant Riverbend filed this motion for attorney's fees and costs.

II.
APPLICABLE LAW
1. Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d) and (e)

Under Rule 54(d) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, the prevailing party is entitled to
costs as a matter of right, unless otherwise ordered by the Court. Rule 54(e)(2) grants attorney's
fees pursuant to Idaho Code §12-121, which states that the court may award attorney's fees and
costs only when it finds that the case was brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably
or without foundation.
To determine who is the prevailing party, the court considers the final judgment or the result
of the action, according to Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 54(d)(l)(B). The court may find that a
party prevailed in part and did not prevail in part, and may apportion the costs accordingly.
Under Rule 54(d)(l)(C)(ix), a party is entitled to the reasonable costs of expert witnesses who
testify at depositions and trial, but no more than $2,000 for each expert for all appearances.

2. Idaho Code §12-120(3)
In a civil action to recover damages stemming from a commercial transaction, the prevailing
party shall be allowed a reasonable attorney's fee to be set by the court, to be taxed and collected
as costs. Idaho Code §12-120(3). A commercial transaction is defined in the statute to mean all
transactions except transactions for personal or household purposes.

III.
ANALYSIS
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1. Costs Awarded to the Prevailing Party

Defendant asks this Court to award it the costs of litigation, based on Idaho Rule of Civil
Procedure 54(d)(l)(A). Under Rule 54(d)(l)(A), the prevailing party in an action is entitled to
costs of litigation as a matter of right. The amount total of all costs, according to Kingston's
affidavit is $1,046.60. Broken down, the costs are apportioned as such:
a. Court Filing: $136.00
b. Plaintiff's Deposition Copy: $910.60

The Court recognizes Kingston as the prevailing party in the action, having succeeded in
its Motion for Summary Judgment. As such, Kingston is entitled as a matter of right for its costs
in the amount of $1,046.60.
2. Defendant is not entitled to an award of attorney's fees

Defendant argues for an award of attorney's fees under two separate theories of recovery.
The first, Kingston asks for attorney's based on Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e)(2), or otherwise
based on Idaho Code §12-121. Rule 54(e)(2) and §12-121 allows a court to award attorney's fees
where it finds that a case was brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably, or without
frustration. Secondly, Kingston asks for attorney's fees based on Idaho Code § 12-120(3 ), which
allows a prevailing party to recover attorney's fees where the action was to recover damages
incurred from a commercial transaction.
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The Court does not find that Ms. Packer's action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without
foundation, based on the totality of the facts and claims made by Ms. Packer. Therefore,
Kingston's request based on 54(e)(2) and §12-121 is denied.
As to the request for attorney's fees as to §12-120(3), the gravamen of this action was not
a commercial transaction, as Kingston argues, but rather a straight forward personal injury claim
based upon negligence. The fact that Ms. Packer was at the event because of a commercial
transaction between her and Kingston does not mean the action arose as a result of the
commercial transaction, as is required by the statute. Therefore, Kingston's request for attorney's
fees based on §12-120(3) is denied.
IV.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Court orders as follows:
1- Defendant's Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs is Granted in Part and Denied in
Part. Defendant is entitled to an award of $1,046.60 for costs.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

_ day of January 2019.
Dated this _23rd

Bruce L. Pickett
District Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Signed: 1/24/2019 10:38 AM

I hereby certify that on this _ _ day of January 2019 the MEMORANDUM DECISION ON
DEFENDANT KINGSTON'S MOTION FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS was entered
and a true and correct copy was served upon the parties listed below by mailing, with the correct
postage thereon, or by causing the same to be delivered to their courthouse boxes.

Counsel for Plaintiffs:

Allen Browning ISB #3007
Allen.browning.law@gmail.com

Counsel for Defendants:

Donald Carey ISB #4392
dfc@careyromankiw.com

Penny Manning
Clerk of the District Court
Bonneville County, Idaho

by

~tfv'~

Deputy Clerk
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Seventh Judicial District, Bonneville County
Penny Manning, Clerk of the Court
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE

NICOLE PACKER,
Case No.: CV-2017-7024
Plaintiff,

DEFENDANT RIVERBEND
COMMUNICATIONS, LLC'S
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION
TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO
RECONSIDER

vs.
KINGSTON PROPERTIES, L.P; DK
ENTERPRISES, INC., RIVERBEND
COMMUNICATIONS, LLC; RIVERBEND
COMMUNICATIONS HOLDING, LLC; and
RIVERBEND COMMUNICATIONS LLC
dba RIVERBEND EVENTS,
Defendants.

COMES NOW, the Defendant, RIVERBEND COMMUNICATIONS, LLC, and
respectfully submits its Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion to Reconsider as
follows:

I.
INTRODUCTION
The Plaintiff, (hereafter "Packer"), is requesting that the Court reconsider its grant of
summary judgment to Defendant Riverbend Communications, LLC (hereafter "Riverbend") for
fatally flawed reasons. First, Packer's continued insistence on being classified as an invitee
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versus a licensee is unsupported by any facts (new or old) or the law, and as a result, she is
precluded from asking this Court to reevaluate its decision regarding her status on the premises.
Second, Packer's reliance upon her new negligence theory is misplaced because Idaho law
clearly prevents her from raising this new theory on her motion to reconsider. Third, Packer's
negligent misrepresentation theory under the Restatement (Second) of Torts, §311 is invalid
because Idaho courts have never accepted a generic negligent misrepresentation tort like the one
set out in §311. Fourth, and lastly, even if §311 could be used by Packer as a viable theory,
which it may not, the evidence in the record shows that this new legal theory asserted by Packer
does not apply and must be disregarded as a basis to overturn the Court's grant of summary
judgment to Riverbend.
II.

ARGUMENT
A. The Court Correctly Found That Packer's Status At the Christmas Expo Was That
Of A Licensee As She Was A Vendor There For Her Own Commercial Purpose.
As this Court knows, in determining whether a duty will arise in a particular context, the
Idaho Supreme court has identified several factors to consider. Boots v. Winters, 145 Idaho 389,
1

179 P.3d 352 (Id. App. 2008); citing Turpen, 133 Idaho at 247, 985 P.2d at 672. However,

Idaho courts only look at those factors if a duty has not been previously recognized.
(Emphasis added). Idaho courts have long held that the duty of owners and possessors of land is
determined by the status of the person injured on the land (i.e whether the person is an invitee,

1

The factors include the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff
suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, the moral
blame attached to the defendant's conduct, the policy of preventing future harm, the extent of the burden to the
defendant and consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach,
and the availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved. Id; citing Rife v. Long, 127 Idaho 841,
908 P.2d 143 (1995).
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licensee, or trespasser). (See Memorandum Decision on Defendant Riverbend's Motion for
Summary Judgment at Pg. 3; see also O'Guin v. Bingham County, 142 Idaho 49, 122 P.3d 308
(2005); see also Holzheimer v. Johnannesen, 125 Idaho 397, 871 P.2d 814 (1994). As such, this
Court correctly analyzed Riverbend's duties to Packer as a possessor of the land at the time
Packer attended the Christmas Expo. "A motion for reconsideration should not be used to
ask a court '"to rethink what the court had already thought through-rightly or wrongly"'.

See Laya v. Pima County, Ariz., 2009 WK 2485996 (D. Ariz. 2009); citing Above the Belt, Inc. v.
Mel Bohannan Roofing, Inc., 99 F.R.D. 99, 101 (E.D.Va.1983); cf, Agric. Research & Tech.
Group, 916 F .2d at 542 (Emphasis added). Plaintiff fails to offer any new evidence to this Court
to support any reconsideration of the decision. Without some new evidence, this motion must
fail.
While Packer has from the inception of this case, and continuing through summary
judgment briefing and her affidavit testimony, framed her case as one involving the duty owed to
2

her as an invitee, her analysis has always been incorrect. For example, Packer has futilely tried
to argue that there is no distinction between vendors and patrons of businesses, and that the
Court misapplied the law as a consequence. This is simply not the case.
Packer does not dispute that an "invitee" is characterized in Idaho as "one who enters
upon the premises of another for a purpose connected with the business conducted on the land, or
where it can reasonably be said that the visit may confer a business, commercial, monetary or
other tangible benefit to the landowner", whereas "a licensee is a visitor who enters with the
consent of the landowner in pursuit of the visitor's purpose". 0 'Guin v. Bingham County,

2

See Complaint at ,r 9 and 10 (describing the alleged dangerous conditions on the land and that
the defendants should be held liable for those dangerous conditions on the land); see also Memo
in Opposition to Riverbend's Motion for Summary Judgment at ,r1, 3, Pgs. 5, 8, 9 (describing
herself as a vendor and trying to argue that he was owed duties as an invitee).
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142 Idaho 49, 122 P.3d 308 (2005); see also Holzheimer v. Johnannesen, 125 Idaho 397, 871
P.2d 814 (1994); Pincock v. McCoy, 48 Idaho 227, 281 P. 371 (1929) (Emphasis added). As the
Court properly found, "the mere fact that Ms. Packer conferred some tangential benefit upon the
Defendant does not change the relationship between Ms. Packer and Riverbend as licensee and
landowner". No new facts are offered or argued to change its conclusion.
Packer is unable to escape the facts of this case; namely, that she attended the show, as a
vendor, to sell items at the Christmas Expo for her own benefit and profit. Accordingly,
Riverbend did not owe her the duties owed to an invitee as she has mistakenly tried to ascribe to
it, or Jay Dye, based upon the cases of Brooks v. Wal-Mart Stores or Tommerup v. Albertston 's,
Inc. Recall those cases dealt with an injured invitee, not a licensee, and thus, do not apply here.
(See Packer's Brief in Support of Motion to Reconsider in re: Riverbend Communications LLC
at Pgs.2-3). For this reason alone, Packer's Motion to Reconsider should be denied.

B. As Packer Is Prohibited From Raising Her New Negligence Theory On Her Motion
To Reconsider, The Theory Must Be Rejected.
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 11 allows reconsideration of an interlocutory order.
However, "it does not allow for the Court to consider deciding an entirely new claim not
previously raised". See Pandrea v. Barrett, 160 Idaho 165, 174, 369 P.3d 943, 953 (2015).
Plaintiff raises negligent misrepresentations for the first time in the Motion to Reconsider.
Because a cause of action not raised in a party's pleadings cannot be considered on summary
judgment, there is no basis for Packer to ask this Court to reconsider her new cause of action
raised in opposition to Defendant's Summary Judgment. See Edmonson v. Shearer Lumber
Products, 139 Idaho 172, 178, 75 P.3d 733, 739 (2003). The obvious rationale for this accepted
rule is that "afterthoughts" or "shifting ground" are not an appropriate bases for reconsideration
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of summary judgment. See Refrigeration Sales Co. v. Mitchell-Jackson, Inc., 605 F. Supp. 6, 7
(N.D. Ill 1983).
It is clear that Packer has merely shifted ground, citing §311 of the Restatement (Second)
of Torts as a new and implied legal theory for imposing tort liability upon Riverbend. Packer
never mentioned this new theory in her Complaint she never argued or discussed in her
opposition brief or affidavit on summary judgment, and only raised it for the first time on her
Motion to Reconsider. As Idaho law clearly disallows reconsideration of Packer’s new legal
theory at this late stage, the request for reconsideration of the Court’s summary judgment
decision should be denied for this additional reason.
C. As Idaho Courts Have Never Accepted §311 Of The Restatement (Second) Of Torts
As An Independent Basis For Imposing Tort Liability, The Court Should Deny
Packer’s Request For The Court To Rely Upon It As A Basis For Setting Aside
Summary Judgment.
No Idaho case, wherein an Idaho court has adopted or discussed §311 of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, could be located by this author. This is likely due to the fact that the confines
of a negligent misrepresentation claim in Idaho have already been expressly stated and limited in
Duffin v Idaho Crop Imp. Ass’n, 126 Idaho 1002, 1203, 895 P.2d 1195, 1010 (1994) to those rare
occasions involving a special relationship such as with an accountant. There is no evidence of
any special relationship between Plaintiff and the Defendant which would support a claim of
negative misrepresentation. As there is no dispute as to whether Riverbend or Jay Dye are
accountants, Packer’s new negligent misrepresentation theory fails for this additional reason and
it must be rejected on reconsideration.
D. As §311 of the Restatement (Second) Of Torts Is Inapplicable To The Facts Of This
Case, The Court Should Refuse To Overturn The Summary Judgment Decision In
Favor Of Riverbend.
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In those cases wherein §311 has been considered as a basis for imposing tort liability, a
key element that is lacking in this case was required; namely, an affirmative misstatement of
fact. (See Grogan v. UGGLA, 535 S.W. 3d 864 (Tenn. 2017) (finding that a negligent
affirmative misstatement is required by §311, not just a non-disclosure) (Emphasis added);
Maneely v. General Motors Corp., 108 F.3d 1176 (9th Cir. 1997) (requiring that a defendant
negligently provide false information under §311); McLachlan v. New York Life Ins. Co., 488
F.3d 624 (5th Cir. 20017) (emphasizing that an affirmative misstatement, not just non-disclosure
is required by §311, because the court was unwilling to create an affirmative duty to disclosure
that would require everyone to warn everyone else of various physical dangers, regardless of the
relationship); Hall v. Ford Enterprises, Ltd., 445 A.2d 610 (D.C. 1982) (similarly requiring a
negligent communication of a false statement that was relied upon to the plaintiff’s detriment);
Heard v. City of New York, 82 N.Y.2d 66, 623 N.E.2d 541 (1993) (wherein diver who was
seriously injured when he dove off of a jetty into shallow water could not hold lifeguard liable
under §311 because the diver’s reliance was unforeseeable or unjustified); Tyree v. Westin
Peachtree, Inc., 319 Ga. App. 330, 331, 735 S.E.2d 127, 128 (2012) (wherein liability under
§311 was not found when the plaintiff walked through a revolving door and was injured despite
the fact that the door’s recorded voice instruction told the plaintiff to step forward as this was not
false information or the cause of her injury).
As this Court properly found, Packer’s argument that Jay Dye at most implied to her that
exiting through the back door was safe, shows that a negligent misrepresentation claim, is clearly
invalid. Even if Jay Dye told Packer to exit through the back doors when he did that morning
after Packer was setting up for the Expo, which is denied, that cannot be credibly argued as an
affirmative misstatement of fact because: 1) is was not dark outside when he made the
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statement; 2) there is no evidence to show that Jay Dye would have known it would be dark
outside when Packer decided to exit; 3) there is no evidence that Jay Dye knew that lights were
out or not working outside of the back exit; or 4) that Packer would proceed in the dark when she
could have turned around and gone back inside to use a different route or she could have used
her cell phone for light or to call someone for help.
Although there is no allegation that Mr. Dye made any representations about the safety of
the rear exit, this case has some facts which are very similar to those involved in the case of

Manahan v. Yacht Haven Hotel, 821 F. Supp. 1110 (D.V.I. 1992). In that case, the plaintiff was
physically assaulted by an unknown male who attempted to snatch her purse, and lost her eye,
when she was walking between her hotel and a restaurant at night. The plaintiff attempted to
hold the hotel and its concierge liable under §311 because the concierge allegedly told her that
the street route between the hotel and restaurant was "well lit" and therefore, "safe". The court
rejected the plaintiffs theory because she could not show that she reasonably relied upon that
statement and that such reliance was the proximate cause of her injuries. The court emphasized
that the plaintiff could not have reasonably relied upon that statement since she admitted to
discerning that the street route between the hotel and the restaurant was not "well lit" before
encountering the dangers presented therein. The court made the following quintessential
remarks when reaching its decision:

One may not blindly act upon a statement in disregard of an opportunity to learn
the truth when exercise of ordinary attention he would have learned of it.

***
By her testimony, the plaintiff had specific knowledge that the route that night
was not well lit for whatever reason. Therefore, for one to commence and
continue walking into the "pitch blackness" solely on the strength of an alleged
statement made two days prior that "the route is well lit" is not reasonable
reliance as a matter of law, particularly, where it can be seen, literally, that the
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statement is incorrect and unreliable. What’s more, the plaintiff has not
submitted any evidence that she did not have alternative means of getting back to
the hotel.
***
Prior to continuing her walk back to the hotel, she necessarily weighed the danger
of walking the rest of the way in the darkness against the reasonableness of
walking back in the light to the restaurant to call a cab. What she chose to do at
that point was not a matter of another’s negligence but one of her own
prerogative.
Id. at 1112-1113.

Just like the concierge in the foregoing case was not shown to have knowledge that the
street route selected by the plaintiff was not well lit when she opted to use it, this Court properly
found that Packer failed to present any evidence that Riverbend knew or should have known
about the lights over the loading dock. Packer failed to show how long the light(s) were off or
broken, or that Jay Dye, when giving his instruction, knew or should have known about the
condition of the lighting. The Court also properly found that Packer failed to provide evidence
establishing why the lights were off or broken, again failing to show any duty held by the
Defendant was breached.
Lastly, and importantly, Packer’s decision to proceed in the dark towards her vehicle
when she could have turned back into the unlocked back door to exit through a different door, or
to proceed without the use of her cell phone for light, or to call someone for assistance, is the
same prerogative choice made by the plaintiff in Manahan, supra. Similarly, Packer is unable to
prove negligence against Riverbend just as in Manahan, and her Motion to Reconsider must be
denied for this added reason.

DEFENDANT RIVERBEND COMMUNICATIONS, LLC’S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO RECONSIDER – Page 8

Page 194

III.
CONCLUSION
Packer's Motion to Reconsider Should be denied. The Motion is improper because
Packer is requesting the Court to simply re-think what it spent time and effort deciding when it
granted summary judgment. The Motion is also improper because Packer is prohibited from
raising an entirely new and unpled legal theory at this stage in the proceedings. Even if the new
legal theory argued by Packer could be raised on reconsideration, it is invalid because § 311 has
never been adopted by an Idaho court and it does not apply to the facts of this case. For each of
these reasons, the Court should summarily reject Packer's request for reconsideration.

DATED this 31st day of January, 2019.
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY, LLP

Isl John A. Bailey, Jr.
JOHN A. BAILEY JR.
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Enterprises, Inc.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE

NICOLE PACKER,
Case No. CV-2017-7024

Plaintiff,
V.

KINGSTON PROPERTIES, L.P.; DK
ENTERPRISES, INC.; RIVERBEND
COMMUNICATIONS LLC;
RIVERBEND COMMUNICATIONS
HOLDING, LLC; and RIVERBEND
COMMUNICATIONS, LLC, dba
RIVERBEND EVENTS,

MEMORANDUM DECISION ON
DEFENDANT RIVERBEND'S
MOTION FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES
AND COSTS

Defendants.

This Memorandum Decision is in response to DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR COSTS
AND FEES.

I.
FINDINGS OF FACT
In December of 2016, Nicole Packer suffered a fall off of a loading dock at an event center
owned by Kingston Properties, after having participated as a vendor in an event hosted by Riverbend. Ms.
Packer filed this action against both Kingston and Riverbend in an attempt to recover for the injuries she
sustained from the fall, claiming that the parties were negligent. In December, 2018, this Court granted
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the Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment, and summarily dismissed Ms. Packer's case against the
Defendants. Shortly thereafter the Defendant Riverbend filed this motion for attorney's fees and costs.

II.
APPLICABLE LAW
1. Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d) and (e)

Under Rule 54(d) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, the prevailing party is entitled to
costs as a matter of right, unless otherwise ordered by the Court. Rule 54(e)(2) grants attorney's
fees pursuant to Idaho Code §12-121, which states that the court may award attorney's fees and
costs only when it finds that the case was brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably
or without foundation.
To determine who is the prevailing party, the court considers the final judgment or the result
of the action, according to Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 54(d)(l)(B). The court may find that a
party prevailed in part and did not prevail in part, and may apportion the costs accordingly.
Under Rule 54(d)(l)(C)(ix), a party is entitled to the reasonable costs of expert witnesses who
testify at depositions and trial, but no more than $2,000 for each expert for all appearances.
2. Idaho Code §12-120(3)

In a civil action to recover damages stemming from a commercial transaction, the prevailing
party shall be allowed a reasonable attorney's fee to be set by the court, to be taxed and collected
as costs. Idaho Code §12-120(3). A commercial transaction is defined in the statute to mean all
transactions except transactions for personal or household purposes.

III.
ANALYSIS

1. Costs Awarded to the Prevailing Party

Defendant asks this Court to award it the costs of litigation, based on Idaho Rule of Civil
Procedure 54(d)(l)(A). Under Rule 54(d)(l)(A), the prevailing party in an action is entitled to
MEMORANDUM DECISION ON DEFENDANT RIVERBEND'S MOTION FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES AND
Page 2 of 5
COSTS

Page 200

costs of litigation as a matter of right. Defendant also requests the costs for experts that were
consulted on the case, but did not testify in either a deposition or at trial. The amount total of all
costs, according to Riverbend's affidavit is $3,016.60. Broken down, the costs are apportioned as
such:
a. Court Filing: $136.00
b. Service of Process: $100.00

c. Plaintiffs Deposition Copy: $910.60
d. Experts: $1,870.00

The Court recognizes Riverbend as the prevailing party in the action, having succeeded in
its Motion for Summary Judgment. As such, Riverbend is entitled as a matter of right for its
costs. However, under Rule 54(d)(l)(C)(ix), expert costs are only awarded when experts testify
at a deposition or trial. The award of costs is still within the discretion of the court as to which
costs are appropriate. Because this action was summarily dismissed before experts could testify
at deposition or be summoned to a trial, there is no right to costs for the expert witnesses. As
such, Riverbend will be awarded the amount of costs minus the amount for experts. The total
amount of costs awarded to Riverbend is $1,146.60.
2. Defendant is not entitled to an award of attorney's fees

Defendant argues for an award of attorney's fees under two separate theories of recovery.
The first, Riverbend asks for attorney's based on Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e)(2), or otherwise
based on Idaho Code §12-121. Rule 54(e)(2) and §12-121 allows a court to award attorney's fees
where it finds that a case was brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably, or without
frustration. Secondly,'Riverbend asks for attorney's fees based on Idaho Code §12-120(3), which
allows a prevailing party to recover attorney's fees where the action was to recover damages
incurred from a commercial transaction.
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The Court does not find that Ms. Packer's action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without
foundation, based on the totality of the facts and claims made. Therefore, Riverbend's request
based on 54(e)(2) and §12-121 is denied. As for §12-120(3), the gravamen of this action was not
a commercial transaction, as Riverbend claims, but rather a straight forward personal injury
claim. The fact that Ms. Packer was at the event because of a commercial transaction between
her and Riverbend does not mean the action arose as a result of the commercial transaction, as is
required by the statute. Therefore, Riverbend's request for attorney's fees based on §12-120(3) is
denied.
IV.
CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court orders as follows:
1- Defendant's Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs is Granted in Part and Denied in
Part. The total amount awarded to Defendant is $1,146.60.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated this

.J2 ./day of January 2019.

Bruce L. Pickett
District Judge
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n day of January 2019 the MEMORANDUM DECISION ON
I hereby certify that on this
DEFENDANT RIVERBEND'S MOTION FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS was
entered and a true and correct copy was served upon the parties listed below by mailing, with the
correct postage thereon, or by causing the same to be delivered to their courthouse boxes.
Counsel for Plaintiffs:
Allen Browning ISB #3007
Allen.browning.law@gmail.com

Counsel for Defendants:
John Bailey ISB #2619
jbailey@hawleytroxell.com

Penny Manning
Clerk of the District Court
Bonneville County, Idaho
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~-6~
Deputy Clerk
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